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Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law |
Dispute Resolution by Officials in Traditional Chinese Legal Culture
Author: | Bobby K Y Wong LLB Barrister; Lecturer, Hong Kong Polytechnic University |
Issue: | Volume 10, Number 2 (June 2003) |
Author's Note: I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. Needless to say, responsibility for any errors remains mine.
It is a dispute over ownership of some cloth. After hearing what the disputants (A and B) and other witnesses said, the official could not decide whether A or B was the truth owner. The cloth had been used as an umbrella by both of them and there was, other than the statements of A and B, no evidence to prove ownership. The official then accused the disputants of bothering him with this trifle case in which only some cloth of very low value was involved. To solve the problem, he ordered that the cloth should be cut into two equal parts and each man got one. After A and B left with the cloth, he sent runners to follow them and see what their responses to his order would be. He was told that A was wholly satisfied with the decision and B complained that it was wrong. Knowing that, he ordered the runners to bring back A and B. Upon interrogation, A finally admitted that he was not the owner. As revealed, the fact was that it started to rain when B was taking the cloth to the market for sale. B used the cloth as umbrella and also allowed A to get shelter under the cloth. Later, A wanted to take the cloth out of momentary greed.[7]
A river separated two counties. There was some fertile land at the middle of the river. People of the two counties had disputes over the land for many years. Many officials had failed to put an end to the matter. Finally, an official decided to end the matter once and for all. He conducted an investigation jointly with officials of the other county. All the records were checked and the land surveyed. Since the investigation was thoroughly done, the people accepted the result and dared not dispute over the land any more.[8] The facts of the case are hardly interesting. What is significant is however the commentary given by the editor. It is said that the approach was one of the means to prevent disputes. The revelation of the truth left no room for the crooked to take advantage.[9]
Although dispute resolution was indeed one of the duties of the official, the emphasis was, as expressed by both the official and the editor of the collection of cases, on maintenance of societal harmony.
A man had two sons. His sons had their own families. After he died, his sons fought over some land which formed part of his estate. At first, some senior members of the clan tried to conciliate. But the conciliation was not successful. The matter was finally brought before the local official. He found out that the dispute was in fact caused by the deceased. Some years before his death, he declared in a letter that the land should be given to the eldest son of the elder son when he died. In a will made at his death he however gave the land to the younger son.
At that time, the law of succession was not so developed and was rather primitive compared to the modern law. There was no established rule of any sort to deal with the situation. In the circumstances, the official could simply have ordered that the land to be shared equally by the two sons. No one would criticize such a decision as unreasonable or unfair. But the official did not end the matter with such an easy and acceptable solution. Instead, he first blamed the deceased for causing all the trouble. To punish his foolishness, he said that he was tended to open his coffin and expose his body. The sons were scared by what he had said and dared not say anything. He then said that he did not know what to do but one decision had to be made one way or the other. He ordered that the case should be decided in this way: the two sons would be subject to the same torture and the one who yielded first would get nothing. He then asked the two disputants to choose one leg that they thought would not feel any pain for the test. Both of the sons replied that every leg felt pain when it was tortured.
