THE NORMATIVE DILEMMA: WILL AND CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING

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The rather obscure title of this paper relates to one of the greatest debates in international law jurisprudence, which has recently been raised again by the French Professor, Prosper Weil, in a noteworthy but contentious article published both in the Revue générale de droit international public in 1982 and the American Journal of International Law in 1983.1

Put in basic terms, the problem is as follows: is there a "threshold" of international law? That is, a point where "non-law" ends and where law begins?

In fact, the question is a very ancient one, as old as international law itself. Professor Weil, with his usual skilfulness, has but poured new wine in old bottles. He has re-phrased a very traditional question: what is international law? He has shifted, slightly, the traditional emphasis put on the very abstract question of the "basis" or the "foundation" of international law to a more concrete one, by addressing himself to the components of international law (international law norms), rather than international law in general.

This is the main question that this Conference seeks to answer.

We are so deeply impregnated with the voluntarist analysis of international law that our natural reflex is to say that where there is State will, there is international law: no will, no law.

In my view, the voluntarist explanation is a bad answer to a bad question. First, it assumes there is no threshold of law. Secondly, State will is certainly not the test of law, even if we confine ourselves to inter-State law, leaving aside other parts of international law.

Before proceeding any further, it is probably necessary to ask why the voluntarist explanation, weak as it is, has taken such a dominant position in international law jurisprudence.

As is well known, the so-called "founding fathers" of international law, including Grotius, did not share this view. On the contrary, they saw

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1 "Vers une normativité relative en droit international" (1982), RGDIP 5–47; "Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?" (1983) AJIL, 413–442.
international law as a means to guide and limit the absolute power of European princes. For Grotius, "the final foundation of *jus gentium* lies in natural law and has its roots in *appetitus societatis*", as President Jimenez de Arechaga aptly demonstrated in a recent colloquium devoted to *International Law and the Grotian Heritage*.

This view, of course, did not sit well with absolute monarchism and with the ancient European Nation States. To them, the so-called "positivist" jurisprudence, as popularized by Vattel and his followers seemed infinitely more attractive.

Moreover, during the nineteenth century, international law scholars themselves were greatly influenced by the scientific philosophy of Auguste Comte and others, and, trying to win the esteem which attached to pure scientists, they had a tendency to invent dogmas that were supposed to explain law in the same way as mathematical postulates or physical "laws" explain mathematics or physics.

In this state of mind, a certain number of supposed equations were set down:

- law = *jus positum*, that is the rules which are formed through certain formal channels; this is the "positivist" approach;
- *jus positum* = *jus voluntarium*, that is the rules which are based on the will of States, and only these rules; this is the "voluntarist" approach;
- *jus positum* = those rules which can be applied by the judges; it can be called the "judiciarist" approach.

This, of course, is a very reductionist view and shows the incurable flaw of positivist voluntarism: the inability of its champions to take into account not only the social, but even the legal reality itself. As the International Court has recalled: "In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than the exception." Moreover, it is simply not true that all rules of international law are of a State will origin, and one can certainly not share Weil's view that: "Absent voluntarism, international law would no longer be

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6 See below p 39.
performing its functions."\(^7\) This is a mere affirmation which focuses more on voluntarist expectations than on the functions of law itself.

In fact, as has been put rather strongly by Professor Falk, Weil's famous article is "a slightly hysterical effort to stop the world from changing" – and this can be said globally about the voluntarist analysis. And, still speaking of Weil's article, Professor Falk adds: "I see it as the work of a highly intelligent person who dislikes what is happening in the world and is translating into jurisprudence a kind of ideological nostalgia for an earlier period of certainty and consensus."\(^8\)

Indeed, the objective of voluntarists – at least, their main achievement – is to lock law into an immutable corpus. They cut themselves off from values and social realities. Legal rules become aims in themselves and law is not seen as a social tool – which it is – but as a kind of self-sufficient religion whose Tables are its formal sources, as they are defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court. "Such an approach distorts inquiry by conceiving of law-creation exclusively from the perspective of the rules applicable in this once centralized judicial institution."\(^9\)

No matter what is the content of the rules, nor the ratione legis, the sole object worthy of study is the way norms are formed. And they are formed, exclusively, by the will of States or, more exactly, they have been created, once and for all, by the will of certain States. Moreover, they cannot be changed except by the same methods. But voluntarists perfectly know that that is totally impossible in the present international context.

This being said, it must be put to the credit of voluntarist positivism that it has tried to differentiate international law from the other social sciences, thus showing rightly that law has specific characters.

There is no doubt that law is rooted in social reality but it represents an "assimilated", one could even say a "digested", social reality, digested through certain formal channels. Contrary to what voluntarists maintain, law is not only a form, it is also a form – a form plus a content,\(^10\) and a content into a certain form. Some contemporary doctrinal schools, such as Professor M S McDougal and his colleagues, in an excessive reaction against the traditional approach have neglected to recognise that law is also a form.

In their attempt to reconcile the science of law with reality, the Marxist neo-voluntarists have, in turn, condemned the classical formalism, declaring for example: "The concept of State will is a mere simplification and doesn't mean anything if the underlying concrete factors on which it rests are not fully taken

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7 Note 1 above at 420.
8 Falk R, "To What Extent are International Law and International Lawyers Ideologically Neutral?" in Cassese A and Weiler JHH (eds), Change and Stability in International Law—Making (1989), p 137.
into consideration".11 This is no doubt some progress towards both realism and morality – even if those authors would probably object to the inclusion of morality. But one wonders if they have not throw'n the baby out with the bath water: for if there is no more formalism, what differentiates law from other social sciences disappears, and it then becomes more risky to decide what the "real will" of States is or can be.

In fact, other contemporary efforts aiming at reconciling law and social reality, but without assimilating the first to the second, seem much more convincing. This is the case with various sociological objectivist approaches or with Professor Schachter's idea of a "legal development".12 This notion of "legal development", with which the present writer agrees, has been defined by Professor Douglas Johnston as "the entire" process "by which legal norms, standards, institutions and procedures are, more or less consciously, created, adapted, rationalized, improved and terminated by human agency".13 This kind of inquiry, if led with a very open mind and with a view not to make "science", but to take into account the whole social reality, is the only way to proceed.

The main attractions of this "legal development" approach are the following:

1. law does not exist per se; it is part of the social reality;
2. it has, nevertheless, specific characteristics, which differentiate law from other social sciences;
3. there is no clear-cut threshold between what is legal and what is not in the international society;
4. rules of law (or legal norms – both expressions are synonymous) are not fixed for ever; they evolve, and this is true for written as well as for customary norms. The time-factor is of predominant importance.14

The above statements lead us to the inescapable conclusion that, not only is State will not the basis of international law, but that it is a very misleading explanation of how international law actually works. On the other hand, consent, if the word is defined broadly enough and if it is not limited to state consent, can be illuminating and might even be a plausible test of law. In fact, contrary to the traditional voluntarist views, there is no strict correspondence, and possibly no

11 "La notion de volonté de l'état etant une simplification a de sens, comme concept, que si l'on tient compte des facteurs sur lesquels elle s'appuie", Chaumont, "Rapport sur l'institution fondamentale de l'accord entre états" in "Les méthodes d'analyse en droit international", Annales de la Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques de Reims (1974), p 250.
13 Johnston, "The Heritage of Political Thought in International Law", ibid, p 196.
14 See eg Schachter, "The Nature ...", note 12 above, p 750.
correspondence at all, between will, obligation, and law. Turning to the problem of threshold, it appears that just as consent is expressed in very varied and graduated ways, there are stages and degrees both in the formation and in the legal force of international rules.15

Will, Consent and Obligation

According to Professor Rosalyn Higgins, "what one identifies as international law will be closely dependant upon what one believes is the basis of legal obligation".16

This is partly true and partly erroneous. It is erroneous because it implies that law is only made of "obligations", that is "binding obligations". This is highly debatable. Law is not as simple as that. There is no doubt that binding obligations are part of law, but law also includes permissions, recommendations, incentives, orientations, etc. Professor Higgins' statement is nevertheless partly true since any discussion of the parameters of law and of its definitions is inevitably premised on one taking a position as to what the basis, or "foundations", of law is or are.

