

CYPRUS

CYPRUS - DRAFT AGREEMENT - STATEMENT BY TURKISH LEADER, [text of The Statement of His Excellency Mr Rauf Denktash, was made available by the Turkish Embassy, Canberra].

1. The Turkish Cypriot side had come to the summit meeting to conclude an agreement with the Greek Cypriot side.
2. The Secretary-General had stated in his report to the security council on 12 December

"I expect that the interlocuters will, at the high level meeting, conclude an agreement containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution of the problem, aimed at establishing a federal republic of Cyprus".

3. In other words of the draft agreement itself, this federal republic would

"Independent and non-aligned bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect."

4. This agreement was worked out in the course of months of hard work, beginning with the working points outlined by the Secretary-General to the two sides in Vienna, on 6 and 7 August 1984. During the three rounds of proximity talks in September, October, November and December, substantive elements of a federal settlement were considered in detail and the Vienna working points were elaborated into a draft agreement for submission to a joint high-level meeting.
5. In Vienna, the Secretary-General put to each side his views on a package settlement of the Cyprus problem. The working points which, in the eyes of the Secretary-General, represented an indivisible whole, comprised: first, political confidence building measures which would be irreversible and reciprocal, secondly, the establishment, starting with the formation of a transssitional government, of a federal governmental structure which would take into account the equal political status of both communities, the unity of the country and functional requirements, and thirdly, the question of territorial arrangements between the two parties making up the federation.
6. During the first and second rounds of proximity talks in September and October respectively, the Turkish Cypriot side gave the Secretary-General full support in his efforts to bring about a just and permanent peace within the framework of the Vienna working points. At the conclusion of the second round, the Secretary-General made a public statement in which he said:

"We have agreed to hold a final round of high level proximity talks, beginning on 26 November 1984. I consider it essential to undertake this further effort before I report to the security council in pursuance of the good offices mission that the council has entrusted to the Secretary-General."

7. During the preparations for the third round of proximity talks, the Secretary-General had requested the parties to come to this final round not with their bargaining positions, but with their final positions in order to take major political decisions. The Turkish Cypriot side complied with this request of the Secretary-General and indeed proposed draft agreement consisting of three reaffirmatory paragraphs and 14 articles, an incorporated; presentation consisting of 66 articles and a verbal understanding. What remained to be done at the high level meeting was to agree on 9, 11 and 14, decide on the setting up of a working group or groups which would elaborate the details of the agreement, and to endorse, as an integrated whole, the draft agreement.
8. The Secretary-General, in paras 50 and 51 of his report of 12 December 1984 to the Security Council, summarised the important development in this final round in the following terms:

"The final round of proximity talks took place in New York between 26 November and 12 December 1984. I presented to the parties and discussed with them as an integrated whole a preliminary draft for a joint high-level agreement. The package contained elements taken from different positions which I thought could help in bridging the gap which still existed. The discussions moved quickly to the central issues of what could be called the core of a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriot side conveyed to me its favourable reaction to all elements of my presentation. In the light of the crucial stage of the negotiations, I suggested at that time a moment of reflection. President Kyprianou then left New York for Nicosia, to return within 10 days. Upon his return from Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot delegation conveyed to me its position with regard to all elementary presentation. As the gap was not yet fully closed, I had further discussions with both sides, in the course of which I sought and received from the Turkish Cypriot delegation understandings that were helpful in further narrowing the gap. By 12 December it was my assessment that the documentation for a draft agreement could now be submitted to the joint high level meeting. I expect that the interlocutors will, at the high level meeting, conclude an agreement containing the necessary elements

for a comprehensive solution of the problem, aim at establishing a federal republic of Cyprus.

Accordingly, I announced on 12 December that the parties had agreed to hold a joint high level meeting under my auspices, at a place to be decided, beginning on 17 January 1985."

9. The Secretary-General also on 12 December, expressed the view that the convening of a high level meeting was

"A piece of news which will be considered a very constructive step forward, leading to the overwhelming, comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem".

Asked what duration he envisaged for the high level meeting, Mr Perez de Cuellar replied that for him one hour would be enough, but that he would be at the disposal of the two sides for two or three days.