It was at this juncture that the first part of the lesson began. The official first drew an analogy between the legs of a man and brothers. He condemned the behaviours of the disputants. After that, they were chained together. At first, they turned their backs to each other in hatred. They spoke not even a word to the other. After a few days, they felt remorse and turned to face each other and sighed. Knowing that, the official brought them back to the yamen. The second part of the lesson then began. The official said that the disputants were in such a difficult position because their father had two sons. If he had had only one, there would have been no problem at all. In order to prevent their own sons from suffering the same in the future, he ordered that each disputant could have only one son living with them. This unexpected statement frightened them out of their wits. They swore that they would not dispute over the land any more. Their wives also undertook not to do the same. To show that the remorse was genuine, they even offered to donate the land to a temple for charity. In the end, the matter was settled by vesting the land jointly in both disputants. They also undertook on behalf of their descendants never to dispute over the land.[12]
Lang Mao was a Confucian official. In a case a man was not on good terms with his stepbrother. They complained about each other. Other officials advised Lang Mao to impose heavy penalty on the disputants. He said, 'They detest each other. Punishing them would only make them hate each other even more. That is not the proper way to educate people.' Instead, he sent some respected elderly to advise the brothers on the benefits of maintaining a good relationship. Finally, the brothers were moved and realized that what they did was wrong. They were remorseful and came to Lang Mao for punishment. But Lang Mao did not punish them. Using this as an opportunity to educate people, he gave them a lesson on Confucian moral precepts. It was reported that, his lecturing was well received and the brothers had no disputes any more.[21]
Neighbours should be on good terms with one another. If they are in good relationships, a man may get support from his neighbours when he is sick or in need of money or help. It would be good to all. If there is a dispute, none of them can get help when it is needed. That would be in no one's interests. Nowadays, only a few people understand this. Often, people fight for their immediate interests. They do not consider their own interests in the long run. Whenever there is exchange in words, they would bring the matter to the local official, forgetting their relationships with their neighbours. But what can they get from litigation? They need to go a long way to the yamen. Time is wasted. Runners are to be paid. In the yamen, they would be scared or even be caned. The outcome of the case is at the discretion of the officials. Even if a man wins the case, the other party may revenge in the future. And there will be no end to it. No one can be sure that he will never be in trouble. If his relationships with neighbours were good, they would give him a hand when it is needed. If they were not on good terms, they would add to his problem. If so, today's winning becomes tomorrow's big loss.....The parties are given a copy of this judgement. They should bring it home and show it to the local people as one form of education.[24]
Clearly, the last sentence of the judgement shows that the official intended to take the matter as an opportunity for giving a lesson to all the local people.
There was once a local official whose mother was knowledgeable and of high morality. If a dispute was difficult to resolve, he often sought his mother's advice. In one case, a woman complained that her son did not treat her well. Being himself a filial son, the official intended to punish the son in accordance with the law. Before doing so, he discussed the case with his mother. She said, 'Hearing is not as believable as seeing. In any event, the man has not received any teaching on propriety. How can you punish him? You better ask the woman to take her son here. I will live with her and you with her son. Let the son see for himself how you respect me. Perhaps he will not do such wrongful thing again.' The official took her advice. When the woman lived with his mother, he respected her as if she had been his mother. Observing how the official behaved for only a few days, the son felt ashamed and wanted to take his mother home. The official's mother however thought that the time was not ripe to send the woman home. She said, 'On the face of it, the man is ashamed now. But deep in his heart, he may not think so. Better let him stay with us for some more time.' After staying for about twenty days more, he swore to the official that he would be filial. The woman also pleaded with tears that his son was sincere this time. The official then let them go. The remorse of the man was genuine. After the incident, he treated his mother well and became famous for his filial piety.[31]
A master borrowed one hundred and sixty taels of silver from his disciple. When the master died, he still owed his disciple seventy taels. The debt eventually became the responsibility of the master's brother. However, he was too poor to repay the debt. Thirty years after the master's death, the disciple sued for the debt. With interest, the amount had become more than three hundred taels. Rejecting the claim, the official held that it was intolerable for the disciple to sue for the money which his master had borrowed from him, especially with such high interest. Yet, as the brother was willing to pay, the disciple could have recovered the seventy taels had the disciple not argued the case before me. Now, but for the fact that the brother of the disciple was also an official, he should have been caned for his vigorous argument which showed no remorse on his part. It was also found that the master had been treated in a very mean manner. The seventy taels, taken as remuneration for the teaching of the master, could not be recovered...to warn those who treated their master without respect.[35]
