Screen Scraping in Australian Finance

Natalia Jevglevskaja and Ross P Buckley

[2023] UNSWLRS 3

UNSW Law
UNSW Sydney NSW 2052 Australia
SCREEN SCRAPING IN AUSTRALIAN FINANCE

NATALIA JEVGLEVSKAJA*
ROSS P BUCKLEY**

Millions of Australians give their online banking credentials to third parties so as to gain access to financial products and services enabled by the analysis of the data in their bank accounts. Screen Scraping (‘SS’) has contributed significantly to the rise of the FinTech industry. While the risks SS entails are significant, nowhere has the practice been formally outlawed despite the availability of safer data transfer arrangements under Open Banking regimes. We examine approaches to SS in the EU, the UK, and Australia and argue the practice should be prohibited here. Such a ban would have two salutary effects. It would protect consumers in financial hardship who use payday loans and it would accelerate uptake of the Consumer Data Right.

1. Introduction

By 2017, when the Australian Government announced its intention to roll out an economy wide Consumer Data Right (‘CDR’), over two million Australians were giving away their bank account login credentials to third parties.¹ The practice had boomed since 2001 when only perhaps 5000 Australians a year were doing it.² These third parties ‘scrape’ data from a customer’s internet banking interface and use it to offer financial products and services, in

---

* Natalia Jevglevskaja is a Research Fellow on the Australian Research Council Laureate Project at UNSW Sydney.

** Ross Buckley is KPMG Law - King & Wood Mallesons Professor of Disruptive Innovation at UNSW Sydney and an Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow (FL200100007). This Australian government funding has supported this research. We are grateful to Georgia Fink-Brigg, Jarrod Li and Katherine Cheng for their research assistance. The views herein are of the authors and not necessarily of the Australian government or Research Council. Corresponding author e-mail: ross.buckley@unsw.edu.au


addition to or in lieu of the products and services offered by the customer’s bank. Colloquially known as Screen Scraping (‘SS’), this practice gives businesses (mostly FinTechs) access to customer data without further identification vis-à-vis the account hosting bank and is now widely used globally. For example, as of 2021, more than 4 million Canadians – making up over 10% of Canada’s population – reportedly rely on financial services that employ SS technology. In the US, the Financial Data Exchange (‘FDX’) estimates that, as of 2020, data access and sharing for between 65-85 million US consumers – 20-25% of the population – was provided through shared customer login credentials.

The advantages and downsides of commercial SS, aka ‘digital data capture’, have been thoroughly discussed. Some regard this as an outrageous practice that needs to be excised from finance as quickly as possible. Others maintain SS enables delivery of novel products and services customers could not otherwise access. Arguing there is no evidence of consumer harm from SS, its proponents suggest the FinTech industry would be crippled should it be outlawed. Banks accuse FinTechs of stealing their customers’ data. FinTechs accuse banks of restricting access to information which should be controlled by customers.

Where SS is the only way to access customer data required for the provision of a service, opposition to a ban is, perhaps, understandable. If businesses reliant on data cannot access it, they cannot compete in the financial services market. However, competition, desirable as it is, should not come at the expense of data safety and security nor facilitate exploitation of financially vulnerable members of our society.

---

3 Review into Open Banking (n 1) 51.
5 Financial Data Exchange (‘FDX’) is a non-profit, industry standards body, dedicated to unifying financial services around a common, secure, and interoperable technical standard for user-permissioned sharing of financial data: see ‘About FDX’, Financial Data Exchange (Web Page) <https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/About/About-FDX.aspx?hkey=ddfb9a93-4f65-840c-f2c8be7fe8a6>.
7 Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Parliament of Australia, Interim Report (September 2020) [5.62].
Although the risks that SS entails for businesses and customers are real and serious, the practice has not been formally outlawed anywhere. Misconceptions abound that SS has been banned in Europe. However, while the EU and UK have commendably restricted the practice, it endures there, as we demonstrate. Jurisdictions that facilitate and regulate Open Banking and Open Finance, such as the EU, the UK, and Australia, expect SS to become redundant with the wider adoption of the Application Programming Interfaces (‘APIs’) which underpin Open Banking and Open Finance and are a far safer mode of data transfer. Yet, the rollout of Open Banking is slow and inertia powerful.

We argue Australia should, when the timing is propitious, explicitly outlaw SS to protect consumers experiencing financial hardship from unscrupulous non-bank lenders and to accelerate the implementation of CDR. Without regulatory intervention there is a real risk that the costs of accreditation under the CDR regime, inertia and path dependence, and the lure of the inappropriate use of data that SS offers, will all combine to see this practice endure well past when it is in the interests of consumers and the broader economy.

This article is structured as follows. Part 2 examines the origins of SS. Part 3 explores the legal and regulatory frameworks in the EU and the UK, in general for context, and specifically to debunk the myth that SS is banned in these jurisdictions. We also consider the reluctance of the Australian Government to pro-actively regulate SS in Part 3. Part 4 examines the upsides and downsides of SS, and Part 5 the arguments for its prohibition. Part 6 concludes.

2. Screen Scraping: Origins and Evolution

SS\(^8\) of data, including financial data, goes back to the emergence of ‘data aggregation’, also known as ‘account aggregation’, in the late 1990s in the US.\(^9\) A select few wealthy clients of some US banks are reported to have been benefitting from data accumulation features that

---

\(^8\) Screen Scraping (‘SS’) has many names. It is also referred to as ‘data scraping’, ‘web scraping’, ‘web harvesting’, or ‘data harvesting’.

allowed for an easy account review since as long ago as the 1980s. As more data was increasingly captured digitally at lesser cost, a new industry sprang up to make a unique value proposition to consumers, namely to ‘aggregate their financial lives onto one website’.

Typically, national banks (‘aggregator banks’) provided aggregation services under their brand name through third parties specialising in gathering, storing and presenting data to the customer (‘data aggregators’). The data could range from information available publicly online (such as travel or store specials and real estate information), personal account information (including credit cards and deposit accounts), to non-financial information (such as balances from frequent flyer or other reward programs or data from utility and insurance companies). To access personal information, aggregators relied on customer-provided usernames and passwords. To benefit from the service a customer had to nominate websites and the information to be collected therefrom and share her user credentials for each. The advantage for the customer was obvious: she could access all of her nominated financial and other information in one place and needed to remember only one username and password.

Banks were eager to offer account aggregation solutions to increase the usefulness of their banking services to customers. They saw it as an opportunity to leverage their position as ‘trusted financial intermediaries’ and thus deepen their customer relationships. Most importantly, banks soon realised that the choice for them may be ‘either to aggregate or be aggregated’, as the prospect of losing their customers to an aggregation service provided by a


14 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Account Aggregation (n 2) 7.


competing financial institution was real and daunting. Furthermore, because data aggregation facilitated an overview of businesses the customer was using and consequently offered new marketing opportunities, independent account aggregation services soon penetrated the market with commercial propositions with which banks struggled to compete.

Before long, the business model of account aggregation via SS spread to Australia and other jurisdictions, including South Korea, Japan, and Europe. Australian Securities and Investment Commission (‘ASIC’) reported seven account aggregation service providers were operating here by April 2001: two financial institutions, a stockbroker, a retail web portal and two other businesses. Marketing campaigns emphasised numerous benefits for consumers, above all the more efficient management of personal finances.

Indeed, over time many areas of social activity have come to rely on SS: internet auctions, search engines (Google, Bing, Yandex, etc), airline, vehicle and/or holiday housing price


19 While account aggregation could also be done via ‘direct feed arrangement’ with the financial institution hosting the data (ie APIs), this method was considered costly and time-consuming and, consequently, less attractive for aggregators. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Account Aggregation (n 2) 2, 15, 18, 21; Hiroshi Fujii et al, ‘E-Aggregation: The Present and Future of Online Financial Services in Asia-Pacific’ (Working Paper No 2002-06, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2002) 2 <http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2002-06.pdf>

20 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Account Aggregation (n 2) 17.


aggregation, targeted advertising, website preservation, academic research, journalism, and many more. SS has become an important part of providing ‘user convenience’ and saving time.

