Privacy Law and Policy Reporter
In a bankruptcy matter, Pollock's counsel objected to evidence ''on the basis that the disclosures comprised within the evidence involved a breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)'. In admitting the evidence, Carr J said nothing in the Privacy Act suggests that such evidence thereby becomes inadmissible in a court of law. The sanctions for interference with privacy are limited and do not expressly nor in my opinion impliedly extend to requiring the rejection of evidence relevant to the disposal of this matter.
I was certainly not cited any authority for that proposition. If it were necessary, before admitting such evidence for this Court to exercise the type of discretion referred to in Bunning v Cross  HCA 22; (1978) 141 CLR 54 I would have no hesitation in doing so in this matter. I can see no relevant unfairness to any person in taking such a course.