There was a dispute between two widows. One sued another, the owner of a pawnshop, for the return of a sum of money. The plaintiff alleged that her husband had deposited the money. The defendant denied the claim, contending that there had never been such a deposit. The plaintiff could produce no evidence to support her case. On the other hand, the defendant has some records (though quite suspicious in certain aspects) to rebut the plaintiff's case. In order to settle the dispute, the official ordered the defendant to pay an amount equal to one third of the alleged deposit to the plaintiff. The defendant was not satisfied with the decision and through a third party again brought the case before the official. The official upheld the original decision and gave the following judgement:
The original decision was made for the purpose of settling the dispute...as well as encouraging the defendant to help the poor plaintiff. Having due regard to people's feelings and propriety, the plaintiff had not been unfairly treated...although both parties were widows, there was a great difference. The plaintiff was poor. The defendant, as the owner of a pawnshop, must be rich. To the defendant, the amount was only a drop in the ocean. The cardinal rule required that the excess must be reduced to the benefit of those in need.[38]
No one ever has an absolute legal right. All the circumstances, of which law is only one, are to be considered to determine the rights of the parties. It is best if morality and law are in harmony. But if they are in conflict, legal rules normally yield to justice. Law, being merely a code of conduct made by people, should not be and often is not followed, if it is in conflict with their sense of what is right, the feelings of the people upon which the concept of justice is founded.[39]
In the Han dynasty, a man (C) brought a case to the local official for a valuable sword in the possession of his elder sister. The official found that C's father was very rich and had a wife and a concubine. C was borne by the concubine and his elder sister the wife. His sister was the black sheep of the family. The concubine died in giving birth to C. C was only five when his father was seriously ill. Before his death, C's father made a will in the presence of his clansmen. The will stated that, except the sword, he gave all his property to C's elder sister who was requested to keep the sword for C until C reached the age of fifteen. When C was fifteen and asked for the sword, his sister refused to give it to him.
On the face of it, this was a simple case. In deciding the case, the official however adopted the following line of reasoning. He concluded that the whole matter was a plot of C's father. His true intent was to leave the estate to C. If he had stated in the will that he left all the properties to C, his daughter would have done anything to get them. Since C was at that time incapable of protecting himself, his daughter would surely have been successful. Further, had he left the estate to C when he died, C would have been incapable of managing and protecting it. In the circumstances, it would be better to let his daughter manage it before C became a grown-up. The official ruled that the sword was a symbol of determination. C's father stated that the sword should be given to C when he was fifteen, because C would then be cable of living independently. Realizing that his daughter would not give the sword to C, C's father anticipated further that C would sue for the sword. It was his hope that the official hearing the case could appreciate his plan and act accordingly. Having come to the conclusion, the official decided that the sister should return not only the sword but also all the estate to C. He stated that the decision was fair. She and her husband had enjoyed the wealth for ten years. The local people generally admired his decision.[41]
There was a dispute about the distribution of an inheritance in a clan. A man was not satisfied with his share. He brought the case to a local official. The lawsuit had dragged on for years. In an attempt to settle the matter once and for all, a new local official gathered all the clansmen and threatened them with the ill consequences of litigation. He told them that there were ambiguities in the documents, and advised them to resolve the dispute by giving some money to the man and letting him go away. The clansmen replied that they had tried but failed to do so. Hearing that, the official held that the clansmen should give some money to the man. To prevent dispute in the future, the man was ordered to leave the locality and never return.[43]
The commentator of the record approved of this decision:
As the discontented party was suffering from poverty and others from hardships of litigation, there was no point in deciding whose conduct was right or wrong. All the parties would be happy to obey the order that put an end to the matter. Giving some money to the poor and discontented man made it possible for him to go away. In doing so, the other clansmen could avoid all the vices of litigation. Although the discontented man got not much, he would no longer live in poverty. Further, litigation in the locality decreased. The official was indeed good at resolving disputes.[44]
The land is not very valuable. Yet the two parties never stopped disputing over it. Their conduct could only be a waste of time and money. It is no good at all. For the purpose of settling the dispute, the land should be forfeited.[45]
[s]uch a result was desirable because it had the effect of discouraging litigation by making it costly for both parties, a congruous outcome relative to the state's Confucian ideology that favoured a theoretically harmonious solution such as private mediation rather than litigation.[46]
[1] There are no statistics to tell the percentage of corrupt officials in the officialdom. But there are voluminous comments and criticism. For general discussion on corruption in traditional China, see Wang Ya Nan Zhong Guo Guan Liao Zheng Zhi Yan Jiu Shanghai: Shi Dai Wen Hua Chu Ban She 1948 181-9 王亞南《中國官僚政冶研究》上海:時代文化出版社 1948 181-9.
