



# Psychologists in the Criminal Justice System dale todd

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## Introduction

A recent text on criminology identifies the need to “analyse the welfare and social control institutions in the first place as an increasingly significant labour market . . . as social control agencies which, irrespective of their function or ideology, are ultimately accountable for their actions to the powerful ruling groups rather than to their clients. . .”[1]

This paper is intended to make a contribution in that direction by an examination of the role of psychologists in the prisons.

That the use of psychologists in several areas of the law has greatly expanded in recent years can hardly be doubted. Although greatest encroachment has taken place in the criminal and welfare fields, excursions also into such areas as family law [2] present alarming prospects. In general such developments have met with little criticism or discussion of some of the controversial issues surrounding such psychological concepts as "mental intelligence" [3] or "psychopathy" and from a perusal of the writings of psychologists themselves, one is forced to wonder how society managed with psychologists for so long. [4] It seems that despite recent theoretical criticisms and attacks on the scientific approach to psychology [5] and the reconsideration by psychologists of their role in other fields, [6] such questioning seems hardly to have filtered through to the field of criminal justice. This is especially strange in light of the continued critique of all aspects of the criminal and penal system by sociologists, criminologists and offenders themselves. This immunity derives partly from the filtering process which determines the type of person to enter the system in the first place and partly because such groups generally tend to consider themselves to be too busy "doing things" to be bothered by theoretical debate. At the same time, apparent through much of their writing, is the traditional excuse of the "neutral scientist" who is not there to question policy, only to help implement it. [7]

But other factors are in operation as well and the reasons for resistance to challenge and the possibilities for encouraging greater awareness among this group can only be fully answered by an understanding of the roles psychologists play and the pressures upon them to maintain such roles.

### **Formal and Informal Roles**

Discussion of the role of psychologists in prisons rarely mentions the ethical questions raised by their very presence. [8] In general only technical difficulties [9] are discussed, particularly and increasingly, the lack of computer facilities or resources for treatment programmes. In this, their contribution is loosely and uncritically defined in terms of some amorphous goal of treatment or rehabilitation. It can be argued that this ambitious goal has had to be revised in light of the rapid increase in the prison population during the late 1960's, when the practical problems of coping with large numbers in overcrowded institutions were to the fore. Nevertheless, the actual jobs psychologists do remain fairly standard, falling into four major areas: (a) reports to other agencies e.g. courts or Probation and Parole; (b) testing and interviewing for assessment

or classification purposes; (c) devising and operating treatment programmes for individuals, groups or total regimes; (d) research programmes for the benefit of staff and organisation. Ideas of assessment and rehabilitation, however, are not new. They formed indeed the very basis of the late C19 approach to punishment in the form of penitentiaries and reformatory institutions. But, although the ideas themselves are old the introduction and acceptance of psychologists does imply the recognition of a different definition of the problem and its likely solution. Thus, while the traditional reform model identified the problem in terms of spiritual needs, today, in theory at least, the problem has been redefined as one of psychological needs, changing the images of the prison, the prisoner and the prison worker. Once the "problem" is seen in these terms, questions about the political nature of the criminal justice system become irrelevant, since the whole emphasis is on a model of social welfare — the prisoner is sick, undersocialised, inadequate or, at least, in need of help and prison is the place where that help is available. Such are the myths and images created and sustained by the psychologist's very presence and his involvement in the processes which help to maintain the myths.

To this extent, therefore, the explicit functions of psychologists follow the same lines as those of traditional criminology and are thus subject to similar criticism. It is simply not the case that psychologists can afford to ignore the theoretical queries being raised by hiding behind the rationalisation that they are too involved in practical affairs. To do so simply ignores the fact that all practice is based on some form of theory, even if its assumptions are not fully articulated.

To this extent, therefore, the explicit functions of psychologists follow the same lines as those of traditional criminology and are thus subject to similar criticism. It is simply not the case that psychologists can afford to ignore the theoretical queries being raised by hiding behind the rationalisation that they are too involved in practical affairs. To do so simply ignores the fact that all practice is based on some form of theory, even if its assumptions are not fully articulated.