In this respect, the classical voluntarists' analysis has been clearly expressed by the Permanent Court in its rather unfortunate judgment in the Lotus case:17

"International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between those co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims."

This judgment implies that will would be the basis, the test, and the sign of law at the same time. It may seem superfluous to discuss such an ancient dictum as that propounded in the Lotus case. But it is difficult to avoid such discussion as it is a frequent departure point of contemporary voluntarist analysis of international law.


17 PCIJ Rep, ser A, No 10, p 18.
There is, of course, not the slightest doubt that a State can be bound by expressing its will. This is true when the State concludes a treaty, and it is obvious that when a treaty contains obligations – which is not always the case – it is binding on the parties. As the International Court recently stated: "There is no question but that the Headquarters Agreement [of 1947 between the United States and the United Nations] is a treaty in force binding the parties thereto". The very conciseness of this affirmation establishes that there is no dispute on this point. The same holds true for unilateral expressions of will as the Court explained in the Nuclear Tests cases.

Therefore, pacta sunt servanda and, more generally, acta sunt servanda. But this calls for two qualifications:

(i) will is not a sufficient explanation, nor, as a matter of fact, an explanation at all, for the binding character of voluntary rules;

(ii) an expression of will does not always create obligations, and, conversely, States can be bound without any expression of their will.

(ii) Will Without Obligation: Soft International Law

If the will of States can create obligations, it can also create less than obligations. Qui peut le plus, peut le moins: if its will can obligate the State, it can also create soft law i.e. law which is not binding.

However, although soft law is at the centre of fundamental debates about international law at the end of the twentieth century, there is no agreement among lawyers on what soft law really is. Some authors limit its definition to the formal sources of the rules and not to the rules themselves. This does not seem to be justified: law can be soft because it is contained in soft, non-binding instruments; but it can also be soft because of its content. There is a material softness as well as a formal softness. Both phenomena have the same explanations, and both fulfil the same social functions. Therefore, a restrictive definition has no justification.

Any rule is soft in some respect since "All rules of international law are open to interpretation". The question is: to what extent is a rule open to interpretation? A lot of treaties – and, formally, treaties are hard law par

18 Cf Art 26 of the 1969 Conventions on the Law of Treaties.
20 ICJ Rep 1974, p 270.
21 Id.
excellence – are substantially soft in that not only are they open to interpretation, but they are also drafted in order not to impose strict obligations on the parties. States "bind" themselves to "make all possible efforts", "to act in a certain manner", "to examine with sympathy".24 For example, Article 56 of the United Nations Charter itself has been defined as a "duty not to do nothing"25 – which is not much of an obligation!

This technique is used very frequently in international economic law. For example, Mr Oliver Long, a former Director-General of the GATT, points out that the 1974 Multi-fibre Agreement was, very deliberately, drafted in an ambiguous and soft manner.26 Another example is the incredible Section 1 of Article IV of the IMF Statutes, by virtue of which a Member State must "endeavour to orientate its economic and financial policy with a view to encouraging well ordered growth with a reasonable price stability, its particular situation being duly taken into consideration". It would be difficult to be "softer" than that!

The same is also true as regards some formal decisions taken by international organisations. Here again, it is extremely striking in the economic field. The OECD Council is entitled to take formally binding decisions; but when one reads them, it is noticeable how soft they are and how they exhort rather than compel. The cases, for example, of the "trade pledge" adopted in 197527 and of the Liberation Codes28 illustrate this point.

In addition, there are many means to "soften" formerly hard law: saving clauses, possibilities of re-negotiations, reservations, deliberate ambiguities, "agreement on a disagreement", etc.29 Professor Bruno Simma has criticised this "infection" of substantive treaty obligations by 'soft law' characteristics30. Be that as it may, this "infection" is a matter of fact: formal expressions of will by a State can amount to non-obligations.

The idea that State will can produce non-binding rules, in itself certainly does not contradict the voluntarist thesis as such. Professor Weil himself admits that "whether a rule is 'hard' or 'soft' does not, of course, affect its normative

The Normative Dilemma

What voluntarists cannot admit is that formal soft law exists and can be created by State will. Here lies one of the "voluntarist dilemmas". They have to choose between two of their basic "equations", and to decide whether State will is law (voluntarism) or if law is what can be implemented judicially ("judiciarism"). It is clear that these soft instruments - international organisations' resolutions, gentlemen's agreements - cannot, as such, be applied by tribunals - which does not mean that they are judicially irrelevant. They are nevertheless the products of State will - directly for the gentlemen's agreements, indirectly for the recommendations.

For obscure reasons - probably related to political conservatism - there seems to be a quasi-unanimity among the adherents of "positivism" to subject the equation that State will is law to the other equation, and to declare that, because formal soft law cannot be implemented by judges, it is not "real" law. They declare that "sublegal obligations are neither 'soft law' nor 'hard law': they are simply not law at all." In particular, recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations are excluded from the category of "sources" of international law, and are even said to be "rivals of international law".

In fact, such an approach is not a reasoned one, for a conclusive and far-reaching reason - which is linked to the very definition of law. It is certainly true that a tribunal cannot enforce a recommendation. But, as Professor Mendelson said: "If you take that stand-point, then all kinds of sources and majorities become relevant. If you look at it from the point of the third-party decision-maker, then you narrow your scope and voluntarism, for example, becomes more important." But law is not made for the judges. A legal norm is nothing but a "standard of behaviour", a standard of social behaviour.

From this point of view, one may disagree with Professor Schachter who writes that law "is in essence a system based on a set of rules and obligations. They must in some degree be binding, that is, the rules must be accepted as a means of independent control that effectively limits the conduct of the entities

31 Weil, note 1 above p 414.
32 Above p 23.
33 Ibid, p 415.
34 See ibid, p 417 and Seidl-Hohenveldern, note 22 above, p 68.
36 Curiously enough, these restrictive views are shared by international lawyers who, like President Jimenez de Arechaga, have nothing to do with voluntarism - see "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", 159 Recueil des cours 30 (1978-1).
subject to the law." 38 The word "limits" is debatable since it implies a kind of external coercion. A norm can "limit" if it is binding. But as long as it guides and influences, it is nonetheless a legal norm.

If this can be accepted, there is absolutely no reason why soft instruments would be excluded from the world of legal sources. A source is "any legal process creating general norms intending to govern international relations." 39 This definition fits resolutions or gentlemen's agreements as well as treaties or customs. Resolutions, for example, are made by institutions, through a legal – even a legalistic – process, and they are intended to influence States' conduct. 40 They are, therefore, sources of law. 41 As Professor Georges Abi-Saab put it, "a normative proposition can be legally relevant without being legally binding." 42

Besides, it is difficult to see why soft treaties would be sources of law while these instruments would not be. As regards judicial implementation, both have the same status: tribunals cannot implement them. It would be hard work to establish in the International Court that a State does not abide by Section 1 of Article IV of the IMF Statutes, 43 (above) just as it is impossible to obtain a judgment on an alleged violation of a resolution or a gentlemen's agreement.