[2] Wong, Bobby ‘Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 30 Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 306.
[3] See, for example, ibid; Moser, M.J. Law and Social Change in a Chinese Community New York: Oceana, 1982; Ladany, L. Law and Legality in China: The Testament of a China-Watcher Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1992; Utter, R.F., ‘Dispute Resolution in China’ (1987) 62 Washington Law Review 383; Northrop, F.S.C. ‘The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism’ (1958) 44 Virginia Law Review 347; Hao, T. C. ‘Cultural Tradition and Formation of Legislation Characteristics in Contemporary China’ (1994) Chinese Legal Science 51; Low, S. P. ‘The Influence of Chinese Philosophies on Mediation and Conciliation in the Far East’ (1996) Arbitration 16; Lin, W. S. ‘Observation on the Legal Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius from the Point of View of Modern Rule of Law’ (1990) 19 National Taiwan University Law Journal 1; Liang, Z. P. ‘Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture’ (1989) Journal Of Chinese Law 55; Pettit, C. ‘Dispute Resolution in the People’s Republic of China’ (1984) The Arbitration Journal3; Huang, Z. D. ‘Negotiation in China: Cultural and Practical Characteristics’ (1989-90) 6 China Law Reporter 139; Lubman, S. ‘Mao and Mediation: Politics and dispute Resolution in Communist China’ (1967) 55 California Law Review 1284; Cohen, J.A. ‘Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization’ (1966) 54 California Law Review 1201; Clarke D.C.‘Dispute Resolution in China’ (1991) 5 Journal of Chinese Law 245; Bodde, D. ‘Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China’ Essays On Chinese Civilization (Blane C. L. & Borei D. eds.) Princeton: Princeton UP 1981, 171; MacCormack, G. The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law Athens: The University of Georgia Press 1996; MacCormack, G. The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law Athens: The University of Georgia Press 1996; and Lai, W. W. ‘the Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist’ (1978) 29 Comparative Legal Cultures 1307.
[4] Wang Yu Huai Ban An Yao Lue Beijing: Qun Zhong Chu Ban She 1980 70 王又槐《辨案要略》北京:群眾出版社1987 70.
[5] Huang, P. C. C. Civil Justice in China Stanford: Stanford University Press 1996 15-6.
[6] See generally, Zhe Yu Gui Jian Beijing: Jing Guan Jiao Yu Chu Ban She 1994《折獄龜鑒》北京:警官教育出版社 1994.
[7] Zhe Yu Gui Jian vol. 6 Bi Xuan《折獄龜鑒‧薜宣》338.
[8] Ibid, Wu Yuan Xiang《折獄龜鑒‧吳元享》328.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Analects: Yan Yuan 《論語.顏淵》 55.
[11]《三國志》vol. 16 《杜畿傳》 496.
[12] Lan Ding Yuan Lu Zhou Gong An Beijing: Qun Zhong Chu Ban She 1985 123-5 藍鼎元《鹿州公案》北京:群眾出版社 1985 123-5.
[13] Ibid, 125.
[14] Shi Ji: Zhou Ben Ji 《史記.周本紀》134.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Shi Ji: Wu Di Ben Ji 《史記.五帝本紀》33-4.
[17] See for example his belief in exemplification of officials to govern: Shi Ji《史記》3099.