In the financial sector, data aggregators expanded their operational systems and moved to selling data-access services to a growing number of FinTechs that did not have capacity to collect the data themselves, but who armed with it could potentially challenge the incumbents in the provision of financial products and services. Today, companies that utilise SS for data aggregation do so for a range of use cases. Some access customers’ accounts on an ongoing basis to provide investment products or financial management tools; others access account information on a one-off basis, for example, to view transaction records as part of a loan assessment process.

23 Expedia, Orbitz, Kayak, Skyscanner, Booking.com, etc.
29 However, banks still use SS too: see Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Interim Report (n 7) [5.57]. See also Andres Wolberg-Stok, ‘Open Banking Ecosystem and Infrastructure: Banking on Openness’, in Linda Jeng (ed), Open Banking (Oxford University Press, 2022) ch 1, 17.
30 Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Interim Report (n 7) [5.48]– [5.49].
Two business models have emerged. SS can be undertaken by a FinTech offering the underlying service, for example, a personal finance management tool (‘PFM’).\textsuperscript{31} A customer will share her banking credentials with such a FinTech so it can retrieve her financial data from her bank which the FinTech then typically stores along with the customer’s ID and password in its database.\textsuperscript{32}

The more common model, however, is where FinTechs use one of a small number of companies specialising in data aggregation to act as an intermediary between the FinTech and the customer.\textsuperscript{33} This model limits the number of parties needing to hold a customer’s credentials and include Plaid, Envestnet | Yodlee, Finicity, MX and others. These entities connect to financial institutions hosting customer accounts and collect, package and deliver the customer data to the FinTech.\textsuperscript{34} This enables the FinTech to focus its time and resources on the development of core products and services.

3. Legal Frameworks

The frequency and certainty with which industry and consumer rights organisations assert that SS has been generally outlawed in the EU and the UK is striking, given how wrong this assertion is.\textsuperscript{35} While expert commentary mostly rightly observes that restrictions are limited to

---

\textsuperscript{31} Personal finance management tool (‘PFM’) is a software application that helps its users to manage their financial activities. PFM solutions range from transaction analysis and spending categorisation to personalised insights and recommendations, such as on savings or investments. See, eg, ‘PFM Solutions for Banks’, Moneythor (Web Page, 1 April 2021) https://www.moneythor.com/2021/04/01/pfm-solutions-for-banks/


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid 73.


the financial sector, specifically payments, it often fails to differentiate between the three
costitutive components of conventional SS practice, namely accessing customer account
credentials, the technical process of ‘scraping’ data from the customer-facing online interface,
and the impersonation of the customer. The elements of impersonation and credential sharing
concern the opponents of SS most. Only the element of impersonation, however, is no longer
tolerated by the EU and the UK’s frameworks, with the other two elements remaining, as is
shown below. Importantly, in certain circumstances all three components of ‘traditional’ SS can
no longer be employed. As demonstrated next, where a bank has implemented a compliant,
stress-tested, and widely-used API it can be exempt from the duty to establish a contingency
mechanism under which customer data is accessed through ‘conventional’ SS. The value of this
restriction remains significantly constrained, however, by its limitation to payment accounts.

This section first examines legal and regulatory frameworks on the sharing of customer
financial data in the EU and the UK and then discusses the stance on SS of the Australian
government.

3.1 The EU Framework

In the EU, Directive 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market (‘PSD II’) mandated the move to ‘Open Banking’ by creating a digital environment that enables customers to consent to third parties accessing their payment account information or making payments on

---

36 See, for example, John Casanova and Max Savoie (eds), Payment Services, Law and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022) 29. For correct and comprehensive analysis, see Han-Wei Liu, ‘Shifting Contour of Data Sharing in Financial Market and Regulatory Responses: The UK And Australian Models’ (2021) 10(2) American University Business Law Review 287, 294.

37 See section 4.2 below.

their behalf.\textsuperscript{39} Seeking to promote competition and innovation in the EU and EEA payment sectors, the Directive opened it to a range of Payment Service Providers (‘PSPs’), including non-bank entities – FinTechs – that offer consumer- or business-oriented payment services based on access to data from payment accounts.\textsuperscript{40} Two new categories of such services were regulated and harmonised under PSD2: Account Information Services (AIS) and Payment Initiation Services (‘PIS’),\textsuperscript{41} respectively offered by Account Information Service Providers (AISPs), and Payment Initiation Service Providers (‘PISPs’).\textsuperscript{42}

AIS collect and consolidate data from a customer’s online payment accounts held with multiple Account Servicing Payment Service Providers (‘ASPSPs’)\textsuperscript{43} – usually banks – in a single place allowing her to better manage personal finances by analysing spending patterns and financial needs in a user-friendly manner.\textsuperscript{44} Companies such as Mint in the US, Money Dashboard in the UK, and Frollo in Australia are all now leading brands in this field.

Sofort in Germany and iDeal in the Netherlands pioneered business models in PIS. These payment services radically simplified online payments by acting as a ‘bridge’ between the customer’s financial institution and the merchant’s account.\textsuperscript{45} Instead of using a credit card and paying credit card fees or going through the hassle of logging into her bank account and then

\textsuperscript{39} While there is no one definition of Open Banking, from the European perspective, Open Banking, at a minimum, includes products and services based on the sharing of ‘payment account data’ as mandated by PSD2 (n 38). See, eg, \textit{Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Strategy for Data} [2020] COM 66, 30 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-european-strategy-data-19feb2020_en.pdf>:

\textsuperscript{40} Payment Service Providers (‘PSP’) is a broad term that includes banks and third parties providing selected financial services, including AIS and PIS: see PSD2 (n 38) arts 1, 4(11), annex I. See also European Banking Federation, ‘Guidance for Implementation of the Revised Payment Services Directive’ (Document, 20 December 2019) <https://www.ebf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EBF-PSD2-guidance-Final-December-2019.pdf>.

\textsuperscript{41} As defined in PSD2 (n 38) articles 4(16) and 4(15) respectively.

\textsuperscript{42} As defined in PSD2 (n 38) articles 4(18), 66 and 4(19), 67 respectively. See also UK Finance, ‘PSD2 Guidance: Open Access Guidance for Account Servicing Payment Service Providers’ (Guidance, April 2020) [1.1] <https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/PSD2%20Guidance%20Section%201%20Open%20Access%20Guidance%20ASPSPs%20January%20202020%20-%20updated%20July%202020.pdf>.

\textsuperscript{43} For a definition of ASPSP, see PSD2 (n 38) art 4(17).

\textsuperscript{44} PSD2 (n 38) preamble, recital 28.

filling in the recipient’s account details and other information required for the purchase, the customer can have a facilitator initiate a payment from her account to a payee’s account. With PIS, she only needs to authenticate with her bank, select the preferred account and confirm a payment order directly through the service she is using.46

The permissibility of SS by AISPs and PISPs became a subject of heated debate during the drafting of Regulatory Technical Standards (‘RTS’) under Article 98(1) PSD2. These standards lay out specific requirements on secure authentication and communication between different actors in the PSD2 payment ecosystem.47 Charged with their development, the European Banking Authority (‘EBA’), was inclined to ban SS.48 However, the final decision-making power on the adoption of the standards was vested in the European Commission,49 which – in response to industry concerns – allowed for several indirect means by which SS could continue. Specifically, from the date the RTS came into effect, ASPSPs had to enable access to customer accounts via one of the authorised methods: either a ‘dedicated interface’ or a modified version of the customer interface which meets the requirements of RTS.50 Seeking to ensure technology and business-model neutrality PSD2 does not prescribe specific technologies or standards.51 For dedicated interfaces, however, ASPSPs have generally regarded APIs as the preferred technology.

