ACROSS THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

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Introduction

Since the 1980s, a quiet revolution has taken place in the institutional design and ideological foundation of governance in Australia. Pressure for reform has led to significant change in the nature of public administration and the relationship between the public and private sectors. In the "post-modern" state, new administrative practices and institutional forms have emerged to facilitate the implementation of public policy and the delivery of public services. In constitutional terms, such novel instruments of governance challenge traditional conceptions of executive power, the public/private dichotomy and the relationship between citizen and government. Consequently, changes in the delivery of government services have also threatened the efficacy and legitimacy of administrative law. Administrative law is built on the notion that the values of accountability and administrative justice must be applied to exercises of public power. Yet the emergence of new forms of public administration has challenged the legal and conceptual boundaries of administrative law.

This essay examines the prospects for accountability and administrative justice in the post-modern state through an examination of one prominent area of governmental reform, the telecommunications industry. Section I provides an overview of the fundamental values of administrative law and the various ways in which the emergence of the post-modern state has challenged the legal and theoretical foundations of administrative law. This discussion demonstrates that, as new forms of executive activity develop, administrative lawyers must respond in a principled manner and rearticulate the values and legitimacy of administrative law. Ultimately, the province of administrative law must be redefine by a more flexible and sophisticated understanding of public power. Section II examines the legislative and regulatory framework of the telecommunications industry. Applying a substantive definition of "public power", this section asserts that the telecommunications industry remains within the legitimate province of administrative law. Section III evaluates the regulatory regime, from the perspective of the consumer of telecommunications services, against the values and standards of administrative law. This section critically assesses three aspects of the regime which impose mandatory service standards on service providers, and provide mechanisms for consumer protection. These are the customer service guarantee, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme, and the industry code scheme. The rights and remedies generated by these mechanisms are tested against the standards of impartiality, fairness, accessibility, participation and transparency which have informed administrative law. This critical evaluation provides an insight into the prospects for accountability and administrative justice in a competitive, private sector industry engaged in the delivery of important public services.

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1 Principles of administrative law and the challenges of post-modern governance

At a time when the very nature of the business of government - the function and purpose of public administration - is being questioned and redefined in so many areas, it is necessary to identify and to re-assert the core values which should be observed by government administrators . . . Incorruptibility, accountability and fairness may seem like high-sounding words. They are, however, basic values underlying public administration in any truly democratic community. They are in no way inconsistent with the processes of desirable change or the search for greater efficiency.

- Governor-General Sir William Deane.

The values of administrative law

The underlying values of administrative law are fundamental to the interests of the body politic and the nature of citizenship in the modern state. Administrative law mechanisms occupy an important position in the constitutional framework by safeguarding the democratic ideals of accountability and transparent, participatory and rational government. The concept of accountability is central to notions of good governance and ethical public administration. Accountability involves:

• a defined capacity by some person or institution to call [a public] authority into account, in the sense of having to answer for its conduct; a responsible authority or person with a duty to answer and explain such conduct; an agreed language and criteria for judgement; and upward, downward and outward reporting or answering processes.

Traditionally, accountability has been generated through a network of relationships of political and financial accountability between the electorate, the parliament, the executive government, and the public service. However, the basic mechanisms of ministerial and parliamentary responsibility cannot satisfactorily control executive power in a complex bureaucratic state. As Sir Anthony Mason explained, “the blunt fact is that the scale and complexity of administrative decision-making is such that Parliament simply cannot maintain a comprehensive overview of particular decisions.” In providing the means to make public administrators directly accountable to individuals, administrative law has served the democratic needs of the community by ensuring the transparency and accountability of government.

4 G.Doern, Political Accountability and Efficiency, Ottawa Government and Competitiveness School of Policy Studies, Queens University, Discussion Paper Series 93-20, Ottawa, 1993, p 4.
In addition to reinforcing general notions of good governance, administrative law also has the fundamental goal of achieving administrative justice for individuals,\(^8\) in the form of lawful, fair, impartial and rational treatment by the institutions of executive power.\(^9\) Administrative law regulates relations between citizens and the state. The entitlement of individuals to administrative justice and the proper fulfilment of public duties has become an important aspect of citizenship in the modern welfare state.\(^10\) As more individual interests, rights and entitlements under the welfare state are determined through exercises of administrative power, "administrative justice is now as important to the citizen as traditional justice at the hands of the orthodox court system."\(^11\)

**The existing administrative law package**

At the Commonwealth level, the fundamental values of accountability and administrative justice have been interwoven into the body of statutes and rights making up the administrative law package.\(^12\) The most prominent aspect of the package is the entitlement of individuals to challenge executive decisions by means of access to independent review bodies. Through judicial review, the legal boundaries of administrative decision making are judicially enforced. Through merits review, individuals may seek tribunal review of unfavourable decisions on a merits basis. An important corollary to judicial and merits review is the entitlement to written reasons for reviewable administrative decisions.\(^13\) Another arm of the administrative law system is the power of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, under the *Ombudsman Act 1976* (Cth), to investigate government maladministration, either pursuant to public complaints or at the Ombudsman's own discretion. Under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) citizens are given rights of access to documents held by government agencies, thus giving effect to the basic principles of accountability, public participation and transparency in government.\(^14\) The *Privacy Act 1988* (Cth) regulates the use and storage of personal information held by government agencies. Further regulation of the preservation of Commonwealth records and rights of access is provided by the *Archives Act 1983* (Cth).

Through this network of legislative controls and individual rights of redress, the administrative law package has given substance to the core values of accountability and administrative justice. However, in recent years, the capacity of the administrative law package to provide for the comprehensive control of executive action in all its disparate forms has been called into question. The administrative law package is premised on a traditional understanding of governance, involving direct decision making by government


\(^{13}\) *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977* (Cth) s 13; *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) s 28.

officers pursuant to legislation. 15 Such a model no longer accurately reflects the full spectrum of executive activity in the post-modern state. In recent times, the traditional model of government activity has been overtaken by new pressures and new expressions of public power.

The emergence of the post-modern state
Following vigorous debate throughout the 1980s concerning the nature of public administration and the need for microeconomic reform, 16 the core assumptions of public administration have been subject to challenge, and new forms of governance have emerged to complement and displace the old. The challenge to conventional public administration has been driven by faith in the effectiveness of private sector forms of corporate administration and the natural efficiency of competitive market forces. Significantly, faith in the maturity and efficiency of the private sector has been coupled with scepticism about the capacities of public sector institutions. The Hilmer Report of 1993, which criticised the anti-competitive distortions caused by public sector activity, confirmed the continuing prevalence of this ideology. 17 A more pragmatic factor in the ongoing debate surrounding administrative reform has been the desire for greater efficiency in government service delivery and a reduction in public sector spending. 18

Pressure for reform and efficiency has challenged the very legitimacy of public power and its traditional constitutional forms. Critics have questioned the capacity of governments to govern effectively and efficiently while remaining directly involved in the minutiae of service delivery at all levels. 19 Governments have been forced to justify their involvement in certain activities, and to contemplate whether there are "better means of providing the services demanded of governments." 20

