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Lowe, Philip --- "Introduction to the Roundtable on the economics of antitrust and regulation in the telecoms sector" [2004] ELECD 62; in Buigues, A. Pierre; Rey, Patrick (eds), "The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004)

Book Title: The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications

Editor(s): Buigues, A. Pierre; Rey, Patrick

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781843765103

Section: Chapter 12

Section Title: Introduction to the Roundtable on the economics of antitrust and regulation in the telecoms sector

Author(s): Lowe, Philip

Number of pages: 4

Extract:

12. Introduction to the Roundtable on the
economics of antitrust and regulation in the
telecoms sector
Philip Lowe

The telecommunications sector has gone through a fast process of change in recent years.
Both the liberalization process and technological progress have driven the sector through
roads which were unimaginable a decade ago. In Europe, we are now in the process of
implementing a new regulatory framework. This new regulatory framework combines `tradi-
tional' sector-specific regulation with elements of antitrust methodology. I think this is an
excellent moment to reflect on the role that economics should play in antitrust and regula-
tory policy to ensure that the new regulatory tools are applied consistently with competition
policy instruments. On several issues I would like to listen to the opinion of the panellists on
this roundtable:
The first issue that comes to my mind is the future role of antitrust in the telecommunica-
tions sector. What should be the respective roles of sector-specific regulation and competition
law? The new European regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services introduces competition tools for the determination and analysis of markets to be
regulated and for the designation of those agents directly affected by regulatory obligations.
For example, the regulatory concept of `significant market power', which designates those
operators that will be subject to regulatory obligations (mainly related to price regulation
and to the granting of access to their network) is now made equivalent to the European
competition-law concept of dominance.1 An important ...


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