

ANZUS AND ASIAN STABILITY

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Anzus is an alliance of democratic nations committed to peace. These two facts about the alliance - our commitment to democratic freedom and our commitment to peace - are so fundamental to ANZUS that they would be worth noting at the outset even were they nothing more than very broad statements of purpose. But so far from being mere shopworn generalities, these two facts have great practical significance for the basic role and function of our alliance - and even for its day-to-day management - significance which is often not sufficiently appreciated.

It is because our nations are democracies that the commitments we make to one another are of great practical consequence and also why they are so reliable. For our three nations, vulnerable as we are to the infirmities that are alleged to afflict democracies in the conduct of their affairs, our alliance commitments are important in bringing a fundamental continuity into our relations. But it is also because these commitments represent the commitments of whole nations to one another - not the mere whim of arbitrary rulers - that it is possible to rely on them. There is no task more fundamental to alliance management than the constant nurturing of public support.

Our collective commitment to preserving peace is no less profound in its practical implications for our alliance. It is perhaps to be expected that so much of the discussion of ANZUS concerns questions about what would happen and how the various parties would respond in the event of war. The treaty itself of course, contains important commitments of mutual assistance in the event of armed attack. Yet it is no depreciation of the importance of those commitments to say that the foremost goal of the alliance is to prevent those commitments from ever having to be called upon. The operation of the alliance in peace time is every bit as vital as its operation in time of war, indeed even more so, particularly in a nuclear age, the task of preserving peace is fundamental to alliance management.

* [The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Wolfowitz delivered this speech on 24 June 1984 to the Conference on The American Effect on Australian Defence at Pennsylvania State University.

His references to the US commitment to Australia, the use of the joint US Australian facilities and the use of ports by the US Navy were widely reported in Australia. The latter issue is of particular relevance in the light of the election of the New Zealand Labor Government which is committed to denying access to NZ ports to vessels carrying nuclear arms.]

The Determination of National Interest in a Democracy

The old aphorism that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests, is still a popular one, but it contains as much concealed falsehood as apparent truth.

Viewing the flux and perjury of nineteenth century alliances it was certainly plausible - and perhaps even somewhat comforting - to believe that geography, historic rivalries and economic interests provide the constants in a nation's decisions, while policies and alliance form and founder around these fixed goals. A nation, so this view goes, may be obsessed by a particular threat, must have particular ports or trading opportunities, or, conversely, may have no interest in a distant land, and should form its alliances in whatsoever way will promote these ends.

The notion of permanent interests, impermanent friends left a great deal to be desired as a model for the conduct of international relations even in the nineteenth century. And in a nuclear age it is a very dangerous basis for democratic nations to conduct their affairs.

Among its other weaknesses, the notion of permanent interests leads to the dangerous fallacies of permanent disinterest and predictability. These can all too often be used to excuse neglect, a seductive choice for designs of others.

Why, so the argument goes, must a nation spend a valuable resources to defend against distant challenges? Why maintain forces without a visible threat? If grand political and military goals are constant, there is no need to reassess defences, and alliances will naturally tend themselves. If decisions are always logical, the need to prepare for unexpected contingencies is quite small.

But we know from long, historical experience that alliances are hard to put together and to keep, that illogical and unpredictable decisions are all too common, and that circumstances can change radically, often without a shot being fired. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Sino-Soviet split, the attempt to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, even a

coup in the small island of Grenada, created new strategic interests and shifted political and military thinking abruptly. Uncertain or ambiguous political commitments, even where interests seemed otherwise clear, led to bloodshed in 1914, in 1939, in 1950, and even in 1982.

I believe that countries, and in particular democracies like the United States and Australia and New Zealand, do have permanent interests. But they are not only of principally the geo-strategic interests on which past debate has centered. Our nations' permanent interests are as much or more in justice and the rule of law, in democracy and freedom, and in peace.

In pursuit of these goals, we have permanent "friends," as well as continuity, reliability and strong alliances with other nations that share the same values. Surely nations that defend freedom and the rule of law have a sound foundation for the elements of such permanent friendship. But these foundations will only be maintained through consistency, responsible policies, and a commitment to cooperation.