The search for more efficient and innovative forms of executive activity has produced several distinct trends in public administration. Within the public service itself, pressure for reform has led to the introduction of imitative private sector practices and management forms, including corporatisation and the adoption of best practice performance indicators. 21 Other areas of executive responsibility have been entrusted to Government Business Enterprises ("GBEs"), distinct legal entities which follow private sector management practices and pursue commercial imperatives, while benefiting from greater operational independence. 22 At the same time, GBEs remain responsible for fulfilling policy objectives, 23 and remain identifiably public bodies, through the retention of government ownership and control. In other areas of government activity, the use of competitive tendering and contracting has put

greater distance between the government and ultimate service delivery. The principal goal of outsourcing has been to harness the efficiency of competitive forces through the use of private sector agents in the delivery of policies formulated by the state.24

At the end of the conceptual spectrum of post-modern governance is privatisation. Privatisation involves the removal of government involvement in the form of ownership or direct control.25 The process of privatisation therefore involves not only the direct sale of government assets into private ownership, but also the effective devolution of executive responsibility for certain activities from the public to the private sector.

**Conceptual challenges to the legal instruments of administrative law**

The new modes of public administration which have emerged from the introduction of various combinations of these practices challenge the conventional constitutional understanding of the state. Traditional relationships of accountability and control have been distorted by the introduction of new sources of public power and new operational imperatives. As governments distance themselves from direct executive responsibilities, and rely on means other than traditional methods of legislation and executive action to achieve their ends,26 the relationship between public policy and ultimate service delivery has become more complex. The introduction into the constitutional framework of new private sector service providers through privatisation and contracting out has blurred conventional lines of responsibility and accountability.27 As a consequence, “the relationship between the government and citizen is becoming increasingly diverse and complex.”28

The capacity of the existing instruments of administrative law to safeguard the principles of accountability and administrative justice has been jeopardised by the restructuring of public administration. The administrative law package, in its current form, does not provide the same coverage in relation to power exercised by contracted service providers, GBEs and privatised industries as has been the case in relation to more traditional forms of executive activity.

In relation to contracting, the actions of contracted service providers do not generally fall within the scope of judicial review.29 In the absence of specific legislation conferring jurisdiction, there is no merits review available of the actions of contracted service providers.30 The actions of contracted service providers are also beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.31 Likewise, the public's right of access to documents under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) does not encompass documents in the possession of contracted service providers.32 This is despite the recommendations of the Administrative

31 *Ombudsman Act 1976* (Cth) ss 3,5.
32 *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) ss 4, 11.
Review Council ("ARC"). The Information Privacy Principles in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) currently have no direct application to private, contracted service providers.

Similar limitations have become apparent in the applicability of the administrative law package to the activities of GBEs. Actions taken by a GBE under a general power to conduct business, or a capacity to enter contracts are beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Courts remain generally reluctant to judicially enforce Community Service Obligations imposed on GBEs. While the extent of merits review of the actions of GBEs depends on the presence of specific legislative provisions, the ARC has noted that few decisions of GBEs are currently susceptible to merits review. GBEs incorporated under the Corporations Law are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. Nor, in general, do they fall within the scope of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) also have no general application to incorporated GBEs.

Political and ideological challenges to the values of administrative law

The principles of accountability and administrative justice have also been subject to challenge on a political and ideological level. Sustained political criticism has called into question the relevance and legitimacy of traditional mechanisms of accountability. Such criticism has in part been an incidental consequence of a shift towards measuring government performance in terms of economy, efficiency and output, rather than procedural standards of administrative fairness. More significant is the perception that there is an irreconcilable conflict between accountability and the imperatives of efficiency and reform. The introduction of private sector models and market disciplines into public administration appears to have highlighted just such a conflict. Advocates of reform in the 1980s emphasised the link between efficiency and the minimisation of public interference. The development of GBEs, for example, reflected the view that efficient and effective administration required removal of the burdens of accountability and administrative justice. Likewise, an important aspect of the privatisation debate has been the argument that the competitive forces of the market operate most efficiently in the absence of public accountability controls.

34 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6.
36 Yamirr and Ors v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1990) 96 ALR 739.
38 Ibid. p 19; Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) s 3(1)(a).
Significantly, the microeconomic reform agenda has coincided and merged with another important body of thought in the debate about public administration, new managerialism. If the general impulse for efficiency has tended to marginalise the values of accountability and administrative justice, the influence of new managerialism has been to make such marginalisation a deliberate focus of reform. New managerialists have characterised administrative law as cumbersome, legalistic, overly expensive and a serious burden on responsive and effective government. To such critics, the existing administrative law regime has come to be associated with bureaucratic inefficiency, irrationality and timid and delayed decision making. As evidenced in recent debates concerning privative clauses, impatience with the costs and distorted resource allocation of administrative law continues to be a motivating political force. In the context of reform, new managerialists have argued for a reduction in accountability controls on the basis that administrative law values are antithetical to effective and fiscally efficient public administration.

A crisis in administrative law?

With such political and ideological forces assembled against the values of administrative law, and with evidence that executive power in the post-modern state is beginning to escape the legal boundaries of the administrative law package, it is unsurprising to find that many have perceived a crisis in administrative law. The shift towards a market orientated state and a shrinking public sector has provoked profound uneasiness among public lawyers about the future standing of administrative law. Some have predicted a diminishing role. Others have taken up a more vigorous defence, warning that "administrative lawyers armed only with public law values have to fight it out in the ideological trenches with those with competing views and values."

In relation to privatisation in particular, many administrative lawyers have recognised that the current debate will define the future role and legitimacy of administrative law. Privatisation brings with it the prospect of areas of traditionally public activity being relocated permanently beyond the province of administrative law. As Harlow warns, "unless [public lawyers] are content with the undignified role of doorkeeper to the empty stable after the private sector has long bolted, it is here that we must learn to fight for our principles."

Clearly, administrative law must respond to change and adapt to new forms of public administration if it is to continue effectively to safeguard the principles it has been developed to protect. The province of administrative law must be reconceived and extended to incorporate novel institutional forces and administrative arrangements.

However, for administrative law to make the necessary legal innovations to respond to the demands of accountability and administrative justice in the post-modern state, there are significant ideological and theoretical hurdles which must be overcome. These include the dichotomy between public and private which has defined administrative law, the inadequacy of traditional justifications of administrative law and the difficulty of identifying exercises of public power in the post-modern state. Ultimately, as the traditional indicia of executive power lose their relevance, a broader theoretical understanding of the nature of public power and the legitimacy of administrative law must be developed. The remainder of this section will be devoted to the consideration of these challenges.

**Bridging the public/private divide**

Traditionally, legal thought has been based on the notional existence of distinct spheres of public and private activity, governed by discrete systems of public and private law. The public sector has been distinguished by the unique characteristics of the state and its relation to individuals. The private sector has been quarantined from the strict requirements of public law, and governed primarily by market principles, self-interested relations between individuals, and the limited intervention of the private law. In the tradition of Western liberal thought, the notion of the private sector carries with it significant psychological, ideological and legal implications. Legal and governmental incursions on the private sector have been strictly limited, and vigorously resisted. The categorisation of activities and institutions as either public or private conditions expectations of the proper function of the law, the proper scope of individual liberties and the legitimacy of state action. In terms of accountability and administrative justice, the designation of certain exercises of power as public or private is fundamental to the legitimation of administrative law controls.