[18] Xun Zi claimed that ‘it was natural for man to eat when hungry, to keep warm when cold, to have a rest when tired, to prefer things which brought material benefits to those which brought disadvantages’. He saw human nature as ‘bad or evil’ and the origin of all disputes.
[19] Confucius never states that human nature was good. He holds that a man’s behaviour may be changed by association with other people. Cf. Hansen, C. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation New York: Oxford UP 1992 78-83.
[20] Schwartz, B. ‘On Attitudes toward Law in China’ in Government under Law and the Individual ed. by Katz, M. Washington D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies 1957 64.
[21] Zhe Yu Gui Jian vol. 8 Lang Mao《折獄龜鑒‧郎茂》486.
[22] Analects: Wei Zheng 《論語.為政》4.
[23] Cf. Wong, B ‘Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution’ (2000) 30 Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 309-311.
[24] Mi Gong Shu Pan Qing Ming Ji vol. 2 393-4.
[25] ‘Lu Jia Shu (Long Qi) Pan Du‧Xiang Di Zheng Chan Zhi Miao Pan’《陸稼書(隴其)判牘.兄弟爭產之妙判》quoted in Fan Zhong Xin Qing Li Fa Yu Zhong Guo Ren范忠信《情理法與中國人》188.
[26] Xin, R. Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social control in China Westport: Greenwood Press 1997 20.
[27] See also Nan Shi‧Lu Xiang Zhuan《南史‧陸襄傳》1199; Xin Tang Shu‧Wei Jing JunZhuan《新唐書‧韋景駿傳》5626; Wei Shu‧Lie Nu‧Fang Ai Qin Qi Cui Shi Zhuan《魏書‧列女‧房愛親妻崔氏傳》1980-1.
[28] Xun Zi: You Zuo 《荀子.宥坐》Xun Zi (tran. Knoblock, J.) Stanford: Stanford University Press 1990 246.
[29] Han Zhu: Han Ting Shou Zhuan《漢書.韓廷壽傳》3213; Hou Han Shu: Lu Gong Zhuan《後漢書.魯恭傳》874.
[30] See, for example, Wei Shu‧Liang Li Zhuan‧ Zhang Chang Nian 《魏書‧良吏傳‧張長年》1901; Sui Shu‧Li Shi Qian Zhuan《隋書‧李士謙傳》1752-3.
[31] Wei Shu‧Lie Nu‧Fang Ai Qin Qi Cui Shi Zhuan《魏書‧列女‧房愛親妻崔氏傳》1980-1.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Lubman, S. ‘Mao and Mediation: Politics and dispute Resolution in Communist China’ (1967) 55 California Law Review 1284 1294. This is identified as the main reason for the pan-penalization in ancient China, see Yang, Q. T. ‘Characteristics & Formation of Pan-penalizationism in Ancient China’ 1994 (74) Modern Law Science 85 86.
[34] Hao, T. H. ‘Cultural Tradition and Forming of Legislation Characteristics in Contemporary China’ (1994) Chinese Legal Science 51 53-4.
[35] Fan Shan Pan Du, Case No.3: Pi Hao Ke Dong Cheng Ci 《樊山判牘‧批判三‧批郝克棟呈詞》quoted in Fan Zhong Xin Qing Li Fa Yu Zhong Guo Ren 范忠信《情理法與中國人》227-8.
[36] Hao, T. H. ‘Cultural Tradition and Forming of Legislation Characteristics in Contemporary China’ (1994) Chinese Legal Science 51 54.
[37] Sometimes the judgement stated that a party won the case but for the sake of maintaining harmony, the official would order that he should not alter the status quo: Mi Gong Shu Pan Qing Ming Ji 《名公書判清明集》vol. 1 198-9.
[38] Fan Shan Pan Du Decisions 3: Pi Dang Shang Liu De Sheng Ken Ci 《樊山判牘‧批判三‧批當商劉德勝懇詞》quoted in Fan Zhong Xin Qing Li Fa Yu Zhong Guo Ren 范忠信《情理法與中國人》226-7.
