learners will need the teacher's help in acquiring expertise in this task.

As teachers in a professional discipline, we should strive to inculcate both generic and professional skills into our teaching and learning programs. If future lawyers are to develop such skills in their professional lives, it is important that they be encouraged to do so in their initial undergraduate training, with appropriate theoretical underpinnings to assist them in that professional maturation.

STUDENTS

Is 'logic' culturally based? A contrastive, international approach to the U.S. law classroom
J J Ramsfield
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We teach inductively, giving students little pieces of doctrine, convention, and practice, asking them to put the pieces together. We reward those who do so quickly. This method resembles a scientific approach, where the observer collects data and poses a theory that explains the data, much as lawyers must do when they 'observe' the client's account of what happened and connect that account with the law it invokes. Our inductive approach works well with some students. It does not work well with others. International students may need more explicit cues about our legal culture. They bring with them the richness of their own legal and business cultures and the opportunity for us to explore diverse ideas and world views.

They also bring their own logic. That 'logic' is perfectly sound, rooted in a particular legal culture, but it may create peculiar cross-cultural analytical clashes.

Contrastive approaches put cultural and disciplinary differences in constructive relief. Contrastive theories reveal the roots of our own logic; our experiences with rhetorical preferences in the law classroom reveal our own biases and omissions. Contrastive approaches can close the gap between legal cultures and between the initiated and uninitiated. We can use contrastive approaches to hasten acculturation of the international student into the U.S. legal community without losing or damaging her native paradigms. We should be better able to teach both international and U.S. students.

For any writer, international or not, the initiation into the U.S. legal discourse community is complex and challenging. The initiation involves acquired responses to conventions created by U.S. scholars and lawyers, to new language, and to expected behaviours. This phenomenon explains the difficulty many novices encounter when they enter the community. A discourse community must be well enough defined so that novices can identify its features. International novices particularly need more direction. We can introduce students to the discourse community by defining its features, such as its mechanisms and its lexicon, by discussing the differences among genres, such as opinions and exams, and by illustrating its expectations and goals in class.

We can show our students more explicitly that embedded within the features of the discourse community are analytical paradigms specific to U.S. legal discourse. Those paradigms are the 'logic' or the rhetorical preferences of U.S. scholars and lawyers, nothing more. Both international and U.S. students may better grasp and better use those paradigms if the paradigms are presented in the context of contrastive rhetoric.

The novice international student may be tempted, then, to import the analytical paradigms or schemata from his legal culture into U.S. legal discourse. Both his prior experience and the texts he has read were rooted in another legal culture; he may naturally assume that experience and texts within this legal culture must be similar. We can assist all uninitiated students by identifying thought sequences and choosing texts that allow for gradual assimilation of new information. A student's ability to interpret accurately should then increase.

We assume that the novice can infer paradigms and assumptions from discussions. Some novices can but we can hasten the acculturation process if we make some of these analytical processes and paradigms more explicit rhetorical terms.

Globalisation is affecting the way we think as lawyers and problem-solvers. To create an effective classroom environment, we have to acknowledge the inevitable shrinking of the international legal community. International students are our closest links. But they pose some interesting challenges: they are not native speakers of English, they may or may not have practised extensively in their own systems and they often have little or no experience in the U.S. legal discourse community. They bring varied approaches and assumptions about legal analysis. Their 'logic' is not ours.

By leaving students to themselves, we risk being positivist, progressivist, and patriarchal. Instead, we may want to use contrastive approaches: responding intentionally to cross-cultural issues will naturally infuse the U.S. legal curriculum with international studies. U.S. legal 'logic' is one of many 'logics'. If we see our logic as others see it, learn the logics of the international community and compare them all, we will sharpen our analytical tools. Contrastive approaches can illustrate the structure, assumptions and traditions of U.S. paradigms and thus hasten novices' facility in using them.

Contrastive approaches invigorate any classroom. By comparing legal systems and analytical paradigms across cultures and disciplines, we set the U.S. legal discourse community in sharp re-

lief. By contrasting, we give students reference points for learning, analysing, and remembering. To use contrastive techniques, we do not need to know everything about other disciplines and legal cultures — students will provide the comparisons — but we can incorporate references regularly.