Yet the post-modern state defies such clear-cut dichotomies. The integration of private sector agents into the constitutional networks of the state through contracting and the privatisation of public functions has blurred the distinction between the public and private sectors. New hybrid forms of governance in privatisation and outsourcing operate to manipulate private, market power to public ends without the direct involvement of identifiably "public" bodies. Private sector bodies are becoming increasingly significant sources of institutional power fundamental to the execution of public policy. At the same time, notionally public bodies are adopting private sector forms and imperatives, and being distanced from governmental interference.

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57 Ibid. p 185.
In the face of such administrative innovation, it is evident that the ability of administrative law to respond to executive power in the post-modern state will depend in large part on the extent to which administrative law can overcome the theoretical limitations imposed by the public/private dichotomy. As governments increasingly transgress the boundary between public and private, so too administrative lawyers must develop the conceptual confidence to follow the extending state across the public/private divide. The public/private divide currently underpinning administrative law has produced an inhibited conceptual framework for the recognition and control of public power. The development of administrative law will continue to be distorted while the instinct remains to divide institutions into starkly defined conceptual categories of public and private. Therefore, if a sophisticated approach is to be developed for the recognition of public power within what is notionally the private sector, administrative lawyers must develop a more flexible approach to the very concepts of public and private.

Extending the legitimate province of administrative law

The need for a more sophisticated understanding of the public/private divide and public power coincides with another challenge in extending the province of administrative law, the need for a clear justification of the legitimacy of administrative law.

The very notion that administrative law is in crisis presupposes that the extended forms of public administration which have been created in the post-modern state fall within the legitimate scope of administrative law and should be subject to the standards of accountability and administrative justice. On closer analysis, however, justifying this normative position and identifying the essential factors that attract the need for administrative law remains an elusive proposition. Yet if the province of administrative law is to be extended, a clear and principled justification of such an extension is politically and legally essential. This is particularly the case if the province of administrative law is to extend beyond the public/private divide, to encompass the actions of the "private" sector.

Traditionally, administrative law has been characterised as protecting the individual against the incursions and actions of the state. In this sense the province of administrative law has been defined by reference to the specific institutional manifestations of the state, as identified by formal indicia such as government control and ownership. The state has been understood as the exclusive embodiment of the public sphere, and the peculiar nature of the state as an entity has justified the need for administrative law controls to protect such standards as the rule of law and the separation of powers. In the context of the post-modern state, the perpetuation of such an approach would severely restrict the scope of administrative law.

More recently, in an attempt to bring contracted service providers within the province of administrative law, an alternative justification has been proposed in the form of financial accountability. The Commonwealth Ombudsman has recommended, to the ARC's approval, that her jurisdiction be extended to allow the investigation of service provision...
wherever public money is being used to provide services to the public, irrespective of the status of the entity delivering the services and the source of their power. Implicit in this approach is the realisation that the identity of the service provider can no longer be relied upon as an appropriate indicator of the proper boundaries of administrative law. Yet at the same time the "follow the dollars" approach perpetuates the need for a close nexus with the government in the form of direct funding arrangements. As such this approach does not contribute significantly to the flexibility of administrative law. Particularly in the context of privatisation, the "follow the dollars" approach does not provide a theoretical framework to distinguish exercises of power by privatised entities which no longer rely on public financing, but which may significantly affect public interests, involve the delivery of defined public policy objectives or dramatically impact upon the interests of citizens.

From the perspective of the citizen as the end-user of public services, the essence of accountability and administrative justice is not the distinctive character of the state, but the proper fulfilment of public duties, the delivery of services according to certain standards and the entitlement to fair and equitable treatment, protected by adequate avenues of redress. Individual end-users do not attach significance to the nature of service delivery, the formal characteristics of the service deliverer, or the basis of financing arrangements.

From this perspective, "an effective system of accountability must apply to the exercise of official power and to the discharge of public functions either by or on behalf of government." Even where private sector bodies are involved, the need for accountability mechanisms persists where "the private enterprise delivers what is regarded as an essential service or a service with a distinctive public interest component." The theoretical difficulty for administrative law lies in recognising such essential services and public interest components, and developing the conceptual framework for designating certain exercises of power as "public" and amenable to the values of accountability and administrative justice, irrespective of the particular characteristics of the institution responsible for delivering the service.

As the nexus between administrative law and the formal indicia of the state diminishes in importance, the legitimacy of administrative law must be tied to a more substantive analysis of power. Formalistic criteria such as degrees of public ownership must give way to a more principled approach to the identification of public power. The ability of administrative lawyers to grapple with these theoretical challenges, and adequately influence policy development and institutional design, may well define the future province of administrative law.

Identifying public power

For radical theoreticians, the search for a more expansive definition of public power represents an opportunity to extend the province of administrative law to include large private corporations purely on the basis of the scale of their economic power. In this sense the debate concerning the province of administrative law has intersected with a broader ongoing debate concerning corporate accountability. Advocates of corporate social responsibility have argued for an extension of administrative law values to the private sector to control exercises of power by powerful super-corporations where at present there is little scrutiny of the fairness of such exercises of power. Such an extension is justified on the basis that the collective interests of the public and the individual interests of consumers may be severely and adversely affected by exercises of power by such institutions. Central to this debate has been the idea that, despite the assumptions of the traditional public/private dichotomy, private power may become "public" simply by virtue of its degree of concentration in particular institutions.

Particularly in the current political climate, however, it would seem that the legitimacy of administrative law must be tied to more specific criteria than the mere concentration of power. Therefore, while the degree of impact that exercises of power have on individual and communal interests may be acknowledged as one of the indicia of public power, it must be recognised as being merely one indication to be considered in combination with other factors.

Many advocates of an expanded province for administrative law have sought to find distinctive public elements inherent in the nature of particular services, particularly in the context of the privatisation of utilities such as electricity, water and telecommunications. However, identifying particular services as inherently "essential", "public" or "governmental" has proved a difficult proposition. To describe a particular area of service delivery as intrinsically public merely because of the traditional involvement of government, as some have done, is intellectually troubling and politically unjustifiable. Furthermore, such attempts to identify public power through a traditional association with the institutions of the state merely perpetuate formalism in the analysis of public power.

More substantive attempts to identify the "public" nature of utility services have been attempted. Taggart points to the strategic, national importance of utility infrastructure and the fundamental importance of utility services to the individual as being factors indicating the

intrinsically public nature of utility services. Allars has likewise singled out certain services involving "collectively consumed resources" as involving the exercise of public power. In the context of collectively consumed resources such as water, electricity, and telecommunications services, the processes involved in the organisation, management and delivery of such services are inherently public functions, which must be subject to the exceptional legal treatment of regulation through administrative law.

