

teaching was mixed, especially since little has been written about what quality university teaching is. Accordingly, HEFCE formulated its own bland and insubstantial ideas, some of which sparked controversy. For example, whether the university is there to produce a skilled workforce or cultivated human beings. Needless to say, the HEFCE was bent towards the former view. How far should the HEFCE be allowed to dictate what quality teaching is when it is still at issue?

To conduct its assessment, the HEFCE's used academic lawyers. However, no set criteria or qualifications for assessors were laid down. Doubts as to the quality of the assessors and the TQA may be assuaged if the assessors are properly trained. However, the training program taken by the assessors did not receive acclaim, with one assessor commenting that the only useful purpose it served was to reveal some of the major defects in the design of the exercise.

The HEFCE produced three reports on the quality of law teaching. The Quality Assessment Report (QAR) was produced after the institution had been visited and is a distillation of the Feedback Report. The Feedback Report, unlike the QAR is only available to the institution being assessed and is a detailed comment from the assessment team on the institution. The HEFCE also produces a Subjective Overview Report (SOR), which comments on the overall level of teaching within a discipline in the light of the assessment exercise.

To be useful QARs must allow a naive reader to compare one institution with another, and inform the reader about the form of the

teaching and learning at that institution. HEFCE's assessors' handbooks recognised these needs. However, a survey of whether they were informative to a wider audience and well received revealed otherwise. The picture the reports present is partial and contradictory. There appears to be little consistency between the method of reporting and the content of the reports for each institution, thus making it difficult to compare one institution with another. Quantitative data do not tell all about an institution and need to be supplemented with qualitative assessment. The QARs were simply too thin to give a full qualitative assessment. The qualitative assessments in the QARs do not appear to sit comfortably with the quantitative data collected. Contradictions also appear when the content of the SORs is compared with that of the QARs. For example, the SOR stated that library resources were in all but one case excellent or satisfactory, despite two of the QARs specifically stating that library provision was inadequate for the course being taught.

In conclusion, HEFCE's assessments contain unexplained notions of quality, undertrained assessors, and opaque and probably inaccurate reports. Without more debate on what quality teaching is, it will be impossible seriously to assess university teaching. Whilst the HEFCE's attempts may have been unsuccessful, they did cause institutions to reflect upon their role and goals. Furthermore, the HEFCE did not produce the governmental incursions into law schools that were originally feared.

GENDER ISSUES

A feminist revisit to the first-year curriculum

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46 *J Legal Educ* 2, June 1996, pp 217-232

The article describes a seminar devised by the author that is taught at Chicago Kent College of Law. Fifteen students are gathered together to revisit six subjects that were taught to them that year: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Criminal Law, Justice and the Legal System, Property and Torts. Attention is paid to the feminist concerns embedded in this curriculum.

The seminar consists of two weekly meetings of two hours duration over a 14 week period. This seminar is not composed of the converted, as all students at Chicago-Kent are required to complete a seminar or an equivalent independent research project after their second year of study and a handful find Feminist Revisit simply the least of evils. The course is divided into two parts. Part 1 addresses doctrinal topics regarded as women's issues which are legal problems that fall within the first-year subjects listed above. Examples of the topics covered which come under the first-year curriculum courses are seduction, sexual fraud as a tort, prenuptial agreements, gender issues that arise in the dissolution of marriage, intramarital crime such as marital rape, domestic violence and battered wife syndrome as a defence to homicide, exclusion of jurors on the basis of sex and statutes of limitation that disadvantage women seeking redress for childhood sexual abuse.

The second part of the seminar begins with the *different voice* thesis of Carol Gilligan. The seminar

concentrates on what first-year doctrine would look like if care and connectedness, in addition to justice, were viewed as individual rights. The innate psychological and biological differences in men and women are examined and students are reminded that gender differences are easy to assert but hard to prove. The course attempts to illustrate different voice feminism using case law, thereby showing that the women in the cases are different depending on whether you look at the case from a liberal feminist viewpoint or a cultural feminist outlook. Looking for the different voice in case law actually freshens the students' perspective on the common law method.

New looks at old cases occupies only a minor amount of the time in Part 2 and most readings come from the academy. To these readings a two-part writing requirement is added on a topic relating to women and law. Students choose their own topics, preferably to do with the first year curriculum and feminism. The second writing task is a one-page assessment of the readings for each class, called Reactions. Students are required to write Reactions for four out of 12 classes.

There are many courses at law schools which concern themselves with feminist jurisprudence. The Feminist Revisit is different in that it is grounded in specifics outside of feminism, thus keeping it firmly in contact with reality. There is also a shared reference point, the first year curriculum. Such a reference point is commonly lacking in a feminist jurisprudence course. However, the Revisit necessarily has to omit the history of feminism.

In planning this seminar the author surveyed the literature on the pedagogy of feminism in law

schools. Courses tend inherently to escape tough scrutiny and to deflect unwelcome criticism and victim consciousness makes it easy for editors of law reviews and legal education journals to relax their criticisms. There is no consensus on curriculum, and indeed curriculum is seen by some feminist legal educators to be an evil. In addition, teaching of feminism in law schools still suffers from ethnocentrism by being dominated by whites. Change must be accommodated and instructors should be aware that the materials used to teach should encompass current developments. The concept of women as victims often arises as does the issue of whether the complaints made by feminists equate to anything more than whining. Such courses give men a chance to experience the conditions which go with the gendered minority status, such as self-consciousness about their bodies, stereotyping and scapegoating.

HISTORY

From cramming to skills — the development of solicitors' education and training since Ormrod

N Saunders

30 *Law Teacher* 2, pp 168–186

Despite being 25 years old the Ormrod report is still referred to as a seminal event in legal education in the United Kingdom. The report came at a time when legal education was changing and several new universities were created which were keen to establish departments of law which were cheap to run and attractive to quality applicants. Many solicitors were reluctant to believe that practitioners needed to have a degree in law or any other subject.

Between 1962 and 1979 the structure of solicitors' training was a compromise which reflected the growing number of entrants possessing a law degree and the increasing role of the Law Society's examinations as the point of entry for school leavers. There were four avenues by which law students could become solicitors. Law graduates were required to complete examinations in Conveyancing, Equity & Succession, Company & Partnership, Commercial, Revenue, and either Family, Local Government or Magisterial Law, as well as accounts, and complete two years of articles. Non-law graduates and mature students with equivalent qualifications had to complete Part I examinations as well as Part II Examinations and two years of articles. School leavers had to complete Part I and II examinations and do 5 years of articles.

The Ormrod Report proposed the division of legal education into academic, professional and continuing education, based mainly on practical considerations. The academic stage would normally be satisfied by a law degree containing Constitutional & Administrative Law, Law of Contract, Land Law, Criminal Law and the Law of Tort. Articles were to be abolished and replaced by a restriction on the practice of admittees for the first three years. There was an urgent need to up-date lawyer knowledge and familiarise them with other disciplines impacting on the law. The Ormrod Committee recommended an Institute to oversee the link between the profession and educational institutions.

It was only in 1979 that the Law Society's Training Regulations recognised qualifying law degrees as a prime means of completing the