We can define the U.S. legal discourse community, its paradigms and register. We can also suggest guidelines for what students may expect to find as they read cases and statutes. We can also promote critical reading by annotating some of the cases to identify features of the discourse, such as using the hierarchy of primary and secondary authority, using primary before persuasive authority, using analytical paradigms that match traditions and doctrines, identifying the relative weight of authority, placing terms of art in positions of emphasis, and using citations in text. In addition, we can identify faulty reasoning by using terms that relate those faults to specific analytical paradigms and to students' cultural expectations.

By seeing the U.S. legal culture as a specific discourse community into which students enter, we can use contrastive approaches to enliven class discussion. Every law course can, in part, become a comparative law course. U.S. students will become more sensitive to international issues and probably more agile in understanding the U.S. legal system. International students will acculturate more quickly into the U.S. legal community and see more clearly the comparisons with their own.

Using contrastive approaches requires some thought about other legal cultures, some research into the students themselves, some more attention to detail, and some new points of view. But we may get better results, and sooner: better class discussions, better written responses to exam questions, and a clearer understanding of the differences among legal cultures. Such contrastive approaches may be, after all, our most 'logical' choice.

TEACHERS

Teaching from the margins: race as a pedagogical sub-text
R L Robinson
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White male professors and students become neutralising, silencing, and powerful forces in the life of minority law professors. By racialising any pedagogical approach, these professors and students implicitly decide at least three things: first, that white colleagues do not infuse their teaching with a racial perspective; secondly, that if I speak with a racialised voice, then I am a mediocre teacher and the students will not pass the bar; and thirdly, because of my race, I cannot become a pedagogical force in a majority white legal educational institution.

Even if minority law professors teach well, in the eyes of their white students they can only be entitled to average student evaluations. As such, these complementary forces place us in institutionally marginalised and pedagogically silenced positions. First, most white students by and large reject minority law professors as purveyors of any legal knowledge, especially if our teaching deviates from standard institutional fare. Secondly, most white law professors generally fear that we will disturb their male (on rare occasions female) prerogatives by proffering a persuasive counter-hegemonic pedagogy.

As a 'black' person, I must take students beyond a well-worn story, perhaps a fairytale with all white characters, so that they can see the kaleidoscope of human colours — blacks, browns, reds, whites and yellows — and so that they can hear how, in America, whites unfortunately use 'colour' as a proxy for race to determine if people and their voices' accents have worth.

Can I explain to my students, colleagues, or deans that my lived life reeks of an oft-told story of my racial (and thus personal) irrelevance to America's core feature — a white cultural matrix? In truth, I face difficulty whenever I subversively challenge my students' culturally blinded racism, and although I fool myself temporarily into believing otherwise, my words, rhythm, and voice alert my students, as I enter the class for the first time, that I am only a black man. My race thus precedes me as I enter my classroom; now they can, in their minds, justifiably doubt me.

My students demand only rules, and my colleagues require sworn allegiance to a 'high school' pedagogy that justifies their institutional standing and personal privileges. I am told emphatically to teach like all others. Give them the black letter law (I think a touch of irony); they, after all, cannot handle a challenging pedagogy and must feel that they can pass the bar. I reject both calls. Because each of us accepts a range of social norms as true, we have, regardless of race, common experience. However, as individuals, we experience a host of events differently. This difference will affect the manner in which we teach. Then I cannot teach like my white colleagues because I am not like them. Despite this obvious existential point, I do get the picture: teach without a (racial?) perspective.

Basically, I was invited to join the faculty because I had 'black' skin and I could stay as long as I taught in a 'white' face. Within one year after I entered legal academe, I am all too painfully aware that race — black and white — operates as sub-text, no matter how I teach. I have learned that effective law teaching locates itself in a high conspiracy of excellence and commitment. Good law teachers are intellectually challenging and aggressively involved with students. Excellence, commit-