Saying that these instruments are sources of international law certainly does not mean that they are compulsory or binding. They are not, although the contrary has sometimes been asserted. It is true that such assertions are rare. 44 Usually, authors are more cautious: they do not claim that recommendations or non-conventional concerted acts are compulsory but that, in certain circumstances, when votes are cast with the intent to be bound by a text drafted in apparently hard law terms, the resolution is, in reality, an agreement concluded in a simplified way. 45 In particular, it has been argued that the fact that some

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38 Schachter, "International Law ...", note 12 above, p 25.
39 Dehaussy, "Sources du droit international – Introduction générale", JCIDI fasc 10, No 7 – "... tout processus juridique de créateur de normes générales destinées à régir des rapports internationaux". See also No 9.
42 Abi-Saab in Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above, p 77.
43 Above p 28.
44 See Elias, "Modern Sources of International Law", in Transnational Law in a Changing Society p 46, and, but less neatly, Bedjaoui M, For a New International Economic Order (1979), [pp 182 et seq].
States express reservations to some resolutions show that these resolutions are held as being legally binding.46

This kind of reasoning is not very persuasive. States always have a choice: they can conclude a treaty, thuselecting for hard law; or they can choose soft legal tools. Why, then, would their formal choice be changed by the analyst? Dr Aust defines an "informal international instrument" as "an instrument which is not a treaty because the parties to it do not intend it to be legally binding",47 but he adds that they can be bound by it if they so intend.48 This is not very coherent.

In the same way, it is certainly not correct to assert that when they have voted for a recommendation States are bound by it.49 When casting their vote, States know that they are adopting a mere recommendation. As Professor McGibbon has written: "Their votes in this context are not manifestations of either their acceptance (or otherwise) of an obligation to comply or their consent or assent (or otherwise) to the provisions of a resolution as legally binding rules. They are votes for or against a recommendation."50 To admit the contrary is not only illogical, but is also completely incompatible with the actual state of international relations and would freeze the international machinery. Strange as it might seem, States, generally speaking, respect their obligations; but they are anxious not to expand them indefinitely. If by voting for a recommendation it is held that States are bound by their vote, they would certainly be very cautious and suspicious, and one can forecast that the legal productivity of the General Assembly would be nil or nearly so.

On the other hand, it is not suggested that soft instruments have no legal effects. They have some and their legal effects are not at all negligible. A recommendation for example:

- must be "examined" bona fide by all the Member States or the Organisation that adopted it;

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48 Ibid, 807, et seq.
narrow the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States;\textsuperscript{51} and may be implemented by them.\textsuperscript{52}

This last consequence is more far-reaching than it looks. It means that, when a State implements a recommendation, its international responsibility is not involved and, in turn, this implies that recommendations are not binding, they are permissive. They do not compel—they permit.

Is it necessary to qualify these assertions? Many international lawyers think so, in that, without denying that recommendations have—or may have—legal value, they suggest that this value depends on several external variables: circumstances of their adoption, voting techniques, importance and consistence of the majority, existence of an implementing or a control machinery, etc.\textsuperscript{53}

This view has been echoed in some judicial or arbitral pronouncements.\textsuperscript{54}

These factors are certainly relevant—but not crucial in the present context. They can (and must) be taken into consideration to establish if the rule enunciated in the resolution is an expression of customary law—as the International Court did in the \textit{Nicaragua} case in 1986\textsuperscript{55}—but the reinforced legal value of the norm is not based on the resolution itself but on the custom of which the resolution is either an expression or a constitutive element.\textsuperscript{56}

The same is true if a resolution is accepted as law by Member States of the Organisation—or even Non-Members—in some additional Act. This could be by a previous treaty (as was done, for example in the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy as regard the legal statutes of the Italian colonies), or in public statements made by States, as was done in 1958 by the USA and the USSR, when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1348 (XIII) on Peaceful Uses of Extra-Aerospheric Space. There is no doubt that, in such cases, the rules embodied in recommendations are compulsory for the States having accepted them; but this binding effect is not due to the recommendation, but to the unilateral declaration(s) of the concerned State(s).\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{54} See eg \textit{Texaco–Catalasiatic v Libya}, Arbitral Award, 19 Jan 1977, 17 ILM 1978 p 1.

\textsuperscript{55} ICJ Rep 1986, p 100.

\textsuperscript{56} Below p 35.

\textsuperscript{57} See eg MacGibbon, \textit{op cit} n.47, p 14.
Conclusions that can be drawn from this brief study are quite simple:

1. law is normative, not positive;  
2. it is made of binding and non-binding norms;
3. State will can create obligations (binding rules); and
4. it can also create non-binding norms of conduct.

(ii) **Obligation Without Will** – "General" International Law

As well as the fact that there can be State will without obligation, there can also be obligation without will, difficult as this may be for voluntarist doctrine.

International law is similar to other legal systems in that subjects of law, including sovereign States, can be bound without their will and, sometimes, against their express contrary will. This is even true for treaties, although they are considered by classical voluntarist doctrine as paragons of "good" law and, in fact, the only real source of law.

When accepting a treaty – which is a voluntary, supposedly free decision – States buy a "one-way ticket". Take a case like Wimbledon. By its will – whether free or not is debatable, but the Court thought so and the Treaty of Versailles was not subjected to the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations – Germany had entered into an agreement. Obviously, at the time the events which gave rise to the dispute occurred, Germany had changed its will and was no longer willing to apply the treaty – moreover, for valid reasons. Nevertheless, and quite rightly, the Court's answer was: *Pacta sunt servanda*. But this sacrosanct slogan of voluntarism as used here means the very contrary of voluntarism: "whatever its will, a State must abide by the law it entered into."

It would, therefore, seem that will is only an explanation for one part of the process, ie, the entry into a treaty. It does not explain the basis of a State's obligation when that State is no longer willing to implement a treaty. This does not mean, of course, that treaties are established *ne varietur*, and it is necessary to be aware that treaty-law changes and lives as does any part of law, either through an informal evolution (mainly thanks to interpretation), or formally. But it is suggested that there is no symmetry in the evolution: what has been done willingly cannot be changed or terminated only by will.

When it enters into an agreement, a State acts unilaterally. Indeed, except in a very few conceivable cases (in the field of human rights for example), at least two States must express their will to be bound. Nevertheless, they express it

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59 Once again, it is not contested that, at least apparently, (see below p 35), treaties are based on the will of the parties.
60 See PCIJ Rep, Series A, No1.
61 At 29–30.
unilaterally: ratification, accession, acceptance, signature, etc., are unilateral acts. On the contrary, when they want to terminate the treaty, the parties must act together. "All States" must express the same will (except, of course, if the treaty itself prescribes otherwise). If not, the recalcitrant State will be responsible for its violation of the treaty. This is the clear result of Articles 54 and 56 to 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

It can be maintained that will is not absent from this process. But it is not State will – not even majority will, but communal will, in a very strict sense – the will of each and every party – not of one or a few or even many of them.

However, it can happen that some liberties are taken with apparently strict rules embodied in the Vienna Convention. Thus, the habilitation clause, adopted by the GATT at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, undoubtedly amends the General Agreement, and should, therefore, have been voted for unanimously in conformity with Article XXX, Paragraph 1, of the General Agreement; instead, it was adopted by consensus. In the same way, the famous Smithsonian Institute Agreement, which was instrumental in changing the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971 was a purely informal agreement, which certainly does not meet the requirements of Article XXVIII of the IMF Statutes. In both cases, the initial pactum was not respected, it was modified: the communal consent achieved what isolated State wills could not have done.

It is also true that the law of treaties offers an apparent safety net to States. This is in the form of the famous doctrine of the fundamental change of circumstances, to which Article 62 of the Vienna Convention is dedicated. According to this principle, a treaty can be terminated provided circumstances have changed in a radical way and this change affects the very scope of the treaty.

This well established rule of law puzzles voluntarists as it is not easy to reconcile with the idea of will. Voluntarists have tried, by claiming that any treaty embodies an implicit clause providing for its termination in case of fundamental changes of circumstances: clausula rebus sic stantibus. This problem cannot be discussed here in any detail, but it is clear that the clausula is a purely fictitious explanation: "Such clauses, if ever employed, are not now generally employed". In fact, it is certainly more convincing to root this rule of law – which does exist in all systems of law – in the necessities of social life.