Given the difficulty of designating certain functions and services as inherently public, it is preferable to seek more authoritative indications in the form of parliamentary intent. Certain activities, bodies and services may be effectively characterised as public as a matter of legislative policy. In the area of privatised utilities, the distinctively public nature of the "processes of collective consumption" is indicated most clearly by the legislative designation of mandatory standards of service. Processes of collective consumption have been defined as those "whose organisation and management cannot be other than collective given the nature and size of the problem." This is to be contrasted with commodity forms of commercially organised consumption which can be effectively organised by the disciplines of the market. Rather than speculating as to the need for processes of collective consumption, the establishment of legislative, non-market criteria for the delivery of utility services provides unequivocal recognition of the need for such public processes. In this sense, public services may be defined as those which cannot be provided, to the satisfaction of certain public policy objectives, by the autonomous determination of market forces and the influence of consumer sovereignty. Rather the existence and content of the service must be defined and mandated through the authoritative public policy making processes of the Parliament, as influenced through political and electoral channels.

The legislative imposition of mandatory standards and public service obligations on executive agents is therefore a significant indicator of public power. In the case of GBEs, the requirement that Community Service Obligations be satisfied represents a clear indication of the public nature of the power exercised by these institutions. Such indicia of public power are also applicable in relation to services involving competitive, private agents. As will be explored in section II, the continuing public nature of telecommunications services has been signalled through a number of legislative measures imposing mandatory service standards and Universal Service Obligations (USOs) on the carriers and service providers involved in the industry.

New manifestations for an expanding administrative law
The fundamental basis of administrative law is that exercises of public power should be subject to the principles of accountability and administrative justice. As expressions of public power change, and the conceptual tools for recognising public power adapt in response, the issue becomes a strategic and legal question of how the values of accountability and administrative justice may be applied to such exercises of power. One option involves the
extension of the existing administrative law package to incorporate new manifestations of public power. Increasingly, however, mechanisms other than the traditional administrative law package are being relied upon to give effect to the principles of accountability and administrative justice.

Particularly in the area of privatisation, the values of administrative law are increasingly protected through entirely novel institutional arrangements and legal instruments. The trend in regulatory policy has been towards self-regulation, the development of industry-specific complaints mechanisms, and reliance on industry specific regulatory institutions. In an area such as telecommunications where the delivery of public services has been entrusted to a competitive industry involving private sector agents, the continuing protection of the values of accountability and administrative justice depends upon industry-specific regulation, self-regulatory codes, and industry-specific institutions. It is therefore essential that such arrangements be closely scrutinised by public lawyers and tested against the core standards and principles of administrative law. The pressing imperative for administrative lawyers must be to ensure that regulation in the post-modern state, in areas involving the exercise of public power, reflects the fundamental values of legality, openness, accessibility, fairness, participation, impartiality and rationality.

2 Public services in the private sector: telecommunications reform and the new regime

History of telecommunications in Australia

In the period from 1975 to July 1997, a series of legislative and institutional reforms transformed the telecommunications industry from its original monopoly structure, through a stage of managed competitive duopoly, to the current regime of open competition. Prior to 1975, all domestic telecommunications services were provided by the Postmaster-General's Department. The introduction of the Telecommunications Act 1975 (Cth) removed telecommunications services from the ambit of the Postmaster-General's Department, and created the statutory agency of Telecom Australia for the specific purpose of delivering domestic telecommunications services.

Following sustained pressure for microeconomic reform, and criticism of the government monopoly model, the Evans Statement of May 1988 signalled the comprehensive restructuring of the telecommunications industry. The statement highlighted the need for flexible and innovative service provision, and linked the need for efficiency in the information economy to the international competitiveness of Australian industry. At the same time the statement reaffirmed the important social objectives of providing universally available and affordable telecommunications services to the Australian community.

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95 Ibid. p 8.
96 Ibid. p 190.
The Evans Statement heralded the introduction of a package of legislative and institutional reforms designed to marry these economic and social imperatives. The *Telecommunications Act 1989* (Cth) introduced limited competition in the provision of value added services, private networks, customer equipment and cable installation. Certain "reserved services", most importantly the provision of the basic telephone service, remained within the monopoly of Telecom. Under the *Australian Telecommunications Corporation Act 1989* (Cth), the Australian Telecommunications Corporation (as Telecom Australia was renamed) operated as a commercial entity, subject to defined Community Service Obligations to provide universal access to standard telephone services, payphones and emergency services.97

More significant changes followed in 1991, as the telecommunications industry progressed to a transitional phase of competitive duopoly. Under the *Telecommunications Act 1991* (Cth), the Australian Telecommunications Corporation's monopoly and the concept of "reserved services" were abolished, and allowance made for the issue of two general carrier licences for the provision of standard telephone services. The competitive duopoly in the provision of standard telephone services was set for a fixed period, to end on 1 July 1997.

Prior to the introduction of open competition on 1 July 1997, a further factor in the restructuring of the telecommunications sector was the partial privatisation of the government-owned carrier, Telstra Corporation (as it was renamed in April 1993). Following the *Telstra (Dilution of Public Ownership) Act 1996*, one third of the shares in Telstra were sold into private ownership, and government control of Telstra was limited to the position of the government as majority shareholder in the corporation.98 Despite vigorous public debate concerning the privatisation of Telstra, however, the most significant reform has not been in the status of Telstra but in the reconception of the entire industry through the introduction of competition and a new regulatory regime.99

**The post July 1997 regulatory regime**

The transition to open competition on 1 July 1997 was achieved through a package of new Acts, the most significant being the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) ("the Act"). The fundamental features of the post July 1997 regime are the removal of restrictions to entry to the telecommunications services market, the creation of a new universal service regime, and the establishment of a framework for industry self-regulation.

The Act removes the barriers to competition in the provision of telecommunications services, with allowance made for an unlimited number of "carriers" and "carriage service providers". A carrier is an owner of "network units" (telecommunications facilities including line links, satellite based facilities and mobile base stations) used to supply carriage services (services for carrying communications) to the public.100 Under the Act, any constitutional corporation may apply for a carrier licence to operate network units.101 A carriage service provider is a person who supplies carriage services (for example telephony or Internet services) to the public using network units owned by a carrier.102 Aside from compliance with service provider rules, outlined below, there is no restriction on eligibility to operate as a carriage service provider.

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97 *Australian Telecommunications Corporation Act 1989* (Cth) s 7.
100 Department of Communications and the Arts, *Factsheet: Carriers and Service Providers*, 1997.
101 *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) s 52.
102 *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) s 87.
Public interest obligations in the current regime
While providing the conditions for open competition, the Act also reaffirms the continuing public interest in universality and equity in the provision of telecommunications services. The Act creates various mechanisms to ensure that telecommunications services are delivered according to public policy standards, rather than the purely autonomous operation of market forces.