But at the informal level[10] also psychologists function to maintain the status quo and support the existing institutional arrangements. Thus, for instance, they are often used to absorb the grievances and hostile feelings of prisoners which might otherwise be directed against the prison itself. The problem then becomes one of an individual's ability to adjust, not the system's ability to change. Given the limited willingness of professional staff to become involved in matters of policy, this is a very effective way of diverting possible trouble.

Similarly, the prisoner who approaches any member of staff within the institution is typically not encouraged to see himself as one of a group of individuals facing similar situations, collective identity and collective action are not encouraged or seen as a solution and thus the situation is de-politicised.[ 11 ] Throughout all of this, the emphasis is on treatment in the prisoner's own presumed interest, not on the protection of his rights, and any attempt to resist such definitions may be taken as mere confirmation of them.[ 12 ]

This problem of the reliance on expert groups and the subsequent definition of problems in terms of individual pathology, is by no means confined to psychologists in the prisons. Indeed, Anthony Platt has recently commented on his own role in a study of legal aid to Black juveniles in Chicago, "While in the short run it appeared humanitarian and benevolent, in the long run it did great injustices to the Black community. It did not create a strong Community organisation, it channeled residents away from political action and it encouraged the community to rely on professionals and experts who did not have any kind of stake in the long range development of their constituency".[13]

This is a most revealing statement of a parallel situation. Furthermore, the rise of "client" groups in various fields emphasises the general nature of the problem. The thrust of the argument of these groups is based on a revelation of the political nature of the professional's task and the right of the client to define his own problems and to resist "institutional meddling in the guise of professional concern".[14] But the challenge to psychologists in the prison situation is based not only on their status (i.e. their power irrespective of their skills) but also on their expertise — that is, psychology is being defined as inappropriate for the prison setting.

For those professional groups working in large bureaucratic structures there is the added problem of accountability. It is to the head of the department that such people are held accountable, not the groups whom they, theoretically, serve. The need to justify one's salary and account for one's salary and account for one's actions makes it likely that they will uphold and defend the values of the Dept. itself rather than those of the "client" group. Furthermore if the professional's formal role is a difficult one to fulfil, as is the case with psychologists in prisons, it is even less likely that they will feel free to criticise. For the role of treatment expert is not a difficult one to challenge at either a theoretical or a practical level. In a situation of such insecurity, added to by the formal restrictions of public service regulations, critical analysis of the Dept. is not a response which can easily be encouraged.

When one considers the resistance there is to accepting the negative

evidence of treatment programmes or assessment/classification schemes, and thus the failure of such groups in their formally defined roles, one is forced to reconsider the informal aspects of their job. As a recent text reminds us regarding the psychologist in the prison, "precisely because the concept and connotations of psychological treatment provide a suitable imagery with which to depict imprisonment, it is unlikely that studies which fail to confirm such treatment's effects will lead to the abandonment of the treatment ideology . . . it seems likely that both the flexibility and the benign visage of treatment will continue to be of value to social control agencies".[15]

Thus the public conscience can be assuaged, psychologists and other professional groups remaining as window-dressing to encourage the acceptance of what remains an essentially punitive system. But, as well as promoting a gross deception, here lies also a great danger. For whilst the public conscience is so assuaged things can be allowed to happen in the name of treatment which would not be allowed to happen in the name of punishment.[16] Thus is continued the process of defining crime as an individual problem and the professional remains invested with a power to intervene drastically in an individual's life.

### **Social Situation of Psychologists in the Prison**

Although cynicism is by no means a rare trait among psychologists in the prisons, vindictiveness is. Their actions therefore are not explicable in terms of an 'unlikely degree of Machiavellianism'[17] nor, I would suggest, from a stubborn disregard of criticisms levelled against them. Rather, we must examine the social situation in which they find themselves to understand how their behaviour is shaped by both immediate and wider social concerns inherent in the situation. This will be done at several levels — the academic background from which psychologists are drawn, organisational pressures to which, they are subject, the wider role of "experts" in society. It is not suggested that these three remain completely separate in the problems that they pose. Indeed they are very much inter-related.