A modified customer interface refers to an online banking interface originally devised for authenticating and communicating with the ASPSPs’ users (i.e. banks’ customers) but modified

---


49 PSD2 (n 38) arts 98(4), 10–14.

50 RTS (n 47) arts 30–31.

51 PSD2 (n 38) art 98(2)(d).
in a way that would allow an AISP / PISP to identify itself to the financial institution operating the account.\(^{52}\) Qualified certificates for electronic seals or qualified certificates for website authentication, commonly referred to as e-IDAS certificates, must be used for identification.\(^{53}\) Such certificates should include all the information an ASPSP needs to identify an AISP/PISP and determine its authorisation status.\(^{54}\) Accessing data through an adjusted customer interface created an opportunity to use SS in a new, modified form and is occasionally referred to as ‘screen scraping plus’ (‘SS plus’).\(^{55}\) This is the point that is often overlooked – an AISP/PISP may still legitimately rely on customer’s personalised security credentials to employ automated methods of ‘scraping’ data, even though an AISP/PISP can no longer ‘impersonate’ the customer holding the account.\(^{56}\)

Another backdoor means of SS that PSD2 opened are the ‘contingency measures’ under Article 33 that an ASPSP must take establishing a dedicated API. The contingency mechanism requirements are intended to ensure an AISP/PISP can access customer data through the online interface the customer has with their ASPSP in the event an API does not perform as required, or becomes unavailable (i.e. unplanned downtime), or when the system breaks down.\(^{57}\) Compared to the practice of SS prior to PSD2, impersonation of the customer is no longer allowed when a contingency mechanism is triggered – an AISP/PISP must be able to identify itself towards the

---

52 RTS (n 47) preamble para 20 and art 30(1).
54 UK Finance (n 42) 7–8.
57 RTS (n 47) art 33(1).
However, the other two elements of ‘traditional’ SS – i.e. credential sharing and automated process of capturing data from user interfaces – remain intact under PSD2. An exemption from the obligation to adopt contingency measures may be granted by national authorities where an ASPSP has implemented an RTS compliant, stress-tested API used extensively for at least three months. In such a scenario, an AISP/PISP would be barred from using SS technology in relation to customer payment accounts held by an exempted ASPSP.

3.2 The UK Framework

The legal foundation for the UK Open Banking framework is formed by Part 2 of the Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017 (CMA Order) and Part 7 of the Payment Services Regulation (PSR), which translated PSD2 into UK legislation. The CMA Order established an Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE) to create standards for data sharing (UK Open Banking Standards). These standards were required to cover APIs, data formats, and security as well as governance arrangements and customer redress mechanisms and not ‘include provisions which are incompatible with the requirements in PSD2’. The PSR imposes data-sharing obligations on ‘account servicing payment service providers’ (ASPSP) – ie data holders or banks – with respect to requests made by AISPs and PISPs– ie accredited data recipients.

---

58 RTS (n 47) art 33(5).

59 See above n 56.


61 Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017 (UK) (‘CMA Order’). The order is made under the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK) (‘Enterprise Act’).

62 Payment Services Regulation 2017 (UK) (‘PSR’).

63 CMA Order (n 61) art 10.1.


65 CMA Order (n 61) art 10.2.

66 PSR (n 62) rr 2, 69, 70.
Reg 69(2)(a) and Reg 70(2)(a) of the PSR mandate that ASPSPs must comply with RTS which also provide the basis on which the UK Open Banking Standards are approved for compliance with the PSR for a UK bank. The backdoors to SS have thus been entrenched in the UK’s regulatory framework as a rule.\textsuperscript{67} Since 14 September 2019,\textsuperscript{68} AISP or PISP access to customer payment account information had to be enabled via either a dedicated interface or a modified version of the customer interface which meets the requirements of RTS.\textsuperscript{69} Where an ASPSP chooses to provide access via a dedicated interface, it must have contingency measures in place. An exemption from the obligation to provide a contingency mechanism can be granted by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – the regulator of the UK Open Banking framework – to a financial institution showing it has implemented an RTS compliant, stress-tested, and widely-used API.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, unless the financial institution holding customer data has established open API channels and is exempt from the duty to provide for a contingency mechanism, an AISP/PISP can access customer data using customer credentials and SS technology, provided it identifies itself towards the ASPSP.

3.3 Limitations of the EU and the UK Frameworks

Both the EU, and the UK’s framework remain limited in one significant respect which may retain the attractiveness of and, arguably, even the need for SS. PSD2 is focused on payment accounts\textsuperscript{71} and applies to payment services provided within the EU and EEA. The UK framework is similarly limited to payment systems. The CMA Order, requires access to be given

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} Note, however, that due to a range of technical challenges faced by industry in implementing different RTS requirements, the Financial Conduct Authority has shifted the deadline for the full compliance with RTS several times with the most recent date being set to 30 September 2022: see ‘Strong Customer Authentication’, Financial Conduct Authority (Web Page, 21 March 2022) https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/strong-customer-authentication.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Specifically, Articles 30 and 34-36: see Financial Conduct Authority (n 67) 235.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Financial Conduct Authority (n 67) 236.
\item \textsuperscript{71} A payment account is defined in Article 4(12) of PSD2 as ‘an account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used for the execution of payment transactions’. See also European Commission, ‘Payment Services Directive (PSD2): Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) Enabling Consumers to Benefit from Safer and More Innovative Electronic Payments’ (Memo, 27 November 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_4961>; ‘The RTS only covers payment accounts in the scope of PSD2’.
\end{itemize}
to transaction information for personal current account products
and business current account
products. The PSR adds to this list the requirement to give access to data from a ‘payment
account’, i.e. ‘an account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used
for the execution of payment transactions’. In the view of the Financial Conduct Authority –
the regulator of the UK Open Banking framework – payment accounts include ‘current accounts,
e-money accounts, flexible savings accounts, credit card accounts and current account
mortgages.’ Mortgage and loan accounts, fixed term deposit accounts and cash savings
accounts are not subject to the UK framework.

Even where the exchange of customer payment account data between a bank and a
FinTech runs well via an API, it provides only partial insight into a customer’s overall financial
situation. As a consequence (unless a data holder provides access to other customer accounts
beyond the PSD2 mandate), businesses offering, for example, consumer loans will not be able to
access the information on customer’s savings and investment habits, unless they resort to SS
which offers visibility of all data held in the online banking channel.

In short, as a matter of law, the prohibition of SS in the EU and the UK is limited to
accessing payment account data without identification toward the account holding institution.
This includes scenarios where data is scraped from non-payment accounts, such as savings or
mortgage accounts, in a way that inadvertently captures data from payments accounts.

---

72 Including personal current accounts (with or without an overdraft facility), basic bank accounts, packaged
accounts, reward accounts, student or graduate accounts and youth accounts: CMA Order (n 61) art 12.4.1.
73 Including business current accounts and ‘standard tariff unsecured business overdrafts’: CMA Order (n 61) art
12.4.2.
74 PSR (n 62) r 2.
75 Financial Conduct Authority (n 67) 213.
76 Ibid. See also Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013) PERG 15.3.
77 ‘Why Screen Scraping Still Rules the Roost on Data Connectivity’, Yodlee (Web Page, 18 June 2021):
2, 3 – We Are out of the Starting Blocks with a Marathon Ahead’, The Papers (Blog Post, 27 July 2022)
1257721>.
78 European Banking Authority ‘EBA Responses to Issues XIV to XX Raised by Participants of the EBA Working
Accessing payment account data via SS *upon identification* towards the ASPSP remains lawful in both jurisdictions. Finally, PSD2 contains no sunset clause either for the requirement to provide a modified customer-facing interface, or for ‘contingency measures’ under Article 33 PSD2, suggesting the hybrid model of accessing customer data is likely to remain for now.\(^\text{79}\)

Importantly, both jurisdictions are yet to regulate SS in relation to non-payment accounts. As a matter of practice, PISPs and AISP\(^s\) may need to accommodate different access methods: APIs for payment accounts and customer-facing user interfaces for non-payment accounts, unless ASPSP\(^s\) equally offer (open) API access to the latter.