62 See Long, note 26 above, p 76.
The function of legal rules is to meet social needs; when social needs change legal rules lose legitimacy and lose their binding force.

State will is not totally obsolete since it is up to the affected State to endorse the proposed changes or not. But its will is entirely subordinate to the underlying social international environment – the social background is part of the rule itself.

All these considerations hold true, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, regarding not only treaties but also unilateral acts of States. As discussed earlier,\textsuperscript{67} States can bind themselves by unilateral expressions of will. This is compatible with the voluntarist approach. But when such declarations have been made, "the unilateral undertaking resulting from these statements cannot be interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance of an arbitrary power of reconsideration".\textsuperscript{68} Here again, \textit{acta sunt servanda}. But, once more, the formula is very ambiguous.\textsuperscript{69}

Thus it appears that treaties or unilateral commitments, praised as they may be in voluntarist jurisprudence, flow effectively from the will of States; but when they enter into force, they negate the notion of sovereign will. Once a State, by an apparent act of its free will has entered into a treaty or a unilateral commitment, the trap closes; its will is bound and will be freed only through processes in which the will of an individual State will have little or nothing to do.

Moreover, it is not clear that, in the prevailing conditions of modern international life, a formal expression of will is always necessary. The great so-called "codification treaties" which, more often than not, are "progressive development treaties" can, nevertheless, be binding upon all States, even if not in force. At any rate these general treaties certainly provide "general indications" of what law is.\textsuperscript{70} And it can be recalled that in the \textit{Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf} case, the Court considered that it "would have had \textit{propr\'io motu} to take account of the progress made by the [Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea] even if the parties had not alluded to it in their Special Agreement".\textsuperscript{71}

In any case, whatever the role of State will in conventional processes, it is clear that its influence is even less regarding other means of formation of legal rules.

\textsuperscript{67} Above p 27.
\textsuperscript{68} ICJ Rep 1974, p 270.
\textsuperscript{70} Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, ICJ Rep 1908, p 94.
\textsuperscript{71} ICJ Rep 1982, p 38.
In the first place, regarding rules of customary international law, Professor Weil himself has defined them as "the Achilles heel of consensualist outlook". It will be enough to have a very quick look at the classical theory based on the well-known two "elements" of custom, as enunciated by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.

First, as far as the so-called "material element", the "general practice", is concerned, in a way, States' behaviour converging towards such a practice can be said to be "voluntary". But State wills are aimed here at doing something, not at elaborating a rule of law. If a national court makes a decision on State immunity, its judgment will be part of the general practice. That, however, was not the aim of the court's decision: its only concern was to decide on the precise dispute it had to solve.

Some authors stress a relatively recent evolution: that nowadays the customary process is taken into account much more than it used to be, since its departure point is quite often a resolution – usually named "declaration" adopted in an international organisation – in the UN General Assembly. "Thus, an exogen process gives way to an endogen, centralized, institutionalised, regulated process, deliberately used in order to obtain fixed voluntary results". This is Dupuy's "coutume sauvage". There is merit, no doubt, in this analysis, but I think it has more to do with resolutions than with customs, and, in any case, it relates more to the "mental" or "psychological" element of custom than to practice.

This leads to the question of whether the requirement of an opinio juris is a confirmation of voluntarist theories. The answer must be in the negative for several reasons which will only be mentioned:

1. both elements are not on the same footing. It is only the practice which is "constitutive"; opinio juris can only appear after the event. One cannot "feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation", as the International Court expressed it in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, if this legal obligation does not already exist;


73 Note 72 above, p 61.


75 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Rep 1969, p 44.
2. the wording used by the Court is interesting: a "feeling" that an
obligation exists is a very different thing from a will – this could be
what Professor d'Amato had in mind when he said that "the rules of
international law depend upon consensus of nation–State officials as to
what the content of the law is";\(^76\) and

3. above all, this "feeling", or even "acceptance" – if one sticks to the
wording of Article 38 – is, by no means achieved by the expression of
will of individual States, but a general, communal acceptance of some
more or less openly expressed conviction by States or by international
bodies. In its 1984 judgment, the Chamber of the International Court
constituted in the *Gulf of Maine* case contented itself with an
examination of "the legal conviction ... of all States" ("*de l'ensemble des
Etats*" in the original French text).\(^77\) As President Jimenez De
Arechaga has demonstrated, the Court "has not required strict proof of
the specific acceptance of the defendant State, thus rejecting the
voluntarist conception of custom."\(^78\)

It is, of course, impossible to ignore the "persistent objector" doctrine. But it
must be observed that it is, at best, a "contracting out" doctrine and that,
perceptive as it might seem, it is largely unrealistic: in most cases, States do not
care; practice develops without them being aware of the process. When they
"awake", that is, when the time of *opinio juris* has arrived, it is too late – the evil
is done and the rule does exist. In its 1986 judgment, in the *Nicaragua* case, the
Court noted that, when General Assembly Resolution 2131(XX) was adopted,
the United States declared that this resolution – embodying the non–intervention
principle – was "only a statement of political intent and not a formulation of
law". However, as the US made no analogous statement five years later, when
the much less specific 2625(XXV) declaration was adopted, it was, in fact,
bound by that rule.\(^79\)

On the contrary, of course, nothing impedes a State from expressly accepting
any customary rule. This has, no doubt, important practical effects in facilitating
proof both of the existence of the rule in general and of its application to the
accepting State. And this is enough to explain why, in concrete cases, courts and
tribunals mention, whenever it is practicable, such express acceptances by parties
to the dispute. This was done by the International Court in the *Nicaragua*
case.\(^80\) But no theoretical conclusion can be inferred from this: "Acceptance of
a rule contributes to its effectiveness",\(^81\) but is not a pre–requisite for its
existence.

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\(^76\) D'Amato note 72 above, p 33; see also pp 170 and 269.
\(^77\) ICJ Rep 1984, p 299.
\(^78\) Jimenez de Arechaga, "Custom" in Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above pp 3–11.
\(^79\) ICJ Rep 1986, p 107.
\(^80\) Ibid.
\(^81\) Gaja in Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above p 16.
Finally, it must be stressed that what has been said about treaties is *a fortiori* true for custom. Whatever role their will plays in the formation of customary rules, once these exist, States are bound—and even more strongly than by treaty. The reason for this is that the generality of customary law makes it nearly impossible for a State or a group of States to repudiate completely an existing custom—which binds other States.

From this very quick overview of custom, it can at least be concluded that State will contributes very little to its formation.

This conclusion is even more obvious regarding general principles of law. They are such a problem for voluntarist authors that most of them deliberately ignore these principles and deny them the quality of an autonomous source of law. From a voluntarist point of view, this is a condemnation to death!

This position is quite easy to understand. If, at a pinch, custom can be equated with a tacit agreement—*quod non!*—such a conjuring trick is clearly impossible as regards general principles of law. If paragraph (c) of Article 38.1 of the Court's Statute has an autonomous meaning, those principles can only be general propositions underlying national legal norms, rules applied by States *in foro domesitico*. Of course, it is plain that State will has nothing to do with such rules. Most certainly, they do exist in national legal orders; but in no way have they been created to apply at the international level and, in fact, there are cases when they do not apply. This has nothing to do with State will: it depends entirely on the question of whether or not the international society can be compared with national society.

