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Monteiro, Lyndon --- "Negotiating In A Hostage Crisis: Revisiting The Sydney Lindt Cafe Siege" [2021] UNSWLawJlStuS 35; (2021) UNSWLJ Student Series No 21-35


NEGOTIATING IN A HOSTAGE CRISIS: REVISITING THE SYDNEY LINDT CAFÉ SIEGE

LYNDON MONTEIRO

I INTRODUCTION

Two dead hostages, one dead gunman, and sixteen survivors was the outcome of the Sydney Lindt Café Siege that occurred at Martin Place in December 2014. While most of the hostages survived, it was mostly down to their own will to escape as opposed to them being released by the gunman via negotiations with law enforcement. It is also important to interpret what is an improved outcome. I argue that an improved outcome means no lives lost including the gunman (hereby to be known as Monis) who would ideally surrender to the hands of the criminal justice system.

The NSW Coroner’s inquest into the siege identified a lack of progression in the negotiation process.[1] The siege was arguably defined as a terrorist act under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). [2] Due to public interest immunity, the inquest did not receive content surrounding the negotiation training undertaken by NSW Police.[3] Therefore, I aim to consider how the tools from the Harvard program of negotiation could have been utilised to achieve the ideal outcome of the siege. This essay brings upon questions and suggestions as opposed to definite solutions on the handling of negotiations during the siege. The questions raised and addressed are:

1) Did successful negotiations stand a chance during the Lindt café siege?

2) What were the alternatives in the event of no agreement between the negotiators and Monis?

3) Should NSW Police Force (NSWPF) have changed the player during negotiations with Monis?

4) What were the interests amongst all parties?

5) What communication style would help build a positive working relationship with the hostages and Monis?

6) What options could have been generated?

7) Did any objective external benchmarks hinder the evaluation of creative options?

8) How would any commitments be carried out when there is a high level of mistrust?

I acknowledge that the inquest and this research paper enjoys the benefit of hindsight and does not intend to be critical of those involved in the heroic efforts during the siege in a high-pressured situation.

II DID SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS STAND A CHANCE DURING THE LINDT CAFÉ SIEGE?

A conventional policy of not conceding to terrorist demands[4] was the stance taken by NSW Police in line with The National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) 2012 at the time of siege. Irrational behaviour usually associated with terrorist acts underlies the argument of negotiation with terrorists as being fruitless[5]. Further arguments against negotiating with terrorists derives from a belief that it compromises with the devil and subsequently the pursuit of justice,[6] and places doubt on the negotiation being conducted in good faith.

Robert Mnookin, Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, pointed out that justice looks to the past whereas decisions and bargaining look to the future.[7] In a hostage situation a continuous monitor of the situation to detect any burden of proof to cease negotiations, such as the murder of a hostage, would be the most appropriate approach. Others may argue that Monis should have felt the full brutal force of the police long before the siege was concluded. Roger Fisher’s philosophy was to prefer to negotiate, rather than judge and fight, with an adversary by listening to them as a human-being and understand their underlying interests which was key in the release of US hostages during the Islamic revolution in Iran.[8]

Additionally, it is a myth to suggest that Monis had no intention to negotiate despite his extreme act and refusal to communicate directly with police negotiators. In comparison, suicide bombing as another extreme act of terrorism that generally does not leave