Whether a review of PSD2 will change the existing state of affairs, remains to be seen. In May 2022, the European Commission commenced a consultative process to assess whether PSD2 remains fit for purpose or needs revision.\(^\text{80}\) In particular, the Commission is seeking to understand what proportion of businesses providing and/or seeking access to payment account data under PSD2 (i.e. both, the incumbents and FinTechs) are doing so via APIs and whether they do, or intend to, leverage their API infrastructure to include access to other financial data beyond payment accounts. Industry feedback will hopefully offer valuable insights into success of API-based business models and the looming redundancy of SS. Yet, the reverse scenario, in which the Commission confirms the continuing need for SS in finance, should not be ruled out either. One should also bear in mind that, regardless of the review outcome, the UK’s departure from the EU means the relevance of PSD2 to the UK framework will diminish and the UK Open Banking framework will continue developing on its own terms.\(^\text{81}\)

### 3.4 CDR

Customer data sharing in Australia is governed by the Consumer Data Right (‘CDR’) framework which was established under the *Treasury Laws (Consumer Data Right) Act 2019*

---


\(^\text{80}\) As mandated under PSD2 (n 38) art 108.

\(^\text{81}\) The UK formally ceased to be a member state of the EU on 31 January 2020 with the transition period ending on 31 December 2020. ‘[I]t is intended that the PSD II will eventually be replaced by Open Banking after Brexit’: Victoria Dixon (ed), *Goode on Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions* (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2020) [5-77].
The CDR differs fundamentally from other data-sharing regimes – including in the EU and the UK – in two fundamental respects: (i) it is not limited to sharing of payment account data and extends to other financial accounts, and (ii) most importantly, it is designed to apply across many sectors of the economy. Initially rolled out in banking (where CDR is referred to as ‘Open Banking’), the regime is in the process of being extended to energy and telecommunications, with ‘open finance’ – including superannuation and general insurance – recently identified as a further priority area for CDR deployment.

The CDR statutory framework includes four core components: (i) the CDR Act as enabling legislation; (ii) CDR Designation Instruments issued under Part IVD of the CDR Act which designate sectors of the Australian economy for the purposes of the CDR; (iii) CDR Rules; and (iv) Consumer Data Standards.

The CDR Act created a new Part IVD of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘CCA’), which outlined the overarching objectives and principles of CDR, set out the role and functions of the regulatory bodies charged with establishing and enforcing CDR rules, enshrined minimum privacy protections and empowered the Treasurer to apply CDR to economy sectors.

As mentioned, sector designation occurs through CDR Designation Instruments. For example, the Consumer Data Right (Authorised Deposit Taking Institutions) Designation 2019 (Cth) designated the banking sector. Then, the CDR Rules regulate the scope of data to be shared within a designated sector and the circumstances in which data sharing is required, i.e. in

---

82 *Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Act 2019* (Cth) (‘CDR Act’).


85 *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) (‘CCA’).


87 *Consumer Data Right (Authorised Deposit Taking Institutions) Designation 2019* (Cth).
response to a valid consumer request and subject to consumer consent.\textsuperscript{88} The rules also set out privacy safeguards and regulate the use of data.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, Consumer Data Standards stipulate the technical requirements by which data needs to be provided to consumers and accredited data recipients (‘ADRs’) within the CDR system.\textsuperscript{90} These standards are sector-specific and have been developed through four work streams: API standards, information security standards; consumer experience standards; and engineering.\textsuperscript{91}

No explicit prohibition on SS is contained in the CDR framework. It does not include an obligation on data holders to establish a modified customer interface or ensure availability of a ‘fallback mechanism’ in the event dedicated interfaces fail to work as intended or experience a downtime.

The CDR’s silence on SS was its drafters’ deliberate choice back in 2017, when the government commissioned the review into Open Banking in Australia to identify the most appropriate model for the national market and recommend the regulatory framework under which it would operate.\textsuperscript{92} After considering a series of submissions that focused on the risks and opportunities presented by SS, the review found that SS had become the FinTech industry’s default way of gaining authorised access to customer’s financial data given that data sharing agreements with banks that would allow FinTechs to receive customer data via secure portals, such as dedicated interfaces, were, at best, few and far in between.\textsuperscript{93} Crucially, the review concluded that Open Banking should neither endorse nor prohibit SS – as banning SS would remove an important market-based check on its design – but should aim to make the practice of SS redundant by facilitating a more efficient data transfer mechanism.\textsuperscript{94}

Subsequently, several significant consultative processes also turned their attention to the question of SS. In 2020, both the Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Under CDR, ‘consumers’ include both individuals and businesses entities: see Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Act 2019 (Cth) (‘CDR Act’) s 56AI(3); Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Bill 2019 [1.100], [1.101].
\item \textsuperscript{89} The Treasury, ‘Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right: Issues Paper’ (Paper, March 2022) 4.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{91} ‘CDR Booklet’ (n 86) 9.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 1) 121–2.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 92) 72.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 92) x, 72, 84.
\end{itemize}
Regulatory Technology\textsuperscript{95} (later renamed as the ‘Select Committee on Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre’)\textsuperscript{96} and the Inquiry into Future Directions for the Consumer Data Right\textsuperscript{97} were in agreement that, for the time being, maintaining the status quo was preferable to taking regulatory action.\textsuperscript{98} In response to the proposal by the Reserve Bank of Australia (‘RBA’) to examine whether a ban on SS would support the financial sector’s transition away from the practice, the Inquiry admitted, however, that for \textit{payment initiation services} the eventual prohibition of SS would be in the interests of consumers.\textsuperscript{99} Indeed, without proper safeguards, ‘payment initiation’, aka ‘action initiation’ or ‘write access’, could enable a third party to act in ways contrary to the consumer’s express instructions, causing her substantial harm.\textsuperscript{100} Yet, in contrast to the EU and the UK frameworks which specifically regulate payment initiation, CDR is currently limited to ‘read access’, meaning that while consumers are able to share data with third parties, they cannot instruct them to take actions on their behalf. This, too, was the drafters’ conscious decision – action initiation was viewed as premature and likely to endanger the framework’s acceptance.\textsuperscript{101} The Australian government was particularly mindful that for CDR to succeed, consumers must first gain confidence in their data being accessed and shared securely and only for the purposes to which they have consented.

In response to the Inquiry the government announced in December 2021 that it would ‘expand the functionality of the CDR regime to include support for consumer-directed third-
party action initiation’ in the banking sector. However, and even though the recent Statutory Review of the CDR noted ‘significant enthusiasm’ in the industry for its delivery, at the time of writing it is unclear when action initiation will be incorporated in the framework and when its use will become widespread. In the Inquiry’s view, a ban on SS will only be timely once payment initiation achieves ‘a broad coverage’ of banks and accounts.

The new Labor government that came to power in Australia in May 2022 asserted its full support of the CDR regime. However, the volume of data being shared via Open Banking has not been made public in Australia, making it hard to assess to what extent SS remains a serious contender to APIs in the context of financial data access and sharing. The ACCC guidance for the industry from March 2021 notes only that ‘[b]usinesses collecting data via both channels must be transparent with consumers as to how the data is collected and which protections apply’. Given that Australia has not yet formally phased out SS, it is safe to assume it remains a popular practice.