The burden of maintaining such cooperation and policies in the first half of this century was too heavy to avoid world conflagration. We must avoid such missteps in the nuclear era.

I would like to discuss today the role ANZUS plays in protecting all of our interests in peace and freedom -- both in a regional context and as an important factor in the calculation of world peace. For these issues are intricately linked.

Preserving Nuclear Peace

Effective alliances require a fundamental faith in the responsibility of our allies. As no issue is more important today than preserving nuclear peace, responsible policies to this end are a crucial element in preserving confidence among our countries. For this reason, I would like to begin a discussion of managing ANZUS with a brief word on managing this great issue of our times: the threat of nuclear war.

Surely it is a topic on which much has been said. The dangers of nuclear war have become common political topics world-wide. In my own country, no issue takes greater precedence. Preserving nuclear peace is a duty we owe not just to our friends and fellow countrymen, but to all the inhabitants of this planet.

"A nuclear war," President Reagan has said, "cannot be won and must never be fought." He has said it in China. He has said it in Germany. He has said it in Japan. He has said it in England. He has said it in Congress. He has said it in the Oval Office. He has said it throughout America. The essence of President Reagan's policy on preventing nuclear war can be crystallized in this phrase. It is a principle that has the full support of responsible people everywhere.

Much of the public debate on nuclear issues focuses on the enormous destructive potential of existing arsenals. President Reagan has led the way in the responsible effort to reduce nuclear arsenals:

-- He has proposed the complete elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons -- of intermediate-range missiles; and in negotiations with the the Soviets, he has rejected any solution that would simply transfer such weapons from where they threatened Europe, to where they could threaten Asia.

-- In the START talks, he has proposed deep reductions in intercontinental ballistic missiles, a goal no previous strategic arms treaty has ever approached.

Unfortunately, the Soviets tied progress in START to preventing INF deployments in Europe, deployments that our NATO allies requested in 1979 to offset massive Soviet deployments of a new missile, the triple-warhead SS-20. Last November the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations and in December suspended indefinitely their participation in START, apparently due to their frustration over their failure to prevent NATO's own counter-deployment of intermediate range forces. We are ready to resume both negotiations at any time and any place, without preconditions. Our proposals are fair and workable. All the elements for an agreement are on the table. We hope the Soviet Union will also come to recognize that its interests can best be served by returning to the negotiating table as soon as possible.

But the United States has not simply waited on Soviet responses to control nuclear weapons and to reduce their destructive potential. We have acted on our own to this end. Improvements in our nuclear forces over the years have made them safer -- less vulnerable to surprise attack, less prone to accident or to unauthorized use, less susceptible to seizure by terrorists. These improvements in our nuclear forces are well-known, though insufficiently acknowledged by those who propose to freeze all changes to those forces. What is perhaps less well-known is that fact that these improvements have made it possible to reduce the destructive potential of our nuclear forces over the last twenty years.

Both the number and megatonnage of our nuclear arsenal has been substantially reduced. Our stockpile was one-third higher 1967 than it is now, and the total yield has declined by 75 percent since 1960. The stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has also been dramatically reduced. The U.S. and NATO Allies withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe in 1980, and we agreed in 1983 to withdraw an additional 1,400 weapons over the next several years. These reductions will be realized even if we have to carry through with the deployment of ground-launched and cruise missiles, as NATO decided in 1979 that it would do if no agreement with the Soviet Union to ban or limit those weapons can be reached. For each new weapon that would be deployed in that event, we have withdrawn an old one. Thus, when all NATO withdrawals are taken into account, we will have withdrawn a total of five weapons for each new one that we may introduce under the 1979 decision.

Yes, America has begun to rebuild its nuclear forces even as we have sought to reduce them. But we have done so only after a decade of

restraint, restraint unmatched, indeed exploited, by our adversaries. And we have done so only to avoid the more destabilizing situation when an adversary might be tempted by forces susceptible to a successful first strike.

The U.S. has consistently taken responsible positions on reducing the level of nuclear armaments -- positions worthy of our allies' support. The U.S. also has undertaken a number of other important arms control initiatives to reduce the risk of war and halt or reverse the growth in weapons:

-- In Geneva, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in April a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons

-- In Stockholm, together our NATO allies, we have put forward a package of confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of a European war occurring by accident, surprise attack or miscalculation.