[39] Roebuck, D & Wong, K.Y. ‘Rapid Change and Traditional Morality - Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China’ (1995) 5 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 342 354.
[40] For legislation conferring similar power on the courts, see the Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance (Cap. 458).
[41] Tai Ping Yu Jian vol. 639 Feng Su Tong Yi《太平御覽》卷六三九《風俗通義》
[42] See Huang P. C. C. ‘Codified Law and Magisterial Adjudication in the Qing’ Civil Law in Qing and Republican China (Bernhardt K. & Huang P. C. C. eds.) Stanford: Stanford University Press 1994 142-186.
[43] Zhe Yu Guei Jian vol. 8: Wang Han 《折獄龜鑒‧王罕》474.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Lian Ming Gong An vol. 3: Jin Hou Pan Zheng Shan An 《廉明公案‧金侯判爭山案》in Zhong Hua Fa An Da Ci Dian Beijing: Zhong Guo Guo Ji Quang Bo Chu Ban She 1992 653-4《中華法案大辭典》北京:中國國際廣播出版社 1992 653-4.
[46] Allee, M.A. ‘Code, Culture, and Custom’ in Civil Law in Qing and Republican China ed. by Bernhardt, K. and Huang, P. C. C. Stanford: Stanford UP 1994 140. The case discussed there was about two adjacent plots of land with, as described by the deeds, ‘a small stream as the boundary.’ However, ‘there were two such rivulets’. The subject matter of the dispute was the land between the rivulets. The official ruled that neither party should have the land in issue. Instead, it was given to the Mingzhi Academy.
[47] Cheng, T.K. The World of the Chinese – A Struggle for Human Unity Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1980 101.
[48] For discussion on the characteristics of model officials in Chinese history, see Chang, C. M. ‘The Chinese Standards of Good Government: Being a Study of the Biographies of Model Officials in Dynastic Histories’ (1935) Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly vol. VIII No. 2.
[49] Cheng, T.K. op. cit. 111.
[50] For a general discussion on corrupt officials, Liu Tsai Fu Chuan Tong Yu Zhong Guo Ren Hong Kong: San Lian Shu Dian 1988 劉再復、林崗《傳統與中國人》香港:三聯 1988. See also Huang, P. C. C. Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing Stanford: Stanford University Press 1996, 130-5.
[51] Wu Han, Fei Xiao Tong Huang Quan Yu Shen Quan Tianjin: Tian Jin Ren Min Chu Ban She 1988 50 吳 、費孝通《皇權與紳權》天津:天津人民出版社 1988 50.
[52] Moore, B. Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Boston: Beacon Press 1966 172-6. For records of tricks and punishments of corrupt yamen clerks and runners, see Lan Ting Yuan Lu Zhou Gong An Beijing: Qun Zhong Chu Ban She 1985 1-7, 22-6, 70-4, 82-3, 142-3, 239-44, 270-4藍鼎元《鹿洲公案》北京:群眾出版社 1985 1-7, 22-6, 70-4, 82-3, 142-3, 239-44, 270-4. It should be noted that, before the Song dynasty, yamen clerks and runners received no fixed salary: Shen Kuo, Meng Xi Bi Tan Hong Kong: Zhang Hua Shu Ju1975 133 沈括《夢溪筆談》中華書局 1975 133.
[53]Tradition played an important part to manage personal and commercial disputes during the Cultural Revolution: Utter, R. F ‘Dispute Resolution in China’ (1987) 62 Washington Law Review 383, 394.
[54] Article 2.
[55]A duty to conduct conciliation is in fact imposed by Articles 9 and 85.
[56]Artilce 87.
[57]Article 89.
[58]Article 91.
[59]Article 116.
[60]For example, the legal rights of the parties must, as stated in Article 2 of the Civil Procedure Law, be protected.