4. SS – To Use or Not to Use?

Although the range of services enabled by SS have evolved and diversified significantly since the end of 1990s, many of the arguments for and against SS are as old as the technology itself. Incumbent institutions (banks) and new entrants (FinTechs) often find themselves at

---

102 This will enable third party ‘payment initiation’ as well as ‘general action initiation’, including switching between products and services, opening or closing an account, updating details, etc, see Australian Government, ‘Government Response to the Final Report of the Inquiry into Future Directions for the Consumer Data Right’ (Response, 14 December 2021) 2 <https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2021-225462>.


104 Inquiry into Future Directions for the Consumer Data Right (n 98) 97. 


106 Eyers (n 106).


108 Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right: Report (n 104) 28: ‘The consultation process revealed that there is still significant use of screen scraping in sectors both within and outside the CDR’. See also TrueLayer ‘Response to Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right’ (n 79) 10.
opposite ends of the arguments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, almost every single argument has been met with a counterargument.

4.1 The Advantages of SS (‘Long Live SS!)

SS has long been regarded as an effective tool to address significant information asymmetry in finance and drive competition. Historically, incumbent players – banks – treated customer data as their own by capturing and siloing it on their servers. This created substantial barriers for new market entrants who needed the data to successfully shape their product and services portfolios and drive their businesses. SS has helped to remove those barriers, behind which the banks were sheltering, and enable FinTechs to better compete. In turn, incumbents have been pushed to improve their own service offerings. As a result, some view SS as the single most important driver of use-case development globally.

As data transfer technology, SS has been favoured by businesses for a range of reasons, the foremost being business convenience and efficiency at a relatively low cost. A FinTech with a customer’s account credentials does not need to enter into contractual arrangements with the account-holding institution to access customer data. Without account credentials, a FinTech needs to negotiate data access via structured data feeds – i.e APIs – which is time-consuming and costly. Where API connections are not available, the service to the customer cannot be provided at all and the customer is lost. Even where APIs are ‘open’ – that is characterised by their free or low-cost availability to third parties and a relatively standardised format – building connections to APIs, testing and maintaining those connections requires investment of money and time. Indeed, some argue that building API connections is more difficult than developing...
APIs, particularly where the goal is to connect with multiple financial institutions in multiple markets.\textsuperscript{116}

To illustrate, there are currently three main API standards in Europe – STET PSD2 API framework, UK Open Banking Standard, and Berlin Group’s NextGenPSD2 XS2A Framework Standard – each with different specifications or requirements for its region which then are often further particularised by individual banks.\textsuperscript{117} Whereas each ASPSP has, at most, one API to implement, AISPs and PISPs must implement a large number of APIs, depending on their current services and market coverage.\textsuperscript{118} Monitoring the API connections for downtime, upgrades, and improvements also results in significant and ongoing work which compels many businesses to outsource these tasks to external providers.

Accreditation requirements may also incentivise recourse to SS. In Australia, for example, the time and money that needs to be invested to obtain accreditation under the CDR (and thus be able to share customer data via standardised APIs) are argued to be barriers too steep for many FinTechs to overcome. Smaller companies and start-ups thus often prefer to rely on SS.\textsuperscript{119}

In contrast, the technical set up for receiving data via SS is said to be fast, as it bypasses the data holder’s systems and data sharing permissions.\textsuperscript{120} Most importantly, SS is argued to offer access to both larger volumes of, and more granular, data.\textsuperscript{121} This data can be stored digitally in a data collector’s database (be it a service providing FinTech or a data aggregator acting as an intermediary) and accessed without restriction for as long as customer credentials do

\begin{itemize}
  \item Tink (n 116).
  \item Ibid. See also Andrei Cazacu, ‘PSD2: Does Europe Need a Single API Standard?’, TrueLayer (Blog Post, 13 July 2022) \textless https://truelayer.com/blog/psd2-does-europe-need-a-single-api\textgreater .
  \item Tonia Berglund, ‘From Screen Scraping to Open Banking’, \textit{Australian Broker} (Web Page, 1 July 2021) \textless https://www.brokernews.com.au/features/opinion/from-screen-scraping-to-open-banking-277582.aspx\textgreater .
  \item See also Natalia Jevglevskaja and Ross P Buckley, ‘The Consumer Data Right: How to Realise This World-Leading Reform’ (2022) 45(4) \textit{University of New South Wales Law Journal} (forthcoming).
  \item Adatree (n 35).
  \item PSD2 (n 38); Wandhöfer (n 56) 192–3 [12.020].
\end{itemize}
not change or permission for data access is not revoked. In comparison, connecting via dedicated interfaces may well be less attractive, as banks may not only limit the data that is accessible through APIs, but also reduce the connection speed or API’s availability.

Business advantages, however, are not the sole grounds that SS proponents use to defend it. Alleged consumer benefits are brought into the debate too. When employed by responsible actors that have safeguards in place to duly protect consumer data, SS has been argued to be a viable technology that is ‘valued by consumers’. It also helps them realise their autonomy, since consumers have a right to decide whether they want their data to be shared via SS or via alternative techniques. Some businesses argue that if consumers are given a choice between using a quicker digital assessment processes based on SS and a manual paper-based assessment which takes considerably longer, over 80% of consumers choose the faster, digital option.

Finally, the retention of SS practices has been defended on grounds that they offer a benchmark against which to judge the success of Open Banking. In Australia, for example, the Review into Open Banking emphasised that allowing competing approaches would provide an important test of the design quality of Open Banking: ‘Should those competing approaches become more actively used than those specified under Open Banking, this will provide a valuable signal to regulatory authorities that the design of Open Banking may need to be revisited.’ Besides, some project that there will be a broad range of complementary use cases for SS even when Open Banking has been fully implemented. For example, SS may be needed to supplement API-derived data, where the level and quality of the latter proves insufficient or poor (for instance, SS may be used to help clean and correct Open Banking data parcels and


124 Illion (n 110).


126 Illion, Response to a Question on Notice to Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Inquiry into the Current State of Australia’s FinTech and RegTech Industries (17 February 2020) 2. See also Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology (n 7) [5.63].

127 Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 1) 10. See also Illion (n 110) 4.

128 Berglund (n 120).
perform data reconciliation\textsuperscript{129}, or to provide a redundancy fail-safe in an event that the APIs of the financial institution hosting the customer account are offline or do not function properly.\textsuperscript{130}

### 4.2 The Downsides of SS (‘Long Live APIs!’)

The arguments against SS are many. The foremost is that handing over user credentials is an inherently unsafe online behaviour which runs counter to good IT security practices and the explicit security advice provided by governments and most businesses to consumers.\textsuperscript{131} Where the third party possesses user credentials, it has nearly unlimited control over the customer’s account: it can access data it has not been authorised to access, execute financial transactions without the permission of the customer, and even change the customer’s authentication credentials thereby locking them out of their own accounts.\textsuperscript{132} Moreover, extending user credentials to a third party inevitably creates a larger surface area for cyberattacks, including phishing attacks and unwanted profiling.\textsuperscript{133} As a rule, businesses relying on SS will need to submit the customer credentials in unencrypted form to the server from which the data is to be scraped.\textsuperscript{134} As a result, risks of fraud and unauthorised access to customers’ accounts are compounded, as their login credentials are exposed in multiple places.