The universal service regime imposed by Part 7 of the Act is the most prominent of these mechanisms. Section 149 establishes the basic universal service obligation, which is to ensure that standard telephone services, payphones, and certain other prescribed carriage services are reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on business. The fulfilment of the universal service obligation is no longer linked directly to Telstra Corporation. Part 7 Division 3 of the Act provides for a competitive tendering process in the selection of universal service providers, with allowance made for the Minister to declare any specified carrier to be the national universal service provider, or the regional universal service provider for a discrete service area. Currently, Telstra is the declared national universal service provider. The declared universal service provider for an area must take all reasonable steps to fulfil the universal service obligation, so far as the obligation relates to that area, and must provide to the Minister a universal service plan outlining the provider's plans for progressively fulfilling the universal service obligation within their area of responsibility. The cost of the universal service regime is borne directly by the carriers, through a universal service levy which is determined according to each carrier's proportionate share of the total eligible revenue in the relevant financial year.

The Act imposes a number of other mechanisms for the protection of consumers and the maintenance of mandatory service standards. Carriage service providers must comply with a series of service provider rules, which are enforced by the newly formed industry regulator, the Australian Communications Authority (the “ACA”). These include compliance with the Act, the provision of operator and directory assistance services, and the provision of itemised billing to customers to whom a standard telephone service is supplied. Part 8 of the Act requires that consumers continue to be given the option of untimed local calls in relation to the standard telephone service.

Three sections of the Act have particular significance to the protection of end-users and the safeguarding of service standards. Part 9 of the Act provides for the development of a customer service guarantee, in the form of mandatory performance standards which may be enforced by consumers against carriage service providers. Part 10 of the Act requires all carriers and carriage service providers involved in the supply of standard telephone services to join the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme. Part 6 of the Act provides for the development of codes by the telecommunications industry, in a self-regulatory and co-regulatory setting.

103 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 150(1).
104 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 150(2).
106 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 151(5).
107 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 157, 158.
110 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 68, 69, 102, 105.
111 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 246.
Evaluating the post July 1997 regime: continuing public power in the delivery of telecommunications services

The most conspicuous achievement of the post July 1997 regime is the development of a fully competitive environment in which telecommunications services are shaped primarily by market forces rather than bureaucratic controls. As such, the move to open competition represents the culmination of the reform agenda of the 1980s and reflects the prevailing faith in the maturity and capacity of the private sector. The underlying policy objective of the Act is that the competitive behaviour of a multitude of service providers will increase the diversity and quality of services, encourage technological innovation, promote international competitiveness and efficiency, and reduce costs in the information economy.112

However, despite the shift towards reliance on market mechanisms and private sector service providers, the current regulatory regime is premised on the notion that there is a continuing need for public control to ensure the delivery of telecommunications services on an equitable basis and according to legislatively defined standards. The fundamental principle behind the universal service regime, and the other measures in the Act which operate to maintain publicly defined standards, is that competitive market forces cannot be relied upon as an adequate mechanism for the satisfaction of certain public policy objectives. These policy objectives include the delivery of basic communications services to the national community on an equitable, non-discriminatory basis irrespective of cost and location, the maintenance of strict standards of service quality, and the delivery of services of public importance, such as directory, operator and emergency services.

Such policy objectives reflect the underlying view that there is a distinctive character to telecommunications services. Telecommunications services have been identified as a "basic human need."113 The universal availability of telecommunications services has been recognised as an essential precondition to national cohesion, fundamental to the effective participation of citizens in the social, cultural and economic life of the community.114 The "tyranny of distance" in Australia has made the delivery of universal and affordable communications services a particularly sensitive area of governmental responsibility.115 Particularly for groups on the social and geographical fringes, such as the disabled and inhabitants of rural communities and remote aboriginal communities, rights of access to affordable telecommunications services of a satisfactory standard are intimately connected to notions of citizenship and national community.116

What is most significant in terms of identifying public power in an administrative law sense is not the inherent or traditionally public nature of telecommunications, but the fact that the current regulatory regime provides clear legislative recognition of the continuing public nature of telecommunications services. While responsibility for the delivery of telecommunications service has shifted outside the public sector and into the arena of the market and private agents, service providers in the telecommunications industry have assumed the responsibility for discharging significant public obligations. As in other areas of administrative reform, the regime defies traditional notions of public administration. The

execution of public policy in telecommunications does not rest upon the activities of a government owned or controlled body, nor upon the expenditure of "public" money. Yet there remains a strong residual element of public power being exercised. As legislative standards of conduct and service are superimposed on the activities of the competitive telecommunications market, the private agents of the industry are effectively used as instruments for the fulfilment of public policy. As such, and according to the definition of public power proposed in section I, the telecommunications industry remains within the legitimate province of administrative law.

3 Consumer safeguards in the new regime: a critical evaluation

The previous section identified the residual presence of public power in the new telecommunications regime. The principles underlying administrative law suggest that, from a normative and theoretical perspective, the standards of accountability and administrative justice must therefore be applied to the actions of telecommunications service providers. This section critically evaluates three novel legal instruments which have been introduced in the telecommunications regime to give effect to public law principles. It must be noted that a core level of legal protection in the new regime will be provided by private law mechanisms, including tort, contract and consumer protection legislation. However, the fundamental principle behind administrative law is that, over and above private law, exercises of public power must be subject to the specific, exceptional disciplines of public law.

This section concentrates on such public law disciplines through an assessment of three mechanisms in the Act which operate to control the actions of service providers. These are the customer service guarantee, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme, and the industry code scheme. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in giving substance to the values of accountability and administrative justice, and ensuring the fair and equitable treatment of consumers, depends on the precise nature of the legal rights which they establish and the institutions which they depend upon.

Customer service guarantee

Part 9 of the Act establishes a framework for the development of a customer service guarantee, in the form of a set of minimum customer service standards relating to the supply of standard telephone services.117 The customer service guarantee creates a legally enforceable entitlement to compensation for customers in the event of the contravention of a performance standard by a carriage service provider.118 The ACA, under ministerial direction, is responsible for the development of performance standards and scales of compensation for the customer service guarantee.119 The current standard for the customer service guarantee, the *Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Standard 1997* (the "CSG Standard") establishes a set of performance standards in the form of maximum time periods for the connection of standard telephone services120 and the repair of faults and service difficulties.121 The CSG Standard also requires carriage service providers to attend appointments with customers.122 Carriage service providers are liable for damages equal to the monthly rental for the standard telephone service for each working day of delay

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118 *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth) s 235.
beyond the guaranteed maximum periods set in the CSG Standard for connection and fault rectification, and for each missed appointment.\textsuperscript{123}

The liability of service providers to pay the stipulated damages for contravention of a performance standard may be enforced by customers through legal action in a court of competent jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{124} Section 237 confers jurisdiction on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman ("TIO") to investigate alleged contraventions of a performance standard, and, following determination of the matter, issue an evidentiary certificate which will operate in subsequent legal proceedings as prima facie evidence of the contravention of a performance standard and the entitlement of the customer to compensation.\textsuperscript{125} In an attempt to encourage voluntary compliance as the principal means of enforcement,\textsuperscript{126} and in keeping with the general philosophy of the TIO, customers with a complaint about a breach of the customer service guarantee are required to seek resolution of the matter with their carriage service provider before the TIO will investigate.\textsuperscript{127} The possible ramifications of this precondition will be considered below.