Last but not least, it is necessary to say something about *jus cogens*. It is neither possible nor useful to waste time on this device, so clear is the problem. If such risks exist—and they do in the present writer's opinion—it is clear that "peremptory norms of general international law", by their very definition—unsatisfactory as this definition is at present time—cannot be reconciled with voluntarist views. This is because:

1. according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, they are "accepted and recognized by the international community of States *as a whole*"—which clearly excludes a State by State acceptance or even recognition;

2. *jus cogens* rules have no determinate form and are only recognizable by their effects: contrary provisions are null and void; this is expressly provided for in Articles 53, 64 and 66 of the Vienna Convention as far

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82 See Sur, "Sources ...", note 72 above, No 99.
84 See ibid, pp 294–318.
85 This is all the more certain that, in the *Nicaragua v US* case, the ICJ has, for the first time, used the word, even if it was rather cautious in utilising the concept—see—ICJ Rep 1986, p 100.
as treaties are concerned and is probably also true for unilateral acts;\textsuperscript{86} and

3. the solemn ratification of the concept in 1969 was precisely intended to restrict disastrous political effects of voluntarism.

Legal theories are not – at least, not only – innocuous intellectual games. They have concrete consequences and may become political stakes. To make a long story short, \textit{jus cogens} can be said to be the repentance sign of Third World countries, when they became aware that the strict voluntarist posture they took after independence was a dupe. \textit{Jus cogens} was then perceived as an exit from the vicious circle in which these countries had locked themselves in thinking that in sanctifying their sovereign will they would protect themselves against pressure. They quickly realized that it was a very theoretical view and that what could be true for powerful and well-established States was not so for weak and new countries. Hence, the \textit{jus cogens} doctrine appeared as an effort to protect the interests of the weaker against the wills of the stronger.

Perhaps \textit{jus cogens} can be interpreted "as some form of older natural law thinking"; at any rate, it is clearly "an updated denial of positivism".\textsuperscript{87} However, it may not be the sole contemporary reaction against doctrinal positivism.

In a recent and interesting study, Professor MacDonald reviewed "Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law"\textsuperscript{88} to show that other concepts perform the same role as \textit{jus cogens}. He suggested as examples \textit{erga omnes} norms, objective legal geographic regimes (and Article 62.2(a) of the Vienna Convention seems to confirm it) and, perhaps, the United Nations Charter as a whole. These may be seen as various elements of a kind of international super-legality, in which individual State wills have not much to do, and which serve to limit and restrain these wills, thus providing international relations with a moral content.

I am not of course suggesting that State will has no impact on international law. Voluntary law is prevalent: in day-to-day practice, international law is what concerned States decide it is. But this voluntary law expands inside a general legal framework which owes nothing or very little to individual State will. If we adopt Hart's famous distinction,\textsuperscript{89} it can be said that international secondary rules have nothing to do with State will,\textsuperscript{90} and that this is also true for some, although rather exceptional, primary rules of fundamental importance. If

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} See MacDonald, "Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law", (1987) Canadian Yb I L p 136.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Bos, "Will and Order in the Nation-State System: Observation on Positivism and Positive International Law" in MacDonald and Johnston, note 12 above, p 51; see also Dupuy R-J, note 45 above, p 197.
\item \textsuperscript{88} See note 86 above, pp 115–149, \textit{passim}.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Hart HLA, \textit{The Concept of Law}, 1961.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Franck, "Legitimacy in the International System" (1988), AJIL p 759.
\end{itemize}
there is some merit in such an analysis, then it would confirm Professor MacDonald's forecast of an emerging international constitution.

I would, nevertheless, not go as far as that since I think that speaking of a "constitution" in the international society is ambiguous. However, I would suggest that if this international society is very different from a national society, and if comparisons between both systems of law are cautious, there may be grounds for a comparison. In the same way as, inside the State, contracts express the wills of the parties but within limits determined by general legislation, special international law deriving from State will — that is, treaties and unilateral acts — is expanded and qualified by general international law, which exists independently of State wills.

**Will, Consent and Social Heterogeneity**

Until now the analysis in this paper has been formal and abstract. This was unavoidable since its aim was to try to refute the fundamental postulates of voluntarism.

The following presentation of legal development as a process will be more concrete. The general idea is the following, and was expressed by Wolfgang Friedmann in the first sentence of his 1969 Hague general course: "All law is an instrument of social order, and therefore closely tied to the structure of the society which it seeks to regulate."91 Neither auctoritas nor veritas facit legem but societas. Auctoritas is the positivist flag. Veritas could be the hallmark of natural law. Societas is the objectivist alpha and omega.

Kelsen wanted "to clear law from all external elements".92 George Scelle echoed that "no social phenomenon is, by nature, external to law".93 Even if one does not share all Scelle's views, this is certainly right.

As Professor Rosalyn Higgins put it, "law and politics are not necessarily inimical".94 When one speaks of international law making, the law making process is not "inimical" to politics, but is, in fact, largely, if not exclusively political.95 This refutes the absurd accusation of "politicisation" more and more often addressed to international law making processes inside international organisations. To complain that the General Assembly is "politicised" is as irrelevant as finding fault in the "politicisation" of the United States Congress or

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93 Scelle G, *Précis de droit des gens* (1932), p 83: "rien de ce qui est social n'est par nature indifférent au droit".
95 See Giraud, "Le droit positif — ses rapports avec la philosophie et la politique", *Hommage d'une génération de juristes au Président Basdevant*, p 234; see also de Lacharrière, note 24 above, p 199.
the Australian parliament. In fact, what is called "politicisation" only shows that the legal system is accepting rules and principles that the critics do not like.

Of course, "law cannot and should not mirror social realities in all its details".96 but Fawcett is right when he writes that law "emerges as a fact of life where there are minimum degrees of order, which it must serve to rationalise and extend".97 This condition is fulfilled in the international society: international order does exist98 even if it is very specific and much less "integrated" than the national one. The relations of power which are hidden inside modern States appear, naked, in the international sphere and this, of course, has an influence on law, or, at least, on the analysis of law. This makes international law a kind of laboratory where legal phenomena can be studied more easily than from within the State.

The exercise of power is more evident and law appears more clearly as a reflection of its consequences in the international sphere. And this leads back to will: for will and power are not easily reconciled. Power implies coercion: coercion limits (or excludes) freedom; and, without freedom, it does not make much sense to speak of "will" because by definition, will is free.

But this is not necessarily the case for consent. Will does not equate with consent: "I don't want this" may represent my will but I may still agree to a particular proposal. This is consent, or, at least, what the present writer has in mind when he speaks of consent. The shade in meaning of both words does not seem as clear in English as it is in French. "Consent" in this sense can be an equivalent to what other writers have in mind when they use the word "consensus".99 The point here is that, in the same way, States do not want international law or, more exactly such and such a rule of international law, but even if their will is not free, they can consent to a rule not because they want it, but because they have no real choice.

As has been seen in the first part of this paper, will explains nothing in international law. It can be admitted that, for its part, consent, although certainly not the "basis" of international law, is a more convincing principle since it is not incompatible with at least a certain amount of coercion and it explains – partly at least – the importance, already noted100 of relative normativity in contemporary international law.

96 Van Hoof, note 25 above, p 24.
98 See Dupuy R-J, La clôture du système international – La cite tenestre (1989), 159; and, for a very different presentation, Combacau, "Le droit international, brie a brac ou système?", Archives de philosophie du droit" (1986), pp 85–105 or Sur, "Systeme juridique international et utopie", ibid, pp 35–45.
99 See Bulajic, "Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order" in Hossain K (ed), note 41 above, p 60 or D'Amato, see note 72 above.
100 Above p 1.
The Threshold of Admissible Coercion (consent and freedom)

International law postulates freedom of will - and, anyway, will without freedom is not will at all. Thus, the Vienna Convention devotes five articles (48–52) to this problem and several other provisions are related to it. It therefore seems difficult to assume that, when a State concludes a treaty without error or fraud, corruption or coercion in the sense of the Vienna Convention, its will is not free.