10. These momentuous developments were also hailed by the world media which praised the decisive role and contribution of the Turkish Cypriot side in this achievement. The London Times, for example, in its issue of 1 December declared:

"In a dramatic move which could break the diplomatic impasse on efforts to end the division of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community has offered important concessions and effectively left the ball in the Greek Cypriot court."

"Mr Rauf Denktas, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, announced on Thursday that his side was in complete agreement with the peace plan put forward by senior Javier Perez de Cuellar, the United Nations Secretary-General."

Other prominent publications, similarly, underlined the bold and statesmanlike step taken by the Turkish Cypriot side. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the international media for their objective, accurate and constructive reporting on this significant turning point in the search for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

11. Even Mr Papanfegemu whose past records on Cyprus leaves much to be desired, had to concede on 2 January 1985 that the Turkish Cypriot side had "undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem."

12. The Turkish Cypriot side, at the very beginning of the final round of proximity talks, made the utmost sacrifices and accepted in toto the draft agreement proposed by the

Secretary-General. This was done on explicit assurances by the Secretary-General that the draft agreement representing an integrated whole, was the final text to be concluded at the high level meeting without re-negotiation or any reservations whatsoever, even by way of interpretation.

13. I would now like to inform you of the constructive efforts and co-operative attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side which had made it possible to bring about a draft agreement for submission to the high level meeting which has just been concluded.

The draft agreement proposed by the Secretary-General and accepted by us in toto on 27 November 1984 covered the following central issues which constituted the core of a comprehensive solution:

- a) Reaffirmatory paragraphs including the previous high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, as well as constitutional provisions agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-88/1982, aiming at the establishment of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic,
- b) Powers and functions of the federal government,
- c) The establishment of a bi-communal federal legislature as well as constitutional safeguards,
- d) The Federal executive which would symbolize the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities as well as constitutional safeguards,
- e) Territorial adjustments between the two federated components of the federal republic,
- f) Adequate guarantees and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces,
- g) The establishment of a transitional federal government,
- h) The establishment of two funds, to facilitate economic equilibrium and resettlement respectively,
- i) The placing of the varosha area and six additional areas under an interim administration,
- j) The reopening of the Nicosia international airport,
- k) Provision for a moratorium,

1) The setting up of working groups which would elaborate the details of the agreement.

14. It is essential to understand just how far the Turkish Cypriot side has gone with regarding the federal executive, legislative and territorial arrangements in order to make an agreement possible.

15. The Secretary-General, in his opening statement on 17 January reaffirmed that the objective remained as stated in his report to the Security Council of 12 December 1984, in which he had expressed in his expectation that the parties would, at this joint high-level meeting, conclude an agreement containing elements necessary for a comprehensive solution of the problem, aimed at establishing a federal republic of Cyprus. He repeated that,

"We are here to seek an agreement leading to the establishment of a federal republic of Cyprus".

The Secretary-General added,

"If you are determined to reach an agreement, a unique chance now exists. If this moment is lost, I am sure you will agree, it may not readily recur."

16. I, for my part, voiced the conviction that it was "Perfectly possible for the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to live in freedom and security under their own democratic federated states and to administer their joint republic, as co-founder partners, under the roof of a federation." It states that:

"As the leaders of the two national communities, it is our historical task to give from here, to our respective peoples, the good news that we have been able to take a major step on the path to a peaceful solution." Referring to our "Historic opportunity", I said, "I believe that this opportunity which Mr Perez de Cuellar, the Secretary-General, has brought about is of a historical magnitude. It is our duty not to let this opportunity slip away. I consider this to be the best chance which we have had as yet."

After stating that the high-level draft agreement which had been prepared after months of hard work was an enormous leap forward in the search for a negotiated settlement, I concluded:

"Its adoption today by us will mark the beginning of a new era in the relations between our two peoples and we wholeheartedly hope it will lead to the early establishment of the federal republic of Cyprus, which will be a legacy to leave to further generations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots."