-- In Moscow, we have proposed a strengthening of U.S.-Soviet communications through a technical upgrading of the hotline to help contain possible crises.

-- In Vienna, at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks we have, again with our European allies, presented a new initiative this April that seeks to find a common ground between east and west positions, and to make progress on reducing conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

These, too, are worthy of our allies' respect and support.

A Commitment to Peace and Freedom

The public debate on the levels of nuclear weapons is an important one. But whether our forces freeze at current levels or gain or diminish slightly, the potential destruction remains unacceptable.

The public debate on how we prevent nuclear war is, therefore, of even greater relevance to our fate, but unfortunately, attracts less attention. The prospects of preventing nuclear war depend on far more than just nuclear weapons themselves. Peace will depend on a stable nuclear deterrent, but it will also depend on preventing the regional conflicts that can, unexpectedly, lead to wider confrontations.

Herein lies the second great challenge for preserving our freedom and world peace. Our alliance commitments play a crucial role in meeting that challenge.

The initial and most basic step in the effort to preserve peace and freedom is the national decision to make the attempt -- and the national will to persevere. My country, like Australia and New Zealand, considered itself for most of its history secure behind vast ocean frontiers. Even after WWI, we maintained this illusion. Only after the painful lessons of WWII did we learn, as smaller nations like Norway also learned so painfully, that neutrality does not ensure safety. Since that time, each of our three countries has faced up to the high costs of isolationism in an interconnected world; each has committed itself to the search for peace beyond our borders, not merely in home waters, but in the Pacific and in areas as distant as Africa and the Middle East.

In the aftermath of our difficult experience in Vietnam, America had a renewed flirtation with a reduced international role, even with isolationism. There were strong feelings in America to draw back into ourselves. We considered withdrawing our troops from Korea and other lands where they are vitally needed. We considered reducing our fleet in the hope that we could "swing" ships as needed from one theater to another, ignoring the very real possibility that this could increase the chances of a two-ocean challenge and, even more immediately, would have significantly reduced U.S. presence in the Pacific.

But with the steady growth of Soviet military forces and that increasing and alarming tendency of the Soviets to use that force, either directly themselves, as in Afghanistan, or indirectly, as in Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Chad and elsewhere, we emerged from our Vietnam experience with renewed determination, restored confidence, and a heightened sense of realism.

Our determination and confidence led us to begin to rebuild our forces and to speak more forthrightly for freedom. Our heightened sense of realism gave us a clearer view of the dangers posed by our adversaries, and a desire to further the increasing self-reliance among our friends, including those in Asia. If most of Asia is largely peaceful despite the increase in Soviet activities and capabilities, surely it is due in part to our renewed role and the growing strength of our friends.

America's return to a more vigorous role in the world is testimony to the staying power of democracies in foreign affairs, a quality that has often been questioned by political theorists, including that most brilliant analyst of democratic politics, Alexis de Tocqueville. Our alliances were one of the key factors that kept America from straying from its course. Without these alliances, we might well have accepted a lessened role -- to the detriment of all our countries. Through the alliances, we maintained a clearer view of where our true interests and responsibilities lie.

Indeed, not just America, but the democracies in general have succeeded to an extraordinary degree since WWII in maintaining a constancy of policy. During this same period, the world on the whole has also enjoyed an extraordinary period of peace among the major powers, peace of critical importance in the nuclear age. Both of these achievements are in large part a tribute to the strength and vigor in the West's interlocking set of alliances. In the circumstances, I believe, a heavy burden of proof falls on those who would weaken a system of alliance that has contributed so much to the maintenance of nuclear peace.

This is not to say that our systems of alliances cannot be improved upon. Constant efforts are still required and complacency can be as dangerous as excessive anxiety. But our alliances on the whole make an invaluable contribution, and no one has as yet put forward a surer way of preserving the peace. Certainly the isolation of each nation for itself is not such an alternative.