\textbf{Critical assessment of the customer service guarantee}

It is important to measure the scheme against the fundamental values of administrative law, as identified in section I. The customer service guarantee introduces a blend of elements from public law and private law into the area of telecommunications services. The scheme relies on the public law framework of conferring on the consumer the legal capacity to enforce statutory standards without the need for a contractual nexus.\textsuperscript{128} The creation of individual rights to enforce performance standards against private sector agents and encourage the just treatment of individuals represents a significant development from an administrative law viewpoint. This development is particularly significant when considered in light of the problems relating to privity of contract which have been encountered in the area of public sector contracting.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, the customer service guarantee may provide an innovative mechanism for end-user enforcement of universal service obligations. The current policy of the ACA is to incorporate aspects of the universal service plan relating to connection periods into the customer service guarantee.\textsuperscript{130} Given the traditional limitation which has arisen from the fact that universal service obligations do not create enforceable legal rights for end-users of services,\textsuperscript{131} this represents a notable advance.

At the same time, the scheme relies on private law avenues of enforcement through civil litigation in ordinary courts, and allows for redress only in monetary terms. The reliance on formal litigation represents a significant limitation, given that accessibility is one of the essential precepts of an effective system of administrative justice. Critics have suggested that the scheme should be extended to allow for enforcement in an informal, non-judicial

\textsuperscript{123} In the case of Telstra, for example, this amounts to $11.65 for residential customers, and $20.00 for business customers; Australian Communications Authority, \textit{Factsheet: Customer Service Guarantee}, June 1998.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 235(4)}.


\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{129} I.Harden, \textit{The Contracting State}, Bristol, 1992, p 60.

\textsuperscript{130} Australian Communications Authority, \textit{Connections: The Australian Communications Authority Bulletin}, Issue 3 (June 1998), p 11.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Yamirr v Australian Telecommunications Corporation} (1990) ALR 739.
body, such as an independent tribunal.\footnote{H.Schoombee, “Privatisation and Contracting Out - Where are we Going?”, in J.McMillan (ed) Administrative Law Under a Coalition Government, National Administrative Law Forum 1997, Canberra, 1997, p 144.} While the scheme does incorporate the ostensibly public law institution of the TIO into the equation, thus offering a degree of informality and accessibility, the TIO does not have direct enforcement powers. Criticism has also been levelled at the limited nature of monetary compensation. The lack of more flexible remedies, such as the direct ordering of corrective action, has the consequence that the scheme does not address the substantive effects of contravention of performance standards on particular individuals.\footnote{Ibid.} Nevertheless, the enforceable right to monetary compensation does provide a significant sanction to encourage the equitable treatment of customers,\footnote{N.Seddon, “Commentary: Privatisation and Contracting Out - Where are we Going?”, in J.McMillan (ed) Administrative Law Under a Coalition Government, National Administrative Law Forum 1997, Canberra, 1997, p 147.} and creates a hard-edged form of accountability in a language which is easily understood by private sector bodies.\footnote{I.Harden, The Contracting State, Bristol, 1992, p 60.}

There is one outstanding area of potential weakness in the customer service guarantee scheme. Pursuant to the Act, the ACA has made provision for the rights created under the customer service guarantee to be waived by customers in their individual dealings with service providers, by specific agreement in writing.\footnote{Telecommunications (Waiver of Customer Service Guarantee) Instrument 1997; Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 238.} According to the ACA, “this has been made possible to ensure that customers are not restricted in the choices they make”, by facilitating more flexible commercial negotiations by service providers.\footnote{Australian Communications Authority, Customer Information: Frequently Asked Questions: Customer Service Guarantee for Phone Users, p 3.}

If there is an underlying tension throughout the Act between free market competition and social equity principles, the allowance for the waiving of rights represents one point at which this tension is clearly apparent on the face of the Act. In this instance, the interests of the market have prevailed, and the principles of administrative law have been undermined. In the interests of flexibility, the Act leaves open the possibility of commercial exploitation and the widespread evasion of the rights and performance standards mandated under the Act. The very concept of bargaining away statutory entitlements to fair treatment and mandatory standards is entirely antithetical to the principles of administrative law, and the role of administrative law in controlling public power.

**The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman Scheme**

Under Part 10 of the Act, each carrier and each carriage service provider involved in the supply of mobile telephone services, Internet access, or standard telephone services to small business or residential customers must enter into, and comply with,\footnote{Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 245, 246.} the industry based Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman scheme.\footnote{Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 245, 246.}

The constitution of the scheme confers on the TIO extensive jurisdiction in relation to supervision of the telecommunications industry, and the investigation and determination of consumer complaints relating to the supply of carriage services. The TIO’s jurisdiction encompasses complaints about basic telephone, data and mobile services, operator and directory assistance, fault reporting and rectification, privacy matters, land access, billing and...
payphones.\textsuperscript{140} As noted above, the TIO also has a role in the determination of complaints relating to the customer service guarantee. The TIO has also become the principal institution for the enforcement of industry codes and standards, as discussed below.

The remedial powers available to the TIO in making determinations are extensive. Following an investigation, the TIO may direct a service provider to pay compensation, remove, amend or impose a charge, provide or withdraw a service, supply or remove a good, undertake corrective work, correct its records, include or remove an entry in a directory. Orders involving a cost of up to $10,000 are binding on members, with allowance for non-binding recommendations of up to $50,000 and “findings of fact” for matters involving a remedial value of over $50,000.\textsuperscript{141}

In addition to exercising a reactive review function, the TIO is also a proactive institution, with a responsibility to monitor the behaviour of service providers, inform the public about important telecommunications issues, and provide public data on complaints and their outcomes.\textsuperscript{142} Along with the ACA, the TIO has become an important source of public information, ensuring a significant level of transparency and accountability in the industry. As such the TIO is in a position to influence the development of policy and general administrative standards in the same manner as the government Ombudsman.\textsuperscript{143}

**Critical assessment of the TIO scheme**

With the TIO exercising such important functions in the current regime, it is necessary to examine the structure and operations of the TIO scheme against the ideals of administrative law. The TIO serves an important role in providing a free, informal, speedy and notionally independent source of review of the actions of service providers.\textsuperscript{144} The TIO is indeed the sole source of independent review for telecommunications consumers, aside from private law litigation. The breadth of the TIO’s jurisdiction and the extent of the TIO’s remedial powers make the scheme a valuable source of protection for public law values. In particular, the fact that the TIO may make binding decisions is a significant advance on the powers of the government Ombudsman.\textsuperscript{145}

However, as with other industry based ombudsman schemes,\textsuperscript{146} the critical issue with the TIO is its independence. Independence and impartiality have long been recognised as being fundamental to the effectiveness and legitimacy of systems of administrative review.\textsuperscript{147} The credibility and accessibility of the TIO scheme depends to a large extent on the actual and perceived impartiality of the TIO. The concept of independence in this sense encompasses

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid. p 15.
\item \textsuperscript{147} M.Taggart, “Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public Law” (1991) 2 *Public Law Review* 77, p 89.
\end{itemize}
both operational independence, in day to day activities, and independence in long term agenda setting, membership and control.\textsuperscript{148}