A further argument against SS is that the security and reliability of FinTechs does not compare with the security and reliability of the financial institutions hosting the accounts and issuing the user credentials.\textsuperscript{135} In Australia, for example, CBA has argued that customers who have used services of FinTechs relying on SS are at least twice as likely to experience digital

\begin{footnotes}
\item[129] FinTech Australia, Submission No 19 to Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, \textit{Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre} (September 2019) 35.
\item[130] Illion (n 110) 5.
\item[131] Evidence to Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Senate, Parliament of Australia, Melbourne, 30 January 2020, 33 (Xavier Shay); Evidence to Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Senate, Parliament of Australia, Melbourne, 30 January 2020, 13 (Lisa Schutz).
\item[133] Cliffe (n 114) 174.
\item[135] Winn and Wright (n 9) 7-130.
\end{footnotes}
fraud, compared to customers who do not share their account credentials.\textsuperscript{136} Even though CBA could not prove causally that customer losses were due to sharing personalised user credentials with third parties, it identified a ‘very concerning correlation’ that customers that had logged onto their online accounts via intermediaries were more likely to experience fraud.\textsuperscript{137}

Giving third parties access details to one’s bank account also amounts to a breach of the banks’ customer terms and conditions and – in Australia – places customers at risk of losing their protections under the E-Payments Code. The E-Payments Code administered by ASIC applies to consumer electronic payment transactions as set out in clause 2.5 of the Code (including electronic card transactions, telephone banking, certain online transactions and online bill payments, direct debits, and others).\textsuperscript{138} Although a voluntary code of practice, it is adhered to by most banks, credit unions and building societies along with a number of non-banking businesses.\textsuperscript{139} Under the E-Payments Code, consumers must not voluntarily disclose passcodes to anyone, including a family member or friend, and if she does so, may be liable for damages that occur as a result of handing over her credentials.\textsuperscript{140} While a breach of the passcode security requirements in itself is insufficient to impose liability for losses from an unauthorised transaction on a consumer, a consumer is liable where a service provider can prove on the balance of probability that she contributed to a loss through fraud, or breaching the pass code security requirements.\textsuperscript{141}

One problem, however, is that consumers may not even realise they lose protection under the E-Payments Code. As noted by the Review into Open Banking in Australia, in some instances, ‘the way in which a request for a customer’s bank login details is made means that customers may not even be aware they have given their login details to someone other than their


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Australian Securities and Investments Commission, \textit{ePayments Code} (at 2 June 2022).

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} See \textit{ePayments Code} (n 139) cls 11.1–11.2, 12(2)(a). See also \textit{Report of the Review into Open Banking} (n 1) 72 that notes ‘Handing over login credentials to enable screen scraping may be a violation of the bank’s terms and conditions, meaning the customer may be liable if their credentials were to be compromised.’

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{ePayments Code} (n 139) cl 11.2.
Alternatively, a consumer may naively presume the legality of credential sharing. She may think that, because a FinTech engaged in SS collects data from her financial institution, there would be a legal relationship between the two entities that requires or validates the consumer’s cooperation. Either way, the consumer is being exploited to an extent unfathomable under data sharing arrangements via APIs which ensure transparency in the way consumers are able to grant and revoke access to their data and which ensure consumers know how, when and for what purposes their data is used.

There is broad agreement in the industry that SS has historically been relied upon out of necessity rather than because it is an elegant technology design for data sharing. SS is largely regarded as a slow and unstable method of data collection frequently prone to errors. Specifically, SS methods are based on navigating whole web pages, requiring a lot of data to be downloaded and processed to get a few sought-after pieces of information. They are thus much slower than APIs which establish a direct connection between a data holder and a data recipient. In fact, assessments claim that processes that take SS tools up to ten minutes can be completed in seconds by using dedicated interfaces. Further, SS is a workaround rather than a dedicated solution. It requires maintaining a unique script for each dedicated data source (i.e., for each individual bank). Should the bank’s platform change ever so slightly (for example, a button on the online user interface is moved from one part of the page to another), SS won’t work thereby necessitating a re-write of the script by the developer to re-establish the connection.

The need to repeatedly fix connectivity issues resulting from web updates means that the end-

---

142 Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 1) 52.
143 Account Aggregation (n 2) 26.
144 Adatree (n 35).
145 Report of the Review into Open Banking (n 1) 72.
146 See Berglund (n 120).
user is likely to experience unstable performance. \(^{149}\) Lastly, SS runs on image processing, and is therefore argued to be prone to errors. \(^{150}\)

Understandably, incumbents oppose SS because of their inability to control how much data (including ‘collateral data’), and how often data, is scraped. SS places enormous demands on the IT infrastructure of financial institutions, increasing costs and operational risk. In the US, for example, data aggregators like Plaid and Mint have been found to make up to 20 per cent of a typical bank’s traffic and typically log in 2.5 times as often as real users. \(^{151}\) Some sources suggest data aggregators may even represent up to 25 per cent of financial institutions’ total traffic. \(^{152}\) This problem of burdening the servers of the data host does not arise with APIs.

Opponents of SS also argue that allowing the practice to continue undermines the potential success of Open Banking by creating a two-tiered system where less trustworthy operators are likely to prefer using SS. \(^{153}\) Indeed, Open Banking regimes impose stringent cybersecurity and privacy protection requirements which businesses using SS can circumvent. \(^{154}\) As aptly pointed to by the ACCC, this means that businesses using unregulated data-sharing methods such as SS ‘have a lower regulatory burden than those whose businesses involve CDR data.’ \(^{155}\) Indeed, to secure optimum data safety for consumers, only accredited entities are allowed to share customer data via Open Banking. \(^{156}\) However, why would a FinTech want to undergo a time-consuming and costly process of accreditation and be subject to stringent data


\(^{152}\) Olov Renberg, ‘Fintech Aggregators and Open Banking: Service Enablers or an Unfortunate Backdoor for Fraud?’, BehavioSec (Blog Post, 8 December 2021) <https://www.behaviosec.com/blog/fintech-aggregators-and-open-banking-service-enablers-or-an-unfortunate-backdoor-for-fraud/>.

\(^{153}\) Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 16. See also TrueLayer (n 79)11.

\(^{154}\) TrueLayer (n 79) 10.

\(^{155}\) Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right (n 104) 3.

\(^{156}\) See CCA ss 56BB(d), 56BH; CDR Rules r 1.9, 5.12; PSR pts 2, 3.
access, handling and transfer obligations, if data can be freely accessed via SS? Opponents of SS therefore warn of its capacity to split the FinTech sector into businesses which adhere to higher standards and security requirements and those that do not.\(^\text{157}\)

Last but not least, it is argued that investing in SS is a waste of financial resources because SS will become a defunct technology.\(^\text{158}\)

5. SS – To Ban (Full Stop)

As Australia continues its march towards an open data economy, the hybrid model where data can be derived from both SS and dedicated interfaces appeals to many businesses. In their opinion, it is critically important SS continues to be available to consumers and their service providers into the foreseeable future.\(^\text{159}\)

To their opponents, they reason that today’s business models typically limit the number of parties that need to hold customer credentials to renowned aggregation firms (such as MX, Finicity, Envestnet | Yodlee, Plaid, and others) that provide their services to a large number of FinTechs and (allegedly) use encryption and bank standard security measures to keep customer data safe.\(^\text{160}\) Some even suggest that SS technology has evolved so considerably that from a security standpoint little difference exists between SS and data access via APIs.\(^\text{161}\) Crucially, these businesses contend that no significant evidence of consumer detriment or security breaches occurring because of SS can be demonstrated to date.\(^\text{162}\)

Admittedly, when questioned about SS at a public hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, ASIC Commissioner Sean

\(^{157}\) Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 17.

\(^{158}\) Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 18.

\(^{159}\) Illion (n 110) 5. Finder, Submission to the Treasury, Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right (May 2022) 10.

\(^{160}\) Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology (n 7) [5.57], [5.60]. See also Review into Open Banking in Australia (n 1) 73. See also United States Department of the Treasury, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Nonbank Financials, Fintech and Innovation (Report, 2018) 37 n 87 (‘A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities’).