ANZUS reflects our countries' joint determination to avoid the dangers and painful lessons of isolationism or neutralism. Each of our nation's commitments eases the burden of commitments, real and psychological, of the others. Our joint pledges give each of our pledges added meaning.

The question is not so much whether any one ANZUS country could prosper as a neutral under the umbrella of other's active roles, but whether the other countries would choose to continue active roles once one chose to withdraw. There are Americans who continue to question our role in NATO, despite strong European commitments, because of what they see as inadequate defense spending. I have little doubt that such questions would increase dramatically if the European commitments themselves came into serious question.

Today, our three countries' commitments remain firm. Only last year the ANZUS review confirmed that the treaty "remains relevant and vitally important to the shared security concerns and strategic interests of the three partner governments." Let there be no doubt in the mind of any potential adversary that an armed attack on an ally would require, and would receive from the allies, full and prompt fulfillment of the ANZUS security commitment including, when necessary, military support.

The national security of each of us is a fundamental interest of the others and requires adequate and appropriate respond to threats or attacks on allies from any source. In the case of an attack on Australia, for example, our commitment remains firm whether the attack should come from the Pacific or Indian Ocean approaches. Our commitment to the defense of our allies is not limited to any particular threat; it applies to any potential aggressor.

In the Falklands crisis when our NATO ally Great Britain was wrongfully attacked by a Latin American friend, America did everything it could to negotiate an end to the crisis. But when negotiating failed, we took a strong stand on behalf of our wronged ally, despite the predicted high costs of such a stand. We were strongly committed to doing what was right in support of our ally -- even though we were under no treaty obligation to do so. (NATO does not extend to the South Atlantic.)

The U.S. presence in the Pacific over the past forty years has been a stabilizing one that has served the interests of our friends and allies in the region. ANZUS has been one of the critical factors supporting this stability. In the last forty years, as well, countries of the region have made great progress toward democracy and the rule of law.

These, too, are stabilizing factors. While these conditions prevail, it is difficult to see a situation in which ANZUS members would be called upon to fulfill their commitments in a dispute involving another friendly power. Indeed, a weakening of ANZUS or the consequent weakening of the U.S. role in the Pacific is one of the few events that could conceivably make such hypothetical imaginings a reality. These commitments do not conflict, they interlock; and in so doing they help to prevent conflict.

By our alliances, we add ever greater echoes of support to alliances throughout the free world. There are, for example, no direct political or legal linkages between ANZUS and the Five Power Defense Arrangement. However, any potential aggressor in Southeast Asia must take into account that ANZUS alliance interests would be threatened by an attack engaging Australian and New Zealand forces there.

A strong NATO strengthens deterrence globally to the advantage of ANZUS. But equally the health of ANZUS is vital to the global western alliance -- especially given the increasingly important locations of both Australia and New Zealand. It would be a mistake to underestimate the moral and political influence of this alliance of three of the world's oldest democracies.

Some argue that alliances are dangerous in the nuclear era. But an unlimited nuclear war will leave no corner of our world safe and secure. No nation can hide its head in the sand and count on being spared -- a point made on June 6 in Parliament by Prime Minister Hawke.

The enjoyment of freedom cannot be separated from the responsibilities of freedom -- responsibilities the three ANZUS countries have shouldered squarely. Clearly there are risks associated with engaging directly in deterrence through active cooperation in a major alliance. The United States has willingly assumed such risks on behalf of its allies. We have done so because, as Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden have recently and eloquently argued that such risks are significantly less than those associated with the weakening and failure of deterrence.

Managing ANZUS

Once there is the will to take alliances seriously, the problems of managing an alliance come into full play. ANZUS, like NATO, provides the elements for peace. Alliance management is the art that puts meaning into the framework that the treaty provides.

Successful alliance management depends on our success in meeting five critical challenges:

First, as an alliance of democracies, ANZUS inherits the challenges democracies face in running a coherent foreign policy. Policies that do not sustain public support will fail. Needed policies that lack public support can go unrealized. In short, alliance management requires an open and informed public debate led by citizens mindful of the great, not just the immediately visible, threats the future holds.

Second, an effective alliance among three vital democracies requires extensive, on-going contacts at all levels of government and society.