The TIO scheme operates as a private company limited by guarantee, with a membership of carriers and carriage service providers. The scheme is governed by a Board of Directors, which is responsible for funding issues and the appointment of the TIO, and a Council, which has responsibility for general policy issues and the overall operation of the scheme. The Board is appointed by the members of the scheme. The Council has seven members; including three appointed by members, three selected from consumer and community groups, and an independent Chairperson.\textsuperscript{149} While the institutional structure does have the advantage of encouraging industry self-regulation, and ensuring expert industry-based participation,\textsuperscript{150} it fails to provide the appropriate guarantees of impartiality and independence. The fact that the Board, which appoints the TIO, is composed entirely of industry members directly undermines the credibility and integrity of the office. The mixed composition of the Council is intended to operate as a guarantee of the scheme's independence from industry.\textsuperscript{151} Such a view, however, places excessive faith in the ability of the independent Chairperson and the non-governmental public interest representatives to counterbalance the interests of the member appointees. Given the capacity of the Council to shape the policies, practices and philosophy of the scheme,\textsuperscript{152} the direct involvement of industry representatives further compromises the actual and perceived impartiality of the TIO. Aside from the managerial structure of the scheme, the independence of the TIO is further undermined by its complete reliance on industry funding. The scheme is funded by its members, with the costs of the scheme divided according to the number and proportion of complaints received against individual members.\textsuperscript{153}

The effectiveness of the TIO as an administrative review body is also compromised by the fact that the scheme requires consumers to attempt to resolve any complaints with their provider before seeking the intervention of the TIO. The jurisdiction of the TIO is only triggered after the relevant service provider is given a "reasonable opportunity to address the complaint."\textsuperscript{154} This legal requirement is also reflected in the philosophy of the scheme, which is that "the TIO is an office of last resort - to be involved once all other avenues for dispute resolution have been explored."\textsuperscript{155} While the TIO is accessible in terms of its informality and affordability,\textsuperscript{156} the precondition that complainants first approach their service provider may inhibit consumers from exercising their rights of review. Consequently, the accessibility of the TIO as an independent source of review and protection is seriously undermined.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{152} For similar criticisms in relation to the Banking Industry Ombudsman, see D.Everett, "Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman" (1990) 5(10) Banking Law Bulletin, 213, p 216.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid. p 4.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid. p i.
\textsuperscript{157} A.Tang, "Contracting Out in Community Services", in L.Pearson (ed), \textit{Administrative Law: Setting the Pace or Being Left Behind?}, Australian Institute of Administrative Law, Sydney, 1997, p 342.
Even where the TIO accepts jurisdiction over a complaint, the emphasis remains on informal, internal resolution of the complaint by the service provider and a minimal role for the TIO. Initial complaints progress through three distinct stages; consultation, formal complaint and dispute. At each stage, the TIO attempts to encourage voluntary resolution of the matter, through conciliation, mediation and negotiation. It is only at the dispute stage that the TIO operates as a formal review body, exercising powers to require documentation from the service provider in the process of determining the dispute.158 It is clear from the procedures and philosophy of the scheme that the TIO does not provide accessible, independent review of the merits of a complaint. The scheme does not provide for the open, transparent, public determination of disputes in a manner equivalent to traditional tribunals.159 Rather the TIO operates primarily as a facilitator for the private resolution of disputes, with the determinative powers of the TIO reserved for extreme cases.

Self-regulation in the post July 1997 regime

An essential pillar of the new regime is reliance on self-regulation by the telecommunications industry. The underlying regulatory policy of the Act is to promote "the greatest practicable use of industry self-regulation."160 To facilitate self-regulation, Part 6 of the Act establishes a framework for the initiation, development and implementation of codes of practice by the industry and its representative bodies.

The introduction of self-regulation in telecommunications is in keeping with a widespread trend in contemporary regulatory theory. 161 The involvement of regulated bodies in the development and implementation of regulatory rules is intended to produce more flexible and tailored rule making, greater responsiveness from the regulated parties,162 and generally more effective regulation than traditional command and control models of regulation.163 Most importantly, in terms of the microeconomic reform agenda outlined in section I, the use of self-regulation in the telecommunications industry is intended to produce efficient regulation, by minimising the direct regulatory responsibilities of government164 and the compliance burdens imposed on the industry.165

The incorporation of self-regulation in the Act is intended to synthesise the efficient self-ordering of the market with the maintenance of consumer safeguards, public policy objectives and performance standards. Self-regulation is thus part of the wider reform in public administration. As such, it represents another manifestation of change with which administrative law principles must be reconciled. A closer examination of the legislative and institutional framework for industry self-regulation in telecommunications, however, reveals that industry codes are not a reliable, standardised source of protection for the universal values of accountability and administrative justice.

165 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 4.
The legislative framework for industry self-regulation

Under Part 6 of the Act, bodies which represent the telecommunications industry may develop industry codes to govern the activities of industry participants. The peak industry body, the Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF), has assumed the responsibility for code development.\(^\text{166}\) ACIF is a private, industry funded association, with membership encompassing carriers, service providers, equipment vendors, user organisations and consumer groups.\(^\text{167}\)

The Act allows for codes to be developed in relation to any matter related to the delivery of telecommunications goods and services.\(^\text{168}\) ACIF's Consumer Codes Reference Panel is currently engaged in the development of codes relating to privacy, marketing of telecommunications services, credit management, charging and billing, customer and network fault management, and consumer complaint handling.\(^\text{169}\)

The Act provides that industry codes may be registered with the ACA, in which case they will be made available on a public register.\(^\text{170}\) Compliance with industry codes is voluntary, although the ACA has a reserve power to direct a particular industry member to comply with a registered code.\(^\text{171}\) ACIF anticipates that industry participants will agree to be bound by code provisions, including enforcement sanctions, by becoming signatories to the codes, and to general codes governing code administration and compliance.\(^\text{172}\)

Where the ACA considers that a code is required in relation to a particular matter, it has the power to request the industry to develop such a code.\(^\text{173}\) Where the industry fails to develop a satisfactory code the ACA has the reserve power to itself develop an industry standard.\(^\text{174}\) Compliance with industry standards is mandatory.\(^\text{175}\) Notwithstanding this reserve power, the clear intention of the Act, the ACA and ACIF is that the role of the ACA in the code regime will remain minimal. According to its own corporate plan, the role of the ACA is one of partnering industry in fostering "the conditions that will bring about an efficient, competitive and increasingly self-regulated communications sector."\(^\text{176}\) The powers of the ACA are seen merely as "default or safety net powers, within the objectives set by Parliament, of fostering industry competition and ensuring adequate consumer safeguards."\(^\text{177}\)

The Act thus entrusts to the regime of self-regulation matters which are fundamental to the rights of consumers. The entitlement of the individual consumer to fair treatment, public protection and administrative justice depends to a large extent on the nature of industry codes. The development, content and ultimate enforceability of codes will therefore have a


\(^{168}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 109, 112.


\(^{170}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 117, 136.

\(^{171}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 121, 122.