#### **1. Academic Psychology**

One could not pretend that psychology, as a discipline, forms some kind of unified whole and yet due to the nature of the prison task, it is unlikely that every theoretical position will be represented. Peter Sedgwick has recently commented "the practitioner usually takes for granted official practice, working with the perspective of the moderate centre in an age where the ground occupied by the centre is only a middle between alternatives of several kinds".[18]

For a variety of reasons, academic psychology shows an over concern with "objective" scientific study. Beginning with the early

rejection of the introspectionists' approach and the replacement of notions of free will by determinism, the idea of psychology as a science continues to be perpetuated and to be reflected in the structure of academic courses, both in terms of content and general approach to the subjects taught. [19] Initially, of course, a scientific, value-free approach was deemed to be necessary in order to encourage acceptance of psychology as a new discipline and is now inextricably bound up with the emerging role of the "expert" in society. [20] It reflects also the shift of orientation of Universities away from "academic study for its own sake" towards more career oriented courses, and an emphasis on reduction of student wastage through an acceptance of the University's obligation to provide needed manpower in certain areas. [21]

There is also growing acceptance of the idea that a three or four year first-degree course in psychology is not sufficient to equip an individual for acting as a psychologist in a professional capacity. However, opportunities for entering post graduate courses in Australia are extremely limited both in terms of number and range of courses available. [22] Furthermore, the emphasis of post-graduate courses is very much one of training people in skills necessary for effective practice. A disjunction between theory (undergraduate) and practice (post-graduate) being seen as desirable. [23]

Such practice remains, of course, as defined by the organisations in which psychologists work, focussing mainly on the areas of clinical work, education, industrial and vocational guidance. As the job market becomes more restrictive, such a practical orientation is likely to be further emphasised.

The academic background of any such group can greatly affect the definition they take of their jobs and the areas which they consider appropriate for them to be involved in. Thus Trasler [24] comments


"The Prison Psychological Service is at present mainly composed of psychologists trained in the British tradition of specialisation, with a heavy emphasis on the classical areas of experimental psychology . . . it may be thought that the comparative weakness of the prison psychological team in respect of training in social psychology is one of the reasons for its failure to develop effective research into the patterns of social interaction that constitute perhaps the most influential aspects of a custodial regime."

Even here, however, Trasler re-emphasises the scientific approach in developing such research by the adoption of 'Skinnerian principles as a frame of reference for naturalistic studies'.

The academic background of psychologists therefore is one which

encourages a divorce of theory from practice, an avoidance of debates which raise questions of value and may lead to a rejection of certain critical issues as not falling within their sphere of concern. When and if problems arise it can still be claimed that the relative youth of psychology as a science is the real reason for its present difficulties. All that is required is more research, more resources and even more psychologists in order to help refine techniques and theories.[25] An interesting twist to this argument is the denial of the need to examine ethical questions precisely because the science is so young and therefore presently ineffective.[26]

Both of these arguments provide effective and convenient shelter from criticism, and sufficient rationale to enable the avoidance of having to reconsider one's basic assumptions.



## 2. The Role of the Expert

The expansion of the professions and our increased reliance on specialists in many fields of social life has been remarked on by many observers, with differing degrees of acclaim or dismay. Heinz Eulau[27] refers to the "incredible specialisation in and proliferation of occupations that have accompanied industrial and technological developments". The recognition of the role they have to play in shaping social policy as well as implementing it is amply demonstrated by Ford's observation that for the first time during the years 1955-

1964 the number of non-Parliamentary papers issued through Departments in Britain almost equalled the number of Parliamentary papers arising in the House or presented by Command.[28] This, Ford claims, represents "a shift in the agencies and methods used for investigation". Thus, the introduction of working groups, working parties, advisory councils and committees, in addition to the traditional Royal Commission, reflects a growing concern with the concept of utilising specialist knowledge to the full, by gathering together expert groups in various areas.[29]

Ford also points out important changes in the 'evidence' collected by such groups and on which their conclusions and recommendations are based. Firstly, much of it now consists of the results of research programmes which require some knowledge in the area to allow for a proper examination. Secondly, although individuals and organisations consulted are listed in the reports, complete copies of their submissions are not. Thus it is impossible to analyse the evidence before the group or to know which submissions were rejected in favour of others. One is left indeed to rely on the integrity of the group itself and these factors combined make it all the more difficult to challenge their position.