The need for coordinated political and military activities requires close official ties and strong institutionalized consultative processes. But they also require lively, informal public commentary and personal interchanges (including conferences like this one). Together these assure a constant flow of information and views on potential problems, as well as a full awareness of each other's concerns, interests, capabilities and objectives. Only through such exchanges can alliance managers reach decisions that serve a common purpose.

Such exchanges can be turned on and off as crises arise and recede. To be effective, they must continue at all levels over time and reflect the high degree of mutual confidence derived from experience and personal contact.

Fortunately, the management of the ANZUS alliance in all three capitals provides precisely that kind of consultative relationship. At the so-called "working levels" there are literally daily contacts between both civilian and military officials, including a thoroughly institutionalized sharing of intelligence and related assessments. At a higher level, there are frequent major meetings of senior officials to exchange views on issues of immediate concern to the alliance.

Most importantly, there is the on-going dialogue through meetings, correspondence, and communications between ministers in the three capitals. The annual ANZUS Council meeting provides a vital element that links political leaders and symbolizes the significance of the relationship.

On the military side, even without a pattern of integrated commands and military forces as in NATO Europe, ANZUS alliance managers over the years have built up a pattern of close defense cooperation which assures that ANZUS forces can operate together quickly and effectively, if that is ever necessary. Key elements of this cooperation are joint exercises between our forces, especially our navies.

The third challenge of alliance management is to meet the need for continuity and long-term consistency of policy. President Reagan came into office committed to demonstrating that the U.S. is a reliable ally and partner. Accordingly, while he has brought strong views of his own to the definition of new policy areas, he has shown great respect for commitments made by previous administrations. That element of continuity between administrations is essential to effective management of alliances between democracies.

I could cite examples as far afield as the Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa to make my point, but let me stick for now to some of more direct concern to ANZUS. In the area of arms control, President Reagan maintained the U.S. commitment to both tracks of the 1979 NATO decision, while offering his new and imaginative proposal on the "zero option" for the arms control track. He announced that the U.S. would observe the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty while seeking to negotiate a better substitute for it. With respect to China policy, the President has made very clear his determination to maintain the framework provided by previous U.S. commitments in this area, at the same time that he has worked to put that critically important relationship on a more realistic and stable basis. The views and concerns of our NATO and ANZUS allies were and are important in shaping U.S. arms control policy. And I can say from direct personal involvement, that ANZUS views were of great importance at critical junctures in the development of this Administration's China policy.

Fourth, there is a need to accept the mutual burdens, as well as the mutual benefits of alliance. It is in the nature of alliances that the precise levels of the burdens and benefits will shift over time. Concerns that another partner is getting a "free ride" plague every alliance in some form. Indeed, alliances can be endangered as much as strengthened by too fervent an effort to make all burdens precisely equal at any given moment to the benefits received. What is important to a healthy alliance is that the burdens be shouldered by all parties as needed, and when needed. And that the benefits be shared as well.

Article II of the ANZUS Treaty binds the partners "separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Because the ANZUS democracies, as the NATO allies, are dedicated to preserving the peace, not fighting a war, there is a tendency in all our countries to resent spending resources for defense that seem unnecessary at the time. Yet when the danger becomes evident, it may be too late or seem too provocative to begin to rearm. There, once again, a well-informed public is essential.

Domestic political pressure and miscalculations in Argentina led to a wholly unexpected war in the Falklands -- a war for which Britain was just barely prepared. British naval planners prior to the Falklands assumed that their forces would be used relatively close to home, that they would never have to engage without allies, that land based air support would always be available, and that landings against hostile forces would not be needed. These comfortable assumptions lowered British defense spending. But an unpredictable world made them predictably dangerous.

The U.S., for its part, is in the midst of a substantial effort to increase its conventional forces. We have done so not to provoke, but to defend, not to escalate, but to provide the means by which problems can be contained. By strengthening our conventional deterrent, we help to increase our options and reduce the risks of nuclear war. In this defense effort, too, we have kept our allies closely informed.