This, in fact, is pure hypocrisy. It is not enough to will; it is also necessary to be able to will. And it is quite clear that in the international society, if States are equal, some are "more equal" than the others.

Does this, which is an undeniable reality, affect the existence or the validity of law? As is well known, the problem was controversial during the Vienna Conference. There was no discussion on the principle: a treaty concluded under duress is void.

But what is duress? Certainly, the use of military force - except in the very rare hypothesis where it is still admitted by the United Nations Charter. But what else? Third World countries wished to prohibit all kinds of coercion; Western States thought it was unrealistic and threatening to legal certainty. Hence the painstaking compromise resulting in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention - which does not answer the question - and the joint Declaration which condemns all kinds of coercion "military, political or economic, during the conclusion of a treaty", which either does not mean anything or is highly unrealistic.

Coercion is a component of international society as of any society. In very sophisticated systems, like our modern nation-States, it can be limited, but it is never neutralised.

It is obvious that the "will" of small weak States is "less free" than that of large powerful ones - and this is not only an economic development problem, even if that is a key aspect. Let us take a few examples:

1. Is a developing nationalising State willing to enter a compensation treaty? It is.
2. Was Tanzania willing to accept a stand-by arrangement from the IMF? It did.
3. Are, generally speaking, developing States willing to conclude so called "cooperation agreements" with industrialised countries? They are.

101 Above p 35.
103 See Jimenez de Arechaga, note 35 above, p 61.
Yet, it is obvious in all these cases that it is difficult to speak of a real free will – you can compel a child to say "it is sunny" when it rains but you cannot force him or her to like rain.

Even from a purely procedural point of view, the real equality of States is not secure. Describing the problems met by Third World countries in big multilateral conferences, Ambassador Pinto, writing as an insider, said:

"The advanced industrialised countries come to the conference in a much higher state of preparedness than do their developing countries' partners. Years ahead in the relevant technological and scientific knowledge; equipped with facilities and manpower more than adequate to the task of analysis of issues, formulation of options and the planning of strategies, equipped also with the means of rapid communication with policy-makers at the capital, the industrialised countries present a formidable image to the Group of 77.

Most States of the Group of 77, and the exceptions are few, are able to respond only through their representations by high quality diplomatic or legal personnel for whom the conference is just one of many varied assignments."

Things being as they are, and these States being sovereign, why do they conclude such treaties if they do not really want to? The short answer is because they need to. Not only because they need money, technical assistance, urgent food help and so on. But also because they feel very strongly the absolute necessity to "participate". And this holds true not only for treaties but, more generally, for international law, whatever its form. "The new State must belong to the international community."

As Professor Thomas Franck writes, "membership confers a desirable status which is manifested when the members have internalised socially functional and status-rooted privileges and duties." And accepting international law is a way to become a member. "Obligation is perceived to be owed to a community of States as a necessary reciprocal incident of membership in the community."

Mutatis mutandis, this applies also to big and powerful States. For various reasons their will also is coerced and if they conclude a treaty or vote in favour of a resolution, it might be – and, indeed, it often is – because it fits their perceived

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105 Bin Cheng, "Custom – The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World", in Macdonald and Johnston (eds), note 12 above, p 519; see also Scelle, note 93 above, p 308; but Scelle assumes, rightly in the present writer's view, that this "belonging" is not free, while Professor Bin Cheng holds for the contrary.

106 Note 90 above, p 711.

107 Ibid, p 753.
interest. But there are other reasons: because they have to arbitrate between
their immediate and their long term interests\textsuperscript{108}; because they fear ridicule\textsuperscript{109} or
because they are, in fact, more deeply involved in international relations, and
therefore care even more for interdependence.\textsuperscript{110}

No State's will is entirely free. And though it can happen, in some
circumstances, that power is well balanced, it is usually not the case and law
reflects the actual balance, or imbalance, of power during the period when the
rule is adopted. What is true for treaties is also true for custom. Practice is the
real test of power, and for its formation "what States do is more important than
what they say".\textsuperscript{111} And there is no doubt that the "bigs" are able to do more than
the "weaks".

Must it be inferred from this that "unequal" rules of law – that is, rules in
force between unequal partners or embodying unequals' wills – are void? That
would clearly be absurd and the negation of the very existence of law itself.
Moreover, if rules of law could coincide in a perfect balanced way with the
interests of all existing States there would be no more need for law.\textsuperscript{112} As is
said in Latin, \textit{cocta voluntas tamen voluntas} (a coerced will is will
nevertheless).\textsuperscript{113} But if this is no doubt true, it cannot be accepted without
qualifications. There must be a threshold of admissible coercion.

In this respect, recent solutions applied on a case by case basis by
international courts and tribunals are based on common sense and quite
convincing. They can be summed up by saying that non-military coercion
invalidates the rule if and only if it is obvious and out of proportion to the usual
practices, which cannot be avoided, in an international society strongly marked
by an imbalance of power. Thus, in its 1973 judgments in the \textit{Fisheries
Jurisdiction} case, the International Court refused to admit that the mere
inequality of power between the United Kingdom and the Federal German
Republic on the one hand, and Iceland on the other hand, could, in itself, void the
relevant fisheries agreements.\textsuperscript{114} The Arbitral Tribunal which solved the dispute
between Kuwait and Aminoil in 1982,\textsuperscript{115} while accepting that the 1973

\begin{footnotes}
\item 108 Ibid, p 716.
\item 109 Ibid, p 715.
\item 110 For an example, see Schachter, "International Law in Theory ...", note 12 above, p
106.
\item 111 Schwebel, "The Effect of Resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly on
Customary International Law", \textit{ASIL Proceedings} 1949, p 302. See also de
Lacharrière, note 24 above, p 57.
\item 112 See Chaumont, note 11 above, p 249 or Colin J–P, in Actes des 2ème et 3ème
\item 113 See Bin Cheng, note 105 above, p 519.
\item 114 ICJ Rep, 1973, p 14.
\item 115 Ref Arbitral Award, 24 March 1982, ILM p 976, [JDI], 1982.
\end{footnotes}
agreement between the parties had been concluded under economic pressure, concluded that: "in fact, the Corporation made a choice: as unpleasant as certain demands could have been it thought it should accept because it was possible to deal with them. Its whole behaviour shows that this pressure was not of such a nature as to inhibit its freedom". Nevertheless the Tribunal took these pressures under consideration in interpreting the agreement, and in determining that consents given under economic coercion could not form part of opinio juris.

This is very reasonable and realistic: coercion is a fact of international life. It is absolutely impossible to speak of "free will" in the international society. But this does not impede States in consenting to the rules of international law. Nor does this mean that their consent is legally invalid because of the disadvantageous position in which they might have been placed.

(ii) A Threshold of Law (consent and relative normativity)

Inequality of power and tensions between States raise another problem of threshold.

Indeed, the apparent disorganisation of the international society and the complexity of its functioning carry with it a range of processes. Inside States the existence of a centralised legislator – usually a Parliament – allows a clear distinction between what is, and what is not, or not yet, law. As Professor Falk clearly explained, "in a social system without effective central institutions of government, it is almost always difficult in the absence of formal agreement, to determine that a rule of law exists. Normativity is a matter of degree, expressive of expectations by national governments toward what is permissible and impermissible."

In such a situation, there are uncertainties as to the content of law.