Part of the definition of an 'expert' depends on a body of knowledge to which he can claim particular access. Such a body of knowledge, particularly if its concepts are complex or obscure and backed up by 'hard data', provides an aura and mystique which sets the 'expert' apart. This insulation is perpetuated by an individual's ability to call on a professional organisation for support, an organisation which can control its membership and impose rules of conduct for its members. Their statements then acquire an authenticity which may be based more on the standing of the group itself rather than the validity of the content, and challenges from outside the group can be effectively refuted or ignored.[30]

The promise held out by such expert groups is their unique ability to give unbiased rational judgments in particular problem areas. Thus they are often involved in evaluating programmes and policy, as well as proposing and implementing new ones. Ford, again, comments "the particular statutes which commence great social and political experiments are but the formal launching of the ships. They then have to prove themselves in the open seas, with their chances of storm and currents. That is what many of the papers of this period are all about".

The claims to scientific study and the role of expert in the field of human behaviour, both necessary to encourage the acceptance of psychology in the first place, have now had a rebounding effect. Thus, "there is a misleading but seductive ideal of the research pro-



cess, borrowed from the physical and biological sciences, in which work proceeds in an orderly, linear, almost deterministic fashion from the discovery of knowledge to the development of a product that men can use — an explosive, a pill, a laser, a serum. The ideal ignores of course the countless failures, dead ends and unexpected applications that researchers or their followers stumble on without premeditation. By analogy, however, research projects on the behaviour of infants are expected to lead to effective programmes for child development, and research projects on motivation and deviant behaviour to effective programmes for crime prevention. They may — but they may not”.[31]

For psychologists to acknowledge their failure in ‘producing the goods’ expected of them, would thus require a challenge to the basic premises on which much of psychology is founded — and who would have the courage to do that? Furthermore, in those areas of practice where the contradictions should be most apparent, such a challenge would result also in the exposure of the problems of the formal rationalisations for the psychologist’s presence in certain organisations. This may in turn reveal their informal roles and, possibly, result in a shrinking of the job market.[32] Again, many rationalisations exist which avoid the necessity for such scrutiny.[33]

### **3. Organisational Pressures**

Certain problems in this area have already been discussed, but in addition to what has been set out above, there are some aspects of the prison situation which present special problems.

As public servants, psychologists find themselves subject to Public Service regulations which, again, inhibit criticism of their department. At the same time, they are subject to the Acts and Regulations governing the running of prisons and the standing orders for each institution. These may impose restrictions on the things psychologists may do, where they may go, who they may see and under what conditions. They may also place the psychologist in a position subordinate to a member of staff who is not of the same profession but to whom he may at times find himself accountable. Thus, contradictions may occur between his professionally defined obligations and the line of accountability within an institution which may deny him the autonomy he sees as necessary to carry out his work. The problem of accountability has already been briefly mentioned. It is indeed most critical as regards those tasks which bring the psychologist into a professional relationship with the prisoner as a ‘client’ — assessment and treatment. The areas of research and advising management are, however, less ambiguous in their orientation, although certain deceptions may be necessary if co-operation from prisoners is essential to the research programme. A swing to a

research/management orientation nevertheless provides a possible solution of some of the problems raised by the accountability conflict inherent in the 'client-centred' situation. Such a swing has for some time been advocated by psychologists in the English prison service and is made quite explicit in Trasler's [34] recent paper, which emphasises once again the contribution psychologists can make as 'scientific researchers'.