17. Mr Kyprianou, however, as of our very first meeting in the morning of 17 January, raised fundamental objections to each and every paragraph of the draft agreement. Moreover, he denied even the existence of such an agreement. He even questioned basic established concepts such as the equal political status of the two communities and bi-zonality which were already included in the Vienna working points, as well as, the agreed legislative, executive and territorial arrangements. He was not prepared to fill in the blank dates and agreed to the establishment of working groups. On the question of international guarantees and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot, forces, he put forward demands and views which were not compatible with the relevant provisions of the draft agreement. By his statement, he also opposed the establishment of a transitional federal government.
- 18 I expressed my regret and sorrow at seeing Mr Kyprianou in his approach to the problem and general attitude, still reflecting the Greek Cypriot perceptions of 1963. I told him that if he really approached the problem in this mentality, the three rounds of proximity talks would have been in vain and that his remarks nullified even the shadow of this draft agreement. I stated that I would regard it my duty to inform my people of his views.
19. In the second session on the same day, I formally replied to Mr Kypranou expressing my deep disappointment with his attitude. I told him that while he still firmly adhered to his old views, the Turkish Cypriot side had made maximum sacrifices by accepting the draft agreement and called upon him to make a similar sacrifice and to accept in full the agreement before us. I invited him repeatedly, for the sake of peace and fraternity in Cyprus, to follow my example. I drew attention to the fact that some of his views were in total contradiction with the draft agreement and that demanding the acceptance of these was tantamount to asking the Turkish Cypriot side to surrender to the Greek Cypriots. I also pointed out that Mr Kyprianou was trying to raise issues the discussion of which had been left to the working groups. I added that even if our meeting were to last until Sunday night, there would not be enough time to solve these questions which had been left to the working groups and that the draft agreement could not be re-negotiated.
20. During the subsequent meetings held both in private and informal sessions, Mr Kyprianou continued to reject the existence of an agreement. At one point, he even attempted to deny any knowledge of the very text on which he had based his objections. During these meetings, both the Secretary-General and I made sincere efforts to persuade Mr Kyprianou to accept the existing agreement which the Secretary-General himself had drawn up as an "Honest Broker".

21. Mr Kyprianou then chose to argue that he had misunderstood the whole exercise and proceeded to try to terminate the high level meeting without accepting the draft agreement. These tactics were naturally unacceptable to us, because these tactics were obviously designed to keep the Turkish Cypriot side committed to the draft agreement, while the Greek Cypriot side would be free to press to extract further sacrifices, from each and every element in this document.
22. What we have witnessed during the past three days has been an exercise in futility owing to the inexplicable reluctance of the Greek Cypriot side to contribute to the achievement of a successful outcome of the high-level meeting. It is self-evident that the only possible successful outcome of this meeting would have been the conclusion of the draft agreement, which in the eyes of the Secretary-General constituted a fair and reasonable framework for a comprehensive settlement.
23. I had to come to New York in the sincere hope that we would conclude a very important agreement which would indeed be a turning point in the relations between the two peoples of Cyprus. I know that the Secretary-General also strongly hoped to see such an achievement. We are deeply thankful to him for all his efforts.

Unfortunately, Mr Kyprianou was unable, for reasons of his own, to contribute to a successful outcome. He did not want to conclude this agreement.

I believe that I have a responsibility to put the full facts before world public opinion. I have done so without any feelings of enmity. My people and the world are entitled to know the truth."

CYPRUS

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON CYPRUS *

The parties agree on the following matters which are to be viewed as an integrated whole:

The Parties:

a) Recommit themselves to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979.

b) Indicate their determination to proceed, at the date referred to in paragraph 14 below, to the establishment of a federal republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect;

c) Reaffirm their acceptance of those introductory constitutional provisions that were agreed upon at the intercommunal talks in 1981-82:

i) The Federal Republic of Cyprus shall have international personality; the federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all of the territory.

ii) The people of the Federal Republic shall comprise the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community. There shall be a single citizenship of the Federal Republic of Cyprus regulated by federal law.

iii) The territory of the Federal Republic shall comprise the two provinces or federated states.

iv) The official languages of the Federal Republic shall be Greek and Turkish. The English language may also be used.

v) The Federal Republic shall have a neutral flag and anthem to be agreed. Each province or federated state may have its own flag using mainly elements of the federal flag. The federal flag shall be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of any other flag.

vi) The Federal Government shall observe the holidays of the Federal Republic. Each province or federated state shall observe the federal holidays as well as those established by it.

vii) Reaffirm all other points that were agreed upon during the course of the intercommunal talks as contained in "revision" dated 18.5.82 concerning general provisions. Part I, fundamental rights and liberties, Part II, as well as parts III and IV.