\(^{162}\) See, eg, statement by RAIZ Invest Limited: ‘Screen scraping has existed in Australia for over 5 years. It is widely used by many companies, including ANZ and Xero with no reported security or fraud issues in those 5 years.’ RAIZ Invest Limited, Submission No 29 to Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre (September 2019) 4.
Hughes confirmed that ASIC was not aware of any evidence of consumer loss occurring from SS. It is equally worth noting that neither are APIs foolproof. An Akamai report has found that from May to October 2019, credential stuffing attacks on the financial services industry targeted APIs, often accounting for 75% or more of the total login attacks against financial services. Breaches frequently occur where API authentication is poorly implemented allowing attackers to assume legitimate users’ identities.

With data quality under CDR being another issue calling for improvement, FinTechs have yet another card to play in defence of SS. The Financial Data and Technology Association (‘FDATA’) notes, for example, that many of its members frequently complain about poor quality data and delays in receiving data.

Yet the argument that the security of data transfers by SS equals that of transfers by dedicated interfaces fails to persuade. There may not yet have been significant consumer losses from SS, but this does not mean they are improbable. Personalised security credentials, if shared with perceived benevolent actors, can be readily compromised by malicious third parties and exploited to the detriment of the customer. The greater the amount of consumer financial account and transaction data collected and retained by data aggregators, the greater the potential damage to consumers from a data breach. Where businesses employing SS technology offer ‘action initiation’ as opposed to merely ‘read access’ solutions, the harm to consumers is likely to be even greater.

---

163 Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology (n 7) [5.62].
164 Credential stuffing is a type of cyberattack in which attackers use lists of compromised user credentials to obtain access to a system, see ‘What Is Credential Stuffing’, Imperva (Web Page) <https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/credential-stuffing/>.
166 Accenture, Catching the Open Banking Wave (Report, 2021) 14.
167 Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right: Report (n 104) 31, finding 2.1.
168 Financial Data and Technology Association, Submission to the Treasury, Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right (April 2022) 17; Finder (n 160) 6.
169 A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities (n 61) 37.
170 Review into Open Banking in Australia (n 1) 108.
5.1 SS Facilitates Predatory Lending

Most importantly, the advantages of SS sit largely with the business community, not consumers, who SS leaves vulnerable to having their data exploited in ways of which they’re unaware. The argument that SS exists because of ‘consumer demand’ and ‘consumer convenience’ as a hassle-free way of obtaining financial services, such as small loans, is unsustainable. Faced with a choice between manually collecting, organising and presenting the required financial data in a format preferred by the lender or letting the latter obtain and collate the data, some consumers will hand over their banking credentials, and some will not. Yet when consumers are excluded from accessing mainstream credit lines and the only available providers use SS, no true choice exists for consumers between obtaining credit and keeping their credentials safe.171 Such a scenario doesn’t demonstrate conscious consumer ‘demand’ or choice. It is unlikely that many Australian consumers would choose SS were they also given the option of sharing their data via more secure dedicated interfaces as under Open Banking.

In light of the general expectation that Open Banking will make the practice of SS obsolete in due course, one may question the value of an explicit ban on this method of data collection. However, CDR’s full implementation in banking and finance – which commenced in July 2020172 – will seemingly take many more years. The process is slow, and it is consumers who bear the brunt of the potential adverse effects of SS in the meantime. Unlike other jurisdictions, Australia’s FinTech industry is heavily reliant on SS.173 One of its most concerning uses is in the lending sector, where the practice is prevalent throughout the small loans market, such as payday lending.174

The demand for such small loans from providers other than major banks and credit societies expanded rapidly in the late 1990s, as data aggregation by SS began to proliferate, and the provision of such loans by banks and credit societies began to decline.175 Personal

---

171 Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 17.
173 FinTech Australia, Submission to the Treasury, Review into Open Banking in Australia (September 2017) 5.
174 Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 10.
circumstances, such as adverse credit history or unemployment, restrict the ability of many Australians to access mainstream credit products. In case of payday loans, however, these restrictions generally do not apply. Most payday loans are ‘small amount credit contracts’ under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, that is loans to consumers of up to $2,000 where the credit provider is not an authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI) and the contract term is between 16 days and 12 months.\textsuperscript{176} Payday loans are characterised as a form of emergency finance.\textsuperscript{177} The \textit{Caught Short Interim Report}, for example, found that poverty pervades the lives of most borrowers of payday loans who ‘live in such impoverished circumstances that notions of customer choice lose meaning’.\textsuperscript{178}

Data shows that between April 2016 and July 2019, over 4.7 million individual payday loans were taken out by around 1.77 million households worth approximately $3.09 billion.\textsuperscript{179} This constitutes a not insignificant share of the global payday loan market which in 2021 was valued at USD $33.5 billion, and is projected to reach $42.6 billion by 2028.\textsuperscript{180} While there are caps on fees that loan providers may charge, such as a one-off establishment fee of not more than 20% of the loan amount and a monthly account keeping fee of not more than 4% of the loan amount,\textsuperscript{181} the monthly fee does not reduce over time as the loan is repaid but applies every month to the original amount borrowed. As a result, depending on the loan duration, the equivalent interest rate is often around 100% per annum, and at times very much higher.\textsuperscript{182}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{176} See \textit{National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009} pts 1–2.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Marcus Banks, ‘Caught Short: Exploring the Role of Small, Short-Term Loans in the Lives of Australians’ (Interim Report, September 2011) 8, 23 (‘Caught Short Interim Report’).
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Consumer Action Law Centre, \textit{The Debt Trap: How Payday Lending Is Costing Australians} (Report, November 2019) 4.
\end{itemize}
With payday loans increasingly obtained online, consumer rights organisations warn that:

some nonbank lenders obtain consumer’s bank account passwords to screen scrape financial data. In so doing they hold on to these passwords and use them at later times to identify if a bank account is low in funds. If the account is low in funds they then proceed to spam the consumer with direct marketing material offering further high cost loans. While access to quick credit may lead to benefits for some consumers, the reality is that this unscrupulous behaviour pushes many people into a spiral of debt.'

The asymmetry of power and information between a financially vulnerable consumer and a payday lender with access to her financial information in considerable. Even if the lender is not exploitative or fraudulent, the customer may be ill-informed, unsuspecting, or unable to properly evaluate the loan offer. Certainly, payday lending does address the financial needs of some consumers who are able to pay off the loan on time. But this industry is not built upon these responsible, savvy consumers. It is built upon the ignorant and the vulnerable, who become over-indebted and trapped, and upon the stream of late fees and other charges their credit contracts impose upon them. Overall, the practice is deeply exploitative and harms far more Australians than it assists. While banning SS is not going to prevent payday lending, it will, at the least, make it harder to prey on consumers low in cash. When predatory lenders no longer have access to information as to the state of a customer’s account, they will need to compete on equal terms with other lenders under the CDR. Lenders with less ‘aggressive’ loan conditions will hopefully win customers thereby potentially bringing down fees and interest rates on payday loans in the long term.

5.2 SS Slows the Rollout of the CDR

Another reason for regulatory intervention on SS is the problem of industry inertia which – if not addressed – may slow the implementation and acceptance of the CDR. Joining the

---

183 While only 5.6% of payday loans originated online in 2009, the figure was expected to hit 85.8% in 2019: see Consumer Action Law Centre (n 180) 4.

184 Financial Rights Legal Centre, Financial Counselling Australia, and Consumer Actions Law Centre, Submission to the Treasury, Consumer Data Right: Sectoral Assessment for Non-Bank Lending (14 March 2022) 5. See also Consumer Action Law Centre (n 184) 4 that notes ‘over a five-year period, around 15% of payday loan borrowers fall into a debt spiral.’