For the present, however, the psychologist is operating in a situation where other aspects of the organisational task may take precedence over the one in which he is engaged.

Analysis of organisations in terms of formally stated goals is an extremely hazardous task. Silverman [35] comments, "it seems doubtful whether it is legitimate to conceive of an organisation as having a goal except where there is an ongoing consensus between the members of the organisation about the purposes of their interaction."

And he goes on to say: "in practice, goals are often set in a complicated power play involving various individuals and groups within and without the organisation, and by reference to values which govern behaviour in general and the specific behaviour of the relevant individuals and groups in a particular society."

Such struggles over the definition of the organisation task reflect on such basic issues as salary, conditions and security of the groups involved. [36] The encroachment of psychologists into the prisons, whilst acceptable in terms of a very broadly defined goal of 'rehabilitation' has been met with by a strong resistance by those groups already in the prisons, most importantly, the prison officers. Thus although theoretically there need be no conflict between the goals of 'safe custody' and 'rehabilitation', it would be deceptive to describe the psychologist's position solely in terms of such formal goals.

The hostility, suspicion and resentment between groups within the prison may produce a defensive reaction among psychologists. Faced with a threatening situation of attack by other staff members within the institution, they have little to fall back on to maintain their self image except their professional discipline. Thus, their increased reliance on psychology as a body of knowledge may make them less receptive to any form of criticism.

Such intergroup pressures may also, of course, be seen as the 'real' obstacles to the psychologist, preventing him from successfully carrying out his task. This argument, that psychology has not yet been given a proper chance in the prisons, is similar to the argument



*The notorious Grafton Gaol, together with the new Long Bay "Hell Cells" form the Prison Departments final solution.*

about the youth of psychology as a science and provides a similar rationale.

#### **4. Changes in the Organisation**

Analysis of the moral climate in which the prisons are operating is extremely difficult in Australia with different State systems and a general lack of policy statements at any level. It may be more fruitful then, instead of trying to consider the past, to consider the likely development of penal philosophy in the future and how this will affect the psychologist.

Stan Cohen[37] argues that future changes in the operation of the prisons will be strongly influenced by outside events rather than by any 'new thinking'. In particular, he emphasises the changing nature of the prison population by such factors as the attempts to remove short-termers, the development of community-based alternatives, the decriminalisation of certain offences and the increasing numbers of high security or, at least, long term offenders. All of these are leading to new problems for prison management,[38] exacerbated by the

increased politicisation of prisoners and the growing power of the prison officers. Cohen argues that in such a situation, psychiatrists and psychologists will continue to increase their power “not because of some inherent superiority in their paradigm of crime, but by showing that they have the power to be more effective custodians”. Such a thought is indeed somewhat disconcerting, but will psychologists in fact accept their roles as ‘new custodians’?

For many psychologists already in the prisons, I would think not. Attracted to the service at a time when rehabilitation was emphasised, even though one can demonstrate the way in which such a philosophy can be used as a method of control, the belief in their ability to ‘help’ individuals is a dominant factor in their remaining within the prison. The split that they see between such ‘helping’ and the control function of the institution is not based on cynicism and would be the determining factor in causing many of them to balk at the idea of contributing to a system based unashamedly on ‘control’.

There will undoubtedly be some psychologists for whom the notions of control will be entirely acceptable and, indeed in line with a particular stream of more general psychological thought[39] and it may be that such psychologists would be more attracted to the prisons in future. This, of course, would be precisely the group whose belief in scientific objectivity and their own exclusive expertise provides them with greatest immunity from criticism. The resurrection of stereotoxic techniques[40] development of electronic devices for monitoring and controlling behaviour[41] as well as the continued expansion of psychotechnology[42] make the ethical issues all the more critical, but unfortunately, likely to be forgotten.