\(^{173}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 118.

\(^{174}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 123, 125.

\(^{175}\) Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 128.

\(^{176}\) Australian Communications Authority, Corporate Plan 1997-2000, October 1997, p 1.

\(^{177}\) Australian Communications Authority, Connections: The Australian Communications Authority Bulletin, Issue 1 (December 1997), p 1.
significant bearing on the fate of the individual in the de-regulated telecommunications environment.

Critical assessment of the industry code scheme: the processes of code development

Given the significance of industry codes, the processes involved in the development of codes are of great importance. From a constitutional perspective, Parliament has effectively delegated wide ranging quasi-legislative responsibilities to non-governmental agencies. Through ACIF, the industry itself has become the primary policy making force.\(^{178}\) Therefore, as the Act does not provide for minimum standards in regulating the content of codes, and does not provide the ACA with a general jurisdiction to review the content of codes, the maintenance of adequate policy standards depends to a large extent on procedural standards adopted in code development.

Rather than establishing the conditions for independent policy formation, the Act relies on a pluralistic model, through the integration of competing interest groups in the code development process. The regime of code development places great pressure on private, non-governmental representatives of the public interest. Consumer and user groups are represented on the ACIF Board and Advisory Assembly,\(^ {179}\) as well as on the numerous Reference Panels and Working Committees involved in the development of codes.\(^ {180}\) In addition, the ACA, ACCC, TIO and Privacy Commissioner have observer status on all ACIF reference panels.\(^ {181}\)

As a matter of policy, ACIF has expressed its commitment to balanced, co-operative and inclusive code making to incorporate the legitimate interests of consumer representatives.\(^ {182}\) ACIF has also committed itself to "comprehensive public consultation" in code development.\(^ {183}\) There remains the need, however, for more secure standardising mechanisms to ensure the accountability, transparency and openness of the processes involved in the development of codes. The legitimacy of the process depends upon the capacity of private representatives of the public interest to exert genuine influence and secure the adequate protection of consumer interests. In the absence of safeguards to ensure balance in the code development process, the code system rests on the dubious notion that such representatives can compete effectively in terms of commercial and political bargaining with experienced industry agents.\(^ {184}\)

In terms of scrutiny of the content and development of codes, the only safeguards established under the Act are related to the process of registration of codes with the ACA. The Act mandates a set of criteria which must be satisfied in order for the ACA to agree to the registration of an industry code. Where a code is presented for registration, the ACA is empowered to evaluate the content of the code, for example to determine whether


\(^{183}\) Ibid. p 8.

appropriate community safeguards are provided for. The ACA also scrutinises the processes involved in the development of the proposed code. The ACA must be satisfied that, prior to submission, the draft code was distributed to industry members and members of the public, adequate allowance was made for the receipt of submissions, and submissions on the code were given consideration. The ACA must also be satisfied that the ACCC, the TIO and at least one body that represents the interests of consumers have been consulted about the development of the code. Where the code deals with a matter relating to privacy, the ACA must be satisfied that the Privacy Commissioner has been consulted about the development of the code.

While these stipulations provide a framework for standardising the processes of code development, they operate only in the context of registration. Under the Act, registration of industry codes is voluntary. The ACA has no authority to review codes unless they are presented by the industry for registration. While the ACA has declared as a matter of policy that codes should be registered, and has sought to persuade the industry of the benefits of registration, the standard practice of the industry in relation to code registration remains to be seen. In any case, the lack of a legislative requirement of registration severely restricts the capacity of the ACA to guarantee universal standards in policy making and code content.

Even in situations where the ACA is involved in the review of proposed codes, the willingness of the ACA to enforce procedural and substantive standards may well be inhibited by the ethos of self-regulation and minimal interference underlying the Act. The actions of the ACA are subject to what has been labelled the “public interest balance test.” The Act requires that, in evaluating codes proposed for registration, the ACA must act in a manner that "enables public interest considerations to be addressed in a way that does not impose undue financial and administrative burdens" on industry participants. The Act therefore ensures that the theoretical and political tension between efficiency and accountability, the tension between public and private, will be played out in the context of code registration. As such, the public interest balance test mandates deference to the autonomy of the industry, and militates against the ACA insisting upon strict standards of public protection.

Critical assessment of the industry code scheme: enforceability of code provisions

Critics of code-based regulatory schemes have recognised that the capacity of industry codes to provide protections comparable to those provided by administrative law ultimately depends upon the introduction of "hard edged" performance standards, enforcement

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185 *Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)* s 117(1)(d)(i).
188 *Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)* s 117(1)(j).
192 *Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)* s 112.
mechanisms and sanctions.\textsuperscript{193} Of particular importance is the ability of individuals to enforce codes of conduct against service providers. In the new telecommunications regime, the matter of code enforcement by consumers against service providers is not provided for in the Act, but is dealt with in the codes themselves. It has emerged that the standard mechanism for the enforcement of code provisions will be the TIO scheme.\textsuperscript{194}

Certainly, the incorporation of the TIO into the code scheme does have the significant advantage of integrating an external enforcement mechanism, giving substance to code-based rights and ensuring the proper separation of rule making and enforcing responsibilities.\textsuperscript{195} However, the reliance on the TIO as the sole means of enforcement of codes of practice introduces the same complications, as outlined above, relating to the credibility, impartiality and accessibility of the TIO. In keeping with the other dispute resolution functions of the TIO, consumers will be required to complain initially to their service provider regarding a breach of a code provision, prior to lodging a complaint with the TIO.\textsuperscript{196} Such factors, in contributing to the inaccessibility of the TIO, may well have the effect of dulling the hard edge of rights created by industry codes.

Conclusion

As a result of the changing nature of post-modern governance, administrative law is facing profound challenges. Administrative reform has exposed the shortcomings of the administrative law package and, on a deeper level, administrative law theory. In responding to such challenges, a significant level of theoretical, legal and political acumen is required on the part of administrative lawyers if the values of accountability and administrative justice are to continue to apply to public power in all its forms. The theoretical and political obstacle of the public/private dichotomy must be overcome. The legitimacy of administrative law must be better articulated. Ultimately, the province of administrative law must be extended and reconceived, according to a more sophisticated, coherent and principled understanding of public power.

Furthermore, as the above examination of the telecommunications industry has demonstrated, administrative lawyers face further challenges in developing satisfactory legal instruments to give effect to administrative law values across the public/private divide. It is imperative that administrative lawyers critically assess the capacity of new legal instruments to guarantee accountability and administrative justice by examining them against the standards of fairness, accessibility and impartiality. While the customer service guarantee, the TIO scheme and the industry code scheme do introduce the values of accountability and administrative justice into the telecommunications industry, a close examination of each mechanism reveals serious flaws. The institutions and rights created by these mechanisms do not compare favourably with the high standards of the administrative law package. As administrative lawyers search for a strategic legal response to the changing nature of public power, the distinctive qualities of administrative law rights and protections must be more faithfully replicated.


\textsuperscript{195} P.Cane, "Self-Regulation and Judicial Review" (1987) 6 Civil Justice Quarterly 324, p 328.