185 Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 12.
regime involves meeting stringent regulatory requirements to ensure that consumers develop trust and confidence in the system. Without an outright ban, organisations who may consider data sharing via CDR as ‘too hard’, such as payday lenders or debt management firms, will continue relying on SS without regard for the consumer.\footnote{Han-Wei Liu (n 36) 327. See also Jill Berry, ‘If the Australian Government Truly Cares about Privacy, then It’s Time to Ban Screen Scraping’, \textit{Startup Daily} (Web Page, 7 March 2022) <https://www.startupdaily.net/topic/data/if-the-australian-government-truly-cares-about-privacy-then-its-time-to-ban-screen-scraping/>.} The facts on the ground appear to prove this assumption. In 2017, FinTech Australia found that many FinTech companies were ‘happy with existing screen scraping solutions, and [were] likely to continue to use these solutions even when alternative technology was available’.\footnote{FinTech Australia, Submission to the Treasury, \textit{Review into Open Banking in Australia} (September 2017) 8.} In 2020, the Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology confirmed that the technology was \textit{widely used} by banks, lenders, financial management applications, personal finance dashboards, and accounting products.\footnote{Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology (n 7) [5.50].} As of 2021, only 7\% of FinTechs in Australia had become Accredited Data Recipients (ADRs).\footnote{May Lam and Malia Forner, ‘Australian Fintech Sector Creating Jobs and Raising Capital, with Sights Set on Overseas Markets’, \textit{EY} (Web Page, 20 October 2021) <https://www.ey.com/en_au/economics/australian-fintech-sector-creating-jobs-and-raising-capital>.} A further 25\% intended to follow suit, while others were planning on participating in the CDR regime via an intermediary.\footnote{Ibid. The inaugural version of the CDR Rules set out one general level of accreditation – the ‘unrestricted’ level – which provides access to all CDR data within scope for banking. On 30 September 2021, the rules were amended to introduce the sponsored level of accreditation, which permits a person to seek accreditation at a new ‘sponsored’ level if they have arrangements with an accredited person with an unrestricted level of accreditation (a ‘sponsor’), see generally Australian Government, ‘Accreditation Guidelines: Version 3’ (Guidelines, February 2022) <https://www.cdr.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-02/CDR-Accreditation-guidelines-version-3-published-16-February-2022.pdf>.} While some service providers are starting to replace collecting customer data by SS with accessing information through the CDR,\footnote{Productivity Commission, \textit{5-Year Productivity Inquiry: Australia’s Data and Digital Dividend} (Interim Report No 2, 23 August 2022) 46 <https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/productivity/interim2-data-digital/productivity-interim2-data-digital.pdf>.} the numbers remain conspicuously low. Only a handful of FinTechs in Australia are ready and willing to turn their back on SS for most use cases. Frollo, for example, has recently announced it has phased out SS for the major big four banks in Australia – Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (‘ANZ’), Commonwealth Bank
(‘CBA’), National Australia Bank (‘NAB’), and Westpac. Generally thought of as the best money management app, and one of the first FinTech companies accredited under CDR, it added it would progressively phase out screen scraping for other banks ‘until it’s only used for banks and products not covered under the CDR’.

That SS can be regulated is demonstrated by the approaches to this practice taken in the EU and UK discussed above. Their limitation to payment accounts notwithstanding, the EU and UK frameworks serve as a precedent from which the Australian government can draw both insight and inspiration. As explained previously, where an account-holding institution is exempt from providing a contingency mechanism, AISPs/PISPs are barred from using SS technology in relation to customer payment accounts (i.e. both with or without identification towards the ASPSPs). While exact numbers are hard to find, some sources suggest that many banks indeed benefitted from the said exemption suggesting that the impact of PSD2 on SS may be larger than expected. In the UK in particular the number of API calls surged significantly: from 12 million a day in February 2020 to 24 million a day a year later, and up to 31 million a day in February 2022, or 860 million calls for the month. The UK experience in particular shows that even partial phasing out of SS can act as a spur to ensure that APIs perform well and the ecosystem grows rapidly and with due attention to data quality.

As noted previously, the Inquiry into Future Directions for the Consumer Data Right observed that the prohibition on SS would be desirable once action initiation under CDR is fully implemented as a viable alternative. Most recently, the Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right

---


194 Frollo (n 19) (emphasis added).


197 TrueLayer (n 79) 11.
Right recommended that SS be banned in sectors where the CDR is functioning as intended.\textsuperscript{198}
For the reasons presented in this paper and given the government’s commitment to the success of the CDR, assessment of how best to address the problem of SS in Australia should not be postponed for too long. Importantly, an advance indication from government on how and when a ban is likely to be implemented would offer certainty and time for businesses to move away from SS and provide stronger incentives to invest in transitioning to the CDR.\textsuperscript{199}

6. Conclusion

SS has mattered historically. At the dawn of the FinTech industry, many businesses facing the unwillingness of incumbents to share customer data were forced to choose between SS and having no data access. Understandably, they chose SS. Had FinTechs waited for the banking industry to develop and open their APIs, there may have been no FinTech sector in Australia at all or it may well have had far fewer compelling products and services to offer.

As shown in this article, many FinTechs and data aggregators associate SS with business convenience, efficiency and low costs. They argue they serve their customers by eliminating the need for tedious manual data sharing and offering more reliable services, as SS cannot be blocked by account holding institutions as readily as can data access via APIs. Crucially, however, SS gives these businesses control over when and how much data to scrape and allows them to exploit the data primarily for their own benefit rather than consumers’. By avoiding CDR accreditation requirements, proponents of SS have a lower regulatory burden than businesses using the CDR. Not least for this reason, preserving the current hybrid model – where data can be derived from either SS or APIs – appeals strongly to many screen scraping businesses. They argue the technology should, at the minimum, be retained as a redundancy fail-safe for when APIs are not working.

The arguments against SS, in our opinion, are far more persuasive. SS remains an innately dangerous online practice which gives third parties virtually unrestricted access to, and control over, customers’ financial accounts. These customers are at an increased risk of digital fraud and of forfeiting their protections under the E-Payments Code. The government repeatedly warns

\textsuperscript{198} Statutory Review of the Consumer Data Right: Report (n 104) recommendation 2.1.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
consumers to protect and not hand over their online user credentials to third parties.\(^\text{200}\) With more than 80% of Australians preferring to bank online,\(^\text{201}\) it is inconsistent and dangerous to allow Australian FinTechs to actively encourage customers to ignore this advice.\(^\text{202}\)

From a technical perspective, SS is a slow and unreliable method of data collection, that has traditionally been employed for lack of a better alternative but is now long overdue for retirement.

From a consumer perspective, SS encourages unsafe data practices by consumers and harms many directly, as it enables payday lenders to target specific consumers precisely when they are most acutely financially vulnerable, and push them into unsustainable spirals of debt.

From a business perspective, SS enables an inertia that in the longer term will not serve commerce or the broader economy in Australia. FinTechs and others will continue to rely on SS from this inertia and their unwillingness to make the investment required to be accredited under the CDR. This will inevitably slow the take up of the CDR. Yet the CDR is one of Australia’s most ground-breaking and important reforms.

Throughout history, water and sanitation engineers have saved more lives than the medical profession. When fully rolled out and operational, the CDR will safely deliver the water the modern economy requires to thrive, which is data, and will impose hygiene standards upon the businesses that, as accredited data recipients, hold the data. SS will delay the rollout of a world-leading reform which in time will offer much to the living standards of all Australians.\(^\text{203}\)

---


\(^\text{202}\) See also Financial Rights Legal Centre and the Consumer Action Law Centre (n 35) 14.

\(^\text{203}\) Jevglevskaja and Buckley (n 120).