Trasler’s paper[43] presents a prime example of this and emphasises the need for such issues to be raised and discussed. He advocates the expansion of the prison psychological service into a correctional psychological service, embracing both custodial and non custodial facilities. Psychologists would then play a key role in deciding when, where and how an individual offender may benefit from these facilities. Behavioural change is seen as a part of the ‘factual basis’ for such decisions — decisions which are to be validated against the ‘true criterion of social adjustment’. In such statements, we have a graphic illustration of how scientific jargon can be used to disguise underlying issues, and how questions of rights and liberties can disappear under the justifications for greater discretionary power.

There would thus be little difficulty in finding psychologists to fulfil such a role, as indeed their present active participation in running such experimental units as at Patuxent[44] would indicate. At least, however, the true nature of the penal system will be

only occur if psychologists were directly accountable to the prisoners themselves.

An extension of this would of course be to advocate subversion. But the potential for doing so would seem to be extremely limited for psychologists who do not play a central role in the organisation and whose formal sphere of influence is extremely limited. Although individual attacks against the system may be possible, it is unlikely to prove effective as a long term strategy since such isolated events would present no real threat.

Mathiesen,[45] however, has suggested a way in which such groups can threaten the system. He argues that precisely because their presence lends legitimacy to the system itself, withdrawal of their support serves to remove an important set of defence lines. Thus, if they operate in conjunction with prisoner groups (who can provide information and take dramatic action to highlight an issue) and with outside academics (to translate the issues and highlight their political implications) then psychologists can develop a meaningful role in the process of change. The aim of such action would be to expose the underlying social functions of the prisons and to expose them in such a way as to question the whole nature of the imprisonment exercise itself, by forcing a reconsideration of the values and philosophies which sustain it.

Such withdrawal of support, however crucial it may be at particular points in time, does not help the psychologist in his day-to-day interactions within the prison. Furthermore, while such a strategy may be acceptable in terms of demystification, if the processes outlined by Cohen above have any validity and the nature of the prison population does alter in the predicted direction, then there can be no reason to think that any amount of reconsideration of values will produce a significant change in orientation. Coercion and control may be precisely what is seen as desirable and there will be the technologists available and willing to see them put into effect. The principles may be openly stated, but that will not necessarily make them easier to change. If such is to be the dominant trend for the future, it is unlikely that the development of any oppositional group, no matter how well organised, could halt it.

Such pessimism may not, however, be warranted. At the least it would seem that psychologists, and indeed other professional workers within the system, who find themselves in such a seemingly hopeless situation, should be given an opportunity to express their dissatisfactions and consider together the possibilities for developing alternative strategies. Some support should be offered to such people to help them sustain their views in the face of overwhelming odds.

revealed — control and coercion will be unmistakably the central themes and euphemisms of treatment and rehabilitation will disappear. The system can then be attacked on its own terms instead of having to waste effort and energy exposing the power face behind its liberal facade.

### Alternative Strategies

The question of 'what to do' about the situation outlined above is indeed a perplexing one. Given the tremendous pressures on psychologists in the prisons against developing a critical perspective, one is tempted to assume that the only possible alternative is to leave the service altogether.

One cannot indeed hold out much hope of changing the system from within — the frustration and cynicism generated, the dangers of co-optation, the inward-looking attitude which it is so difficult to avoid, all combine together to make any change extremely difficult. It also encourages acceptance of short term reforms which may hinder rather than help long-term objectives, by merely bolstering the system. Thus it is no easy thing to ask any person to remain in an organisation, contributing in a way which he considers to be a sham. The techniques for survival in such a situation have not been clearly formulated, but the following is proposed as some justification for staying in the department for some time at least.

It may be of no great harm to experience the frustration and disadvantages of working in a prison department, if such experience can be used to personal advantage in the sense of raising one's own consciousness. However selfish an approach this may seem it is probably preferable to leaving the positions to be filled by individuals with a less critical perspective. Whilst such motivations do nothing for those who continue to suffer under the system, the strategy may be acceptable on the principle of producing least harm rather than any positive benefit, especially given that such benefit could probably

### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I. Taylor, P. Walton and Jock Young 'Critical Criminology' p. 43. Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975.
2. See *In re Paul*, 170 So. 2d. 549 (La. Ct. App. 1965) and *In re MacDonald*, 201 N.W. 2d 447 (Iowa 1972).
3. In his discussion of the family law cases cited, Harold Thomas asserts the superiority of the term 'mental age' over other

'meaningless and confusing terms as severe mental deficiency . . . ' and finally recommends statutory provision for interference with the parent-child relationship on the grounds of the parent's low intelligence. See *J. Family Law* 13 (2) 1973-4 pp. 379-391.