The reassuring conformism of voluntarism enables its adherents to give an orderly appearance to this unacceptable (by them) disorder – at least at the level of legal analysis. As has already been said, voluntarists decide that law is all that proceeds from State will. That is the threshold and it has a lot of clear cut effects. To quote Professor Weil again: "the threshold does exist: on one side of the line, there is born a legal obligation that can be relied on before a court or

116 This agreement was a State contract, but the applicable principles can be transposed to the international sphere.
117 See note 115 above.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 See Bos, "The Recognised Manifestations of International Law", (1977) GYbIL, p 19.
121 Michel Virally points out that national Parliaments can both fix the lex ferenda and transform it into lex lata note 2 above, p 528.
122 Falk, note 9 above, p 178; see also Friedmann, p 142.
arbitrator, the flouting of which constitutes an internationally unlawful act giving
rise to international responsibility; on the other side, there is nothing of the
kind."123

Because this is simple it can be appealing. But because it is simplistic, it
does not fit with reality and does not enable law to fulfil its function – which is
not to maintain what exists, nor to meet scholars' taste for order, but to guide
social conduct, in the interest, not of all members of the society (for that would
be quite idealistic and unrealistic) but of those who hold the most power and
influence.

This being said, there is certainly not in this matter any rigid determinism as
Marxist orthodoxy declares. No State and no group of States exert an absolute
domination on the others, even if there can be no doubt that the "West" (the
OECD countries) are largely predominant in contemporary international society.
This predominance has certainly been reinforced recently; nevertheless, these
States must first co-exist and compromise with one another, and secondly take
the existence and relative power of other countries into consideration.

Law is at the centre of gravity of all conflicting social tensions at a given
moment and the formula applied to custom by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice can be
extended to law as a whole: It is the normative translation of "mutual
tolerations".124 This has absolutely no value connotation, it does not imply any
kind of "harmony"; it only means that, at a given moment, States recognise a
given set of norms as having a legal legitimacy. These rules are not "good" or
"bad" – they are seen by States as being legally relevant. But, of course, as
Professor Franck has demonstrated, "their perception of legitimacy will vary in
degree from rule to rule and time to time."125

At periods when a State or a group of States exert an obvious domination,
variations will be slow and limited and a threshold of law can be said to exist.
This was the case during the long "classical period" of international law –
roughly from the end of the Napoleonic wars until World War II. At this time of
great stability – in spite of endemic wars – it was legitimate to look for a
threshold and not very surprising that scholars thought they had found one, or
apparently found one: State will. At the time, scholars did not and could not
know that the will of a few dominant States could be imposed on the rest of the
world.

Things change when the power of the dominant group is disparaged and
challenged. Then the picture becomes confused. A blossoming of soft law
reveals both the hopes of the weakest and the capacity for resistance of the
dominant. No State or group of States can impose its views, none is fully
satisfied, but all resign themselves. They do not will: Rather, they consent.

123 Note 1 above, pp 417–418.
Principles and Sources of Law", (1952) B Yb I L, p 68.
125 Note 90 above, p 706.
Consensus in the technical sense, a "kind of bastard unanimity", expresses this situation very well. Far from being an efficiency token, it is a sign of renouncement. It indicates at one and the same time that States are not able to reach unanimity and that recourse to the majority principle is unacceptable for various reasons, the main very likely being that the majority needs the minority and that the latter is not strong enough to impose its view and does not want to be isolated.

The same explanation holds true for the use of soft instruments or the inclusion of soft provisions in hard legal instruments. "The main usefulness of soft law rests in the possibility of thus overcoming a deadlock in relations between States pursuing conflicting ideology and/or economic aims." It is not because resolutions are "better" than treaties that resolutions are adopted; it is much more often because a treaty is an inaccessible goal. It is not because general principles are "better" than strict rules – although they might sometimes be – that they are "preferred", but because rules cannot be established. The "grey zone" between law and "non-law" grows. The threshold disappears.

In such a period of contests, rivalries and unsteadiness, legal analysts have no choice but to turn to the entire process of law-making. It is not mainly a matter of ideological or doctrinal preference – even if it is also this. It is pure realistic logic: since there is no more threshold, it is impossible to confine oneself to studying "sources" of international law precisely because the analyst cannot apprehend them. When the analyst things he or she has seized a rule, it escapes

126 Condorelli, in Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above, p 117.
129 As an example concerning raw materials agreements, see Eisenmann P-M, L'organisation internationale du commerce des produits de base (1982), p 302.
130 See eg Bollecker–Stern, note 41 above, p 70 or Virally, "Rapport introductif", in IUHEI, note 24 above, pp 50–52.
132 For an example, see Marchisio S and Di Blase A, supervised by Malintoppi A and Cahier P, L'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'Alimentation et l'Agriculture (FAO) (1986), p 227. The authors show that it is because of the impossibility of concluding raw materials agreements that the FAO has adopted guidelines in this field.
133 See Van Dijk, note 37 above, p 15.
134 See eg Condorelli in Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above, p 80, or Virally, note 2 above, p 521.
like an eel, since there are inevitably elements of "softness" in it. Therefore if he or she is honest,\textsuperscript{135} that analyst will be compelled, whether he or she likes it or not, to forsake sources and to study processes – Professor Abi–Saab has called "building blocks".\textsuperscript{136}

In this respect Professor Christophe Schreuer was perfectly correct to write:\textsuperscript{137}

"A closer look at the realities of international decision–making shows that an attempt to divide the law into neatly separate rules which can be allocated to official types of sources is not satisfactory. Very often it is impossible to base a decision, or even a general prescription, on any one type of source. The process of communication leading to legal expectations and to a conduct corresponding to them, can take place in a variety of forms which are interrelated and often not clearly distinguishable. Even a relatively clear–cut prescription like a treaty provision is in constant interaction with other types of international law, from its drafting up to its application, and can lead a decision–maker through the whole mass of sources of international law, including the resolutions of international institutions.

Each of several relevant elements for a particular decision may not, on its own, be authoritative enough to qualify as a binding rule or to present a sufficient basis for the decision. Their combined effect, however, can be illusive ...

Rather than searching for abstract rules classified by types of sources, it seems more appropriate to examine the entire body of legally significant authority for a particular decision."

As this long quotation shows, a global analysis is particularly indispensable when resolutions are included in the process. As seen previously,\textsuperscript{138} they have legal (not binding but legal) force by themselves. but it would certainly oversimplify legal reality to be satisfied with such a study. A resolution has a legal existence in itself, but it usually forms part of a process as well. "The formal legal statute of the resolution in itself must be distinguished from the legal consequences of its normative content. It follows that – and it is different for a treaty – the legal weight of this normative content is not only the consequence of the legal instrument in which it is inserted; it must also be looked

\textsuperscript{135} Very fortunately, many scholars are! Weill's famous article is, in this respect, exemplary – the author laments over reality, but he describes it very honestly and his study is probably the most acute description of this soft law he is so much horrified by!

\textsuperscript{136} In Cassese and Weiler (eds), note 8 above, p 77.

\textsuperscript{137} Schreuer, "Recommendations and the Traditional Sources of International Law" (1977), G Yb I L 112–113.

\textsuperscript{138} Above p 31.
at outside and beyond this instrument." The "given" legal value – which has already been evoked – must be studied together with the "added" value.

Moreover, this idea of "process" must be given a very large meaning. It refers not only to the flowing of time, but also to the present context of the rule or the instrument. As the International Court recalled: "A rule of international law, whether customary or conventional, does not operate in a vacuum, it operates in relation to facts and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of which it forms only a part".

Thus, for example, the General Preferential System contained in the "Concerted Conclusions" adopted in 1970 by the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences cannot be apprehended in isolation. They must be analysed together with the long series of resolutions they follow and with the national "preferential schemes" – which are unilateral acts – and, probably, with the GATT as amended by the habilitation clause in 1979. In the same way, the meaning of the famous Article 2 of Chapter II of the Charter Rights of Economic Rights and Duties of States cannot be understood without a careful study of the whole process of the formation of the rule from at least the beginning of the 1960s and up to the present (and not 1974). This study would have to take into account not only the other relevant General Assembly Resolutions, but also the very many bilateral conventions on international investment which have been concluded during the last ten years.