1.1 The powers and functions to be vested in the federal government of the Federal Republic shall comprise:

a) Foreign affairs.

b) Federal financial affairs (including federal budget, taxation, customs and excise duties).

c) Monetary and banking affairs.

d) Federal economic affairs (including trade and tourism).

e) Posts and telecommunications.

f) International transport

g) Natural resources (including water supply, environment).

h) Federal health and veterinary affairs.

i) Standard setting weights and measures, patents, trademarks, copyrights.

j) Federal judiciary

k) Appointment of Federal officers.

l) Defence (to be discussed also in connection with international treaties on Cyprus); security as it pertains to federal responsibility.

1.2 Additional powers and functions may be vested in the federal government by common agreement of both sides. Federal legislation may be executed either by authorities of the federal government or by way of coordination between the competent authorities of the federal government and the two provinces or federated states.

2.1 The legislature of the federal republic will be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70 - 30 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation, and an upper chamber with a 50 - 50 representation. Federal legislation will be enacted with regard to matters of federal competence as referred to in (1) above. The adoption of legislation on major matters will require separate majorities in both chambers. The adoption of legislation on other matters will require simple majorities in both chambers. A working group will consider the issues which are major matters, as for instance on ten of the twelve functions referred to in (1) above.

2.2 Appropriate constitutional safeguards will be incorporated in the federal constitution, including deadlock resolving machinery, and special provisions to facilitate action on matters necessary for the continued functioning of the federal government (e.g. on budgetary questions). Legislation adopted by the legislature may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community. In case of deadlock in the legislature, the proposed legislation may be submitted, in the first instance, to a conciliation committee of the legislature, composed of

* [This document appeared in the July 1985 edition of the T-C Review New Cyprus. New Cyprus stated that the agreement first appeared in the Greek Cyprus press and purported to be the full text of a draft agreement prepared by the UN Secretary-General. This document was made available by the Turkish Embassy, Canberra.]

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three Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots, and whose decisions will be taken on the basis of majority vote including at least one Turkish Cypriot. If the deadlock persists the matter may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether the proposed legislation violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community. The matter may also be submitted to a referendum among the population of the community which opposed the draft legislation.

3.1 The Federal republic will have a presidential system of government. The president and the vice-president will symbolize the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities. The executive will reflect the functional requirements of an effective federal government.

3.2 The president will be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president will be a Turkish Cypriot. The president and the vice president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision adopted by the legislature in areas to be agreed upon, it being understood that the scope will exceed that covered by the 1960 constitution. The president and the vice president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the Council of Ministers for reconsideration.

3.3 The Council of Ministers will be composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7 to 3 ratio. One major ministry will be headed by a Turkish Cypriot. It is agreed to discuss in a working group that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be a Turkish Cypriot, as well as that decisions by the Council of Ministers taken by simple majority including at least one Turkish Cypriot Minister will apply to matters of special concern to the Turkish Cypriot community.

3.4 In case of deadlock, the matter may be taken to the Constitutional Court for ruling as to whether it violates the constitution or is discriminatory against either community. The matter may also be submitted to a referendum among the population of the community which opposed it.

4.1 A tripartite body, including one voting non-Cypriot member, will have the responsibility of ruling on disputes relating to the distribution of powers and functions between the federal government and the provinces or federated states, and on such other matters as may be assigned to it by the parties in accordance with the constitution.

5.1 A working group will discuss the exercise of the freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to property, including time frames, practical regulations and possible compensation arrangements, taking into account paragraph 3 of the 1977 agreement.

6.1 Territorial adjustments, in addition to the areas already referred to in the August 5, 1981 Turkish Cypriot proposals, will be agreed upon, bearing in mind the crite-

ria contained in the 1977 high-level agreement. These territorial adjustments will result in the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state comprising in the order of 29 per cent of the territory of the federal republic. Both sides agree to suggest special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides. These areas will remain under their respective civilian jurisdiction. A working group will consider the specific areas of the territorial adjustments as well as the specific areas and characteristics of the special status areas.

7.1 A timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot military troops and elements, as well as adequate guarantees, will be agreed upon prior to the establishment of a transitional federal government.