4. A particularly good example of this is to be found in Stanley L. Brodsky, 'Psychologists in the Criminal Justice System', Uni-Illinois Press 1973.
5. See, for example, N. Armistead (Ed) 'Reconstructing Social Psychology' Penguin 1974; Phil Brown (Ed) 'Radical Psychology' Tavistock 1973. 'Psychology as a Social Problem' by R. C. Winkler, *Australian Psychologist* 8 (2) July, 1973.
6. Armistead and Brown op. cit.
7. Given the increased involvement of social scientists on advisory committees and commissions etc. this claim is now becoming particularly suspect. It is interesting to note also that debate is now taking place within the ranks of pure science regarding this claim to neutrality and objectivity.
8. See Brodsky op. cit.
9. In a recent article, Trasler mentions both practical and ethical issues impinging on the psychologist's role, but fails to elaborate on the latter.  
Gordon Trasler 'The Role of Psychologists in the Penal System' in L. Blom-Cooper (Ed) 'Progress in Penal Reform', Clarendon Press 1974.
10. John Fitch is one of the few respected prison psychologists to raise this question of informal roles, two of which he identifies as the scapegoat and the agent of manipulation. See *British Psychological Society Bulletin* 21(70) 1968.
11. This is well illustrated by references in George Jackson's 'Soledad Brother' Penguin 1971.
12. See Jock Young 'The Zookeepers of Deviance' *Catalyst* 5 1970. A striking example of this is the claim by a prison official that George Jackson's 'Soledad Brother' "provides remarkable insight into the personality make-up of a highly dangerous sociopath", quoted in Jessica Mitford 'Kind and Usual Punishment' Alfred A Knopf 1973.

13. Dialogue with Anthony Platt. *Issues in criminology* 8(1) Summer 1973.
14. Haug and Sussman 'Professional Autonomy and the Revolt of the Client'. *Social Problem* 17 (2) 1969.
15. Kassebaum, Ward and Wilmer 'Prison Treatment and Parole Survival' John Wiley and Sons 1971.
16. Aversion therapy is, of course, the prime example of this.
17. David Silverman 'Theory of Organisations' Heinemann 1970. He suggests that "possibly at certain stages in the development of a discipline its scholars become concerned to demonstrate its respectability, either because of a need to reassure themselves or to encourage the provision of research funds".
18. Peter Sedgwick 'Ideology in Modern Psychology' in N. Armistead (Ed) op. cit.
19. A check of the outlines of Psychology courses available in Australia confirms this. But see specifically — Collins, Francis and Cassell 'The teaching and Assessment of Introductory Psychology at Macquarie University' *Australian Psychologist* 9 (1) March 1974, and N. Armistead, 'Introduction to the Special World of Academic Psychology' in "Rat, Myth and Magic".
20. See section (2) below.
21. Higher Education Report Comnd. 2154 HMSO 1963. Fraser M. 'Autonomy and Responsibilities' *Vestis* 12 1969. Gunn A. 'The Privileged Adolescent' Medical and Technical Publishing Co. 1970.
22. Debate in the *Australian Psychologist* regarding the provision of graduate training in the clinical field has focussed on the behaviouristic — psychodynamic dichotomy. But even those writers arguing in favour of the latter approach have continued to emphasise its scientific nature. See replies to Professor S. H. Lovibond by R. Conway and J. S. Williams. *Australian Psychologist* 4 (2 and 3) 1969.
23. See articles in 'Forum on Membership Qualifications'. *Australian Psychologist* 7 (2) July 1972.
24. Gordon Trasler op. cit.