Interestingly enough, this approach is not a purely academic one. It is the usual way Courts and Tribunals handle the question. Just to cite a few examples, it was on a careful study of a broad law-making process, including a series of General Assembly Resolutions, that the Court based its appraisal of the scope of the right of peoples to self-determination in its 1971 and 1975 advisory opinions, and of the principles of the prohibition of the use or threat of force and of non-intervention in the Nicaragua case. Arbitral Tribunals have done so to appraise the scope of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

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139 Abi-Saab, note 53 above, p 20.
140 Above p 47.
141 See ibid, p 26; see also Juillard, note 58 above, pp 120–123 or Van Dijk, note 37 above, p 16.
143 See Borella, "Le nouvel ordre économique international et le formalisme juridique", Mélanges Chaumont, note 15 above, p 87.
144 Namibia, ICJ Rep 1971, especially pp 31–32.
147 See eg the awards in Texaco–Calasiatric v Libya, 1977, 17 ILM [1978 p1], and in Aminoil v Kuwait, 1982, ILM p 976.
It must be clear that, at least over a long period, the "legal process" thus defined is not "one-way": at certain stages, law "hardens", during others it "softens". It is very clear if we glance through the great trends in this respect since World War II.

- First stage – the Cold War and the East/West tension; the United States and their Allies used, or tried to use, the United Nations General Assembly as a World Parliament where they had a comfortable majority; the Eastern Bloc opposition – and, to a much lesser extent some Latin American reluctance, did not permit such a radical use of the United Nations; nevertheless "hard" use was made of resolutions (see the "Dean Acheson" episode);148

- Second stage – the 60s and the inversion of majority; the new Third World majority with the self-seeking support of the East made enormous use of resolutions, but with a number not being backed by a corresponding economic and military weight, the real legal value of resolutions probably declined;

- Third stage – the so-called "crisis" from 1975 to the end of the 80s: the legal production machinery skidded and ran light; it still produced an amazing quantity of instruments but serious business was conducted elsewhere; for example, while the General Assembly adhered to the 1974 doctrine about indemnity in case of nationalisation, the same States which voted in favour in New York concluded a bilateral investments convention proclaiming the "Hull doctrine".149 It has been said that such a phenomenon witnessed a "mental dissociation",150 there was no certainty; it witnessed above all the powerlessness of Third World countries.

- Fourth stage – it seems to have begun in 1989 and to be characterised by an ideological disarmament (at least East/West) and, maybe, by a new "hardening" of the United Nations process of legal development, at least in security matters as the reaction of the Security Council to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait could show.

This is certainly not a very scientific analysis, but hopefully it gives a general picture. If it is correct, then one thing is very striking: with very different rates of success the dominating groups (in the United Nations) – the West in the first and last phases, the South during the two intermediate phases – have always tried to make maximum use of United Nations resolutions (maximum does not mean optimum but simply as intensive as was possible). This shows probably that a critical step was taken in 1945. A similar pattern may also be traced during the period of the League of Nations.

148 Ref
149 Ref
It can be suggested that both the prohibition of the use of force (which has been correlative with a strengthening of the need for law in the international society) and the creation of a world-wide, all purpose, institution, available for law making, have reinforced both the need and the possibility of communal consent. Before 1945 (or 1919), it was very difficult for such a phenomenon to happen in the absence of a convenient forum – it was not completely impossible (by way of proof, one can think of the 1899 and 1907 Peace Conferences): it was unlikely. Nowadays the forum exists and its existence is both dissuasive (a refusal to use the forum being perceived as a "contempt of co-operation") and incitative ("what do you risk?"). "As the town meeting of the world, the General Assembly is a centre where States may express their consensus."151

According to Professor Schachter:152

"As the central global forum for the international community, with the competence to discuss all questions of international concern, with institutional continuity and a constitutional framework of agreed purposes and principles, the Assembly has become a major instrument of States for articulating their national interests and seeking general support for them. The concept of Assembly resolutions as expressions of common interests and the 'general will' of the international community has been a natural consequence. It also has naturally flowed that in many cases the effort is made to transform the 'general will' thus expressed into law.

This trend is probably all the more deep-seated in that, implicitly, States, public opinion as well as lawyers, refer to the internal model, even if theoretically irrelevant and politically refused. Like Parliaments inside the State, international organizations and, especially, the United Nations General Assembly, represent concretely a framework for law-making."

Naturally enough (and for the same sorts of reasons), resolutions then appear as a kind of law. It is hardly debatable that the analogy is tempting: there is the same material "flavour" (legal texts organized in articles or paragraphs) and comparable procedural process ("parliamentary diplomacy"). Scholars know that these resolutions are not hard law, but diplomats often behave as if they were not aware of this fact (depending on whether their country supports or opposes the text.153 Journalists more often than not appear ignorant and public opinion is nearly always so (in a rather schizophrenic way).

For reasons already discussed,154 there is strong doubt that the General Assembly has a legislative competence or even a "quasi-legislative

151 Jimenez de Arechaga, note 35 above, p 34; see also Van Hoof, note 25 above, p 210.
152 Schachter, note 12 above, p 111.
153 One of the manifestations of this behaviour are reservations made to resolutions. On their effects see eg Flauss, "Les réserves aux résolutions des Nations Unies", (1981) RGDIP, 5–37.
154 Above.
competence". Its resolutions nevertheless appear as "material legislation", and owe their degree of legitimacy to the institution itself, which exerts the role of a validation authority.

This has two consequences. In practice, the analyst, whether a judge or a mere observer, will catch hold of a chosen resolution which will be "the starting point for any investigation as to the relevant law". Conceptually, it will have an important role of collective legitimization, not only through their permissive legal value, but also and above all as a repository of shared community expectations, thus crystallizing communal consent in the international society.

Here again, there is consent and not will, since the "international community as a whole", paradoxically, although entitled to "accept and recognize" peremptory norms of general international law, has no law-making power.

As early as 1955, Quincy Wright wrote: "The discipline of international law is in a state of crisis. As understood by traditionalists it appears to be obsolete, and as understood by modernists, it appears to be premature." A fortiori the same could certainly be written today. But it is clear that the crisis cannot lie in the law itself, which is neither in good health nor ill, but simply is. In return, it can be in the schools of jurisprudence that try to offer current analysis of what law is and how it works.

In the present writer's view, the evil comes from the incapacity – or unwillingness – of lawyers to accept law as it is – to consent to it, "in her infinite variety".

Of course, any academic scholar must have – and necessarily has – his own decoding system. But the more "open", the better. Silete theologi in munere

156 Bastid, "Observations sur une 'étape'dans le développement progressif et la codification des principes du droit international", Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage a Paul Guggenheim (1968), p 145.
158 Macdonald, note 86 above, p 140.
160 On the role the international judge could play in the determination of jus cogens, see Dupuy P-M, "Le juge et la règle générale", (1989) RGDIP, 569–598, especially 588 et seq.
162 For a much more radical view, see Kennedy, "A New Stream of International Law Scholarship" (1988), Wisconsin ILJ, vol 7, no 1 pp 1–49.
163 Baxter, note 51 above, pp 549–566.
"Legal dogma" could seem acceptable in a slowly evolving society. It can no longer be accepted at the present time of multi-dimensional changes, where legal relativism has become an absolute necessity. "Just as there are no fixed ends, there are no final solutions."\textsuperscript{164}

Professor Douglas Johnston is thus right in placing "particular emphasis ... on the shift from 'classical' to 'romantic' moulds of legal development".\textsuperscript{165} In the same way, the time has now come to give up rigid, narrowing and arid classical analyses and to shift to relativist, open-minded and creative romantic approaches.

\textsuperscript{164} Schachter "The Nature and Process ...", note 12 above, p 750.
\textsuperscript{165} See note 13 above, p 197.