The U.S. attaches critical importance to the opportunity to use Australian and New Zealand ports that provide ready access to the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. We view Australia's and New Zealand's

willingness to allow us use of their ports as part of their contribution to ANZUS. We also value efforts to assure standardization or interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, share intelligence, exchange personnel and consult on problems. The maintenance of U.S. presence in the region, and the demonstration of our ability to operate effectively with our treaty partners, are tangible physical evidence of our treaty commitments. All of the ANZUS nations share in this effort, and all benefit from it.

Another and critical element of defense cooperation is that involving the joint facilities in Australia. Although the subject of bilateral agreements between Canberra and Washington, they clearly are within the spirit of the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty. Indeed, such is noted in the agreements.

There is, of course, considerable public speculation about the use of these facilities, including gross distortions or misunderstandings of related U.S. defense strategy. The simple truth, as clearly and forcefully enunciated by Prime Minister Hawke on June 6 in Parliament in Canberra, is that these facilities contribute to arms control, effective deterrence, mutual security and to stability in global strategic relationships. Verification, early warning and the ability to control our nuclear forces and communicate with them are critical to both stable deterrence and to arms control. In addition, these capabilities could be critical in preventing some bizarre accident from turning into an unintended catastrophe. For all of these reasons, the facilities are an important, even essential, part of the West's critical and deeply-felt commitment to maintain world peace -- perhaps the greatest single challenge of this or any century.

Fifth, as alliance managers in all three capitals have recognized from the outset of ANZUS, our treaty relationship is only part of the many-faceted relations between our countries -- commercial, historic, cultural and personal. They are all important. They all affect the course of the relationship and each other. As we approach problems in any one area, we must be careful to see them in the perspective of the entire relationship. If we do so, we will continue to have a strong reservoir of good will and self-interest from which problems can be

solved. At the same time, we will recognize that each element of the relationship is a part of the whole and that each is important and worthy of our best efforts for consultation, compromise and deference to the interests of all.

For alliance managers the essential task, whether in Washington, Canberra, or Wellington, is to maximize cooperation to mutual advantage when we are on common ground, and to contain differences -- legitimate though they may be -- through the kinds of compromises necessary in an effective working partnership. By so doing, we can assure that competition in commerce and differences in other areas do not threaten cooperation linked to our most fundamental shared interest -- mutual national survival.

Conclusion

Relations between America, Australia and New Zealand are truly broad and vital. Our personal, commercial and cultural ties, and a common political heritage dedicated to preserving and enhancing individual liberty, have forged uniquely close relations, relations Americans value deeply. As President Reagan said almost exactly a year ago: "Our ties are a precious tradition, reflecting our many concerns and shared values."

The ANZUS commitment is not limited to paper, it resides in the hearts of Australians, New Zealanders and Americans alike -- in our affection for one another, and in our profound belief in the rule of law. Our treaty commitment naturally requires that our actions be in accordance with our constitutional processes, but our deep ties ensure that those processes will be swift and supportive, and embody the full spirit of our peoples -- the type of commitment democracies require and from which democracies profit. Speaking for the United States I can say that Australians and New Zealanders should rest assured that if any emergency confronts them, the American system is capable of decisive action -- and willing to render it.

The ties between our peoples will always remain a powerful force. But what the future holds for ANZUS may profoundly affect life within each of our nations. Will freedom remain a vibrant force, uplifting peoples throughout the world? Or will freedom itself be a fugitive, cowering in remote lands in the hope that it is too small to note? In the end, even that would prove a futile hope.

Our freedom, and world peace, depend primarily on our own commitment to our mutual defense and the rule of law. The choice before us is not between peace and freedom. By promoting freedom we build what is ultimately the most secure foundation for peace as well. Nor can we choose peace at the expense of freedom. Life in a world of totalitarian powers would no be peace, nor would peace between them long reign.

I believe our countries have the will to preserve freedom. There is an old saying. "if I am not for myself, who will be? But if I am for myself alone, what am I?"

I believe our countries know what we are, we are trustees of freedom. In the end, we can do more to protect that freedom and to build a safe and just world:

- if we are strong, than if we are weak;
- if we proceed with reason and courage, than if we hang back until moderate responses no longer suffice.
- if we are united, than if we stand alone.

The path we must follow is an arduous one not without risk. But then few routes are quicker, and none is safer. There are no short cuts.