7.2 In the meantime, military deconfrontation measures will be pursued by both sides, using the good offices and assistance of UNFICYP.

8.1 A Fund for Development of the Turkish Cypriot province or federated state shall be established with a view to achieving an economic equilibrium between the two provinces or federated states. A fund will also be established to facilitate the resettlement of the Greek Cypriot displaced persons, and of the Turkish Cypriots displaced as a consequence of the implementation of paragraph 6. The Federal Government shall contribute to these funds. Foreign governments and international organizations shall be invited to contribute to the funds.

9.1 The Varosha area and the six additional areas delineated in the Turkish Cypriot map of 5 August 1981 will be placed under United Nations interim administration as part of the UNFICYP buffer zone for resettlement, by a date to be agreed upon at a future joint high-level meeting.

10.1 Both parties agree not to take any action tending to prejudice the process outlined in this agreement, both on the international scene and internally.

11.1 The Nicosia international airport will be reopened under interim United Nations administration with free access from both sides. The United Nations will conclude the arrangements to that effect by a date to be agreed upon at a future joint high-level meeting.

12.1 A committee composed of one representative from each side and a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be responsible for considering allegations of non-implementation of confidence-building measures and will make appropriate recommendations (i.e. paragraphs 7.2, 9.1, 10.1 and 11.1).

13.1 Working Groups will be established to elaborate the details of the agreement.

14.1 The required working groups having completed their work, the parties agree that the transitional federal government of the Federal Republic of Cyprus will be set up on a date to be agreed upon at a future joint high-level meeting.

CYPRUS - STATEMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS *

The High-Level meeting between the President
of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou,
and the leader of the Turkish Community, Mr.
Rauf Denktash, under the chairmanship of the
U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar,
on 17th - 20th January, 1985.

The Turkish Government in a statement immediately after the High-Level Meeting tried to put the blame on the Greek Cypriot side for the failure of the Meeting. The truth is that the Greek Cypriot side approached the High-Level Meeting in good will and full readiness to cooperate with the U.N. Secretary-General and to have a constructive dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot side with a view to finding a fair, viable and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

It must be clear to all that the Greek Cypriot side is the one that has every reason to want an early solution of the Cyprus problem, since it is mainly the Greek Cypriot side which is suffering from the continued existence of the problem. Unfortunately, at the High-Level Meeting the Turkish Cypriot side, far from showing any readiness for a constructive dialogue, virtually demanded in an ultimatum-like manner acceptance of a preliminary draft agreement without the slightest change and without any prior discussion or negotiation.

This was never the scope of the High-Level Meeting. The meeting took place after the U.N. Secretary-General had assessed that there was progress in the proximity talks for President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash to discuss and negotiate on the basis of the existing documents and all that had been exchanged in the proximity talks for the finding of a framework for a lasting, comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Mr. Denktash did not accept either a dialogue or discussion and negotiation, but rejected all possible formulas put forward with a view to averting a deadlock and making progress at the High-Level Meeting.

It is a fact that Mr. Denktash rejected out of hand even the Secretary-General's invitation to continue the meeting at a later date or to have a new High-Level Meeting. The Greek Cypriot side continues to believe that the Secretary-General's efforts must be continued and that everyone should strengthen his initiative emanating from the mandate given him by a series of Security Council Resolutions.

* [This statement was provided by His Excellency P.N. Vanezis, High Commissioner of the Republic of Cyprus, Canberra.]

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If the latest meeting in New York had not produced any results because of the Turkish side's intransigence, this does not mean, as the Secretary-General himself has stated, that efforts to solve the Cyprus problem should be abandoned. President Kyprianou has already stated in New York that he is ready to respond to Mr. de Cuellar's invitation to a new High-Level Meeting and to discuss in a constructive spirit the outstanding substantial issues that make up the Cyprus problem.

If a corresponding political will is shown by the Turkish side, it will then be possible to carry out a constructive dialogue in a spirit of good will with a view to finding, the soonest possible, a framework for a fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem that would put an end to the hardships of all the people of Cyprus and lay the foundations for a peaceful state that would prosper for the benefit of all its people.

It is definitely completely wrong to blame the Greek-Cypriot side for the failure of the High-Level Meeting. The following statements by the U.N. Secretary-General throw enough light on how the meeting developed throughout these four days, in New York:-

A!

On 18 December, 1984 Mr. de Cuellar declared:- "The High-Level Meeting is expected to be, as is every direct meeting between parties concerned, a constructive dialogue on which the parties will present their views of the ideas on the table".

B!

On 19 December, 1984 Mr. de Cuellar again declared during a press conference: " I don't see the meeting as a mere formality. What I expect from the meeting is a constructive discussion in which the parties will present their views on my presentation. That is how I see it".

C!

On 18 January, 1985 Mr. de Cuellar again pointed out to the press: " I don't expect to solve the problem but to put the Cyprus problem again on the rails, to start a serious negotiating process for an overall solution of the problem". In a question as to whether the draft document was presented to the two leaders on a "take it or leave it basis" Mr. de Cuellar replied: " I am not entitled to present the paper to the parties on the basis of take it or leave it It is a summit in which the parties are exchanging views on the basis of the documentation I have presented".

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Mr. de Cuellar speaking on 22nd January at the University of Edinburgh was asked if he blamed the Greek side for the failure of the talks. He gave the following answer:
" No, I think it would be unfair to blame the Greeks, as it would be from my side inappropriate to apportion responsibility".

In a last attempt, in order to save the High-Level talks, Mr. Kyprianou paid in the morning of 19 January, 1985 an unofficial visit to the U.N. Secretary-General accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.G. Iacovou. President Kyprianou proposed the following formula:-

1) The U.N. Secretary-General to declare that "the two sides endorsed the documentation presented by the Secretary-General and his introductory statement as a basis for negotiations in conformity with the integrated whole approach aiming at a comprehensive and overall solution of the Cyprus Problem".

2) To carry out a minor change in the agenda concerning the subject of the Legislature as it had been suggested by the U.N. Secretary-General, i.e. "on major matters there should be separate majorities and on other matters simple majority".

3) To separate the term "international guarantees" from the term "defence".

4) The High-Level Meeting to be postponed and be reconvened at the end of February.

5) During the second High-Level Meeting the discussion should be on four subjects:

- (i) Withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops
- (ii) Guarantees
- (iii) Territory
- (iv) 3 freedoms.

6) Immediately after the second High-Level Meeting working committees to be appointed to deal with constitutional and other matters.

This last minute attempt was again, unfortunately, rejected by Mr. Rauf Denktash who insisted on signing the "Preliminary Draft for a joint High-Level agreement", presented to both parties by the U.N. Secretary-General.

On his way back to Cyprus, the leader of the Turkish Community, announced at Istanbul airport that he was going to hold "parliamentary and presidential elections" on 23rd June, 1985.

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It should be observed that this new negative and aggressive action, taken by the Turkish side, violates once more the Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus and particularly Resolution 550 (1984), and it takes place at a very delicate time, immediately after the New York High-Level Meeting.

From the above quotations it becomes abundantly clear that the two parties did not go to the High-Level Meeting on a "take it or leave it" basis. The Secretary-General himself said that this was not the case. Certainly the two parties did not go to New York to take or leave a proposal which did not even exist. There was no proposal, document or agreement ready to be signed. The two parties went to negotiate what happened in the three rounds of the proximity talks; to indulge in serious negotiations of basic, outstanding issues that derived out of various documents which resulted from the proximity talks. Both sides went to New York committed to the documentation as a basis for negotiations subject to an overall agreement and an integrated whole approach.

Despite all the negative actions of Mr. Denktash, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is continuing its full cooperation with the Secretary-General so that his initiative will succeed. It has all the good will to respond favourably to any substantial change of the present Turkish policy and is ready to effectively contribute to the search for an honest and just solution to the problem that could bring happiness to all the inhabitants, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, relieving them from the present nightmare of suffering, uncertainty and artificial division. The Government has all the necessary political will and determination to work in order to achieve such a high an lofty aim.

CYPRUS**Security Council**Distr.
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14 June 1985

RESOLUTION 565 (1985)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2591st meeting,
on 14 June 1985

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1985 (S/17227 and Add.2) and of 12 June 1985 (S/17227/Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1985,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period, ending on 15 December 1985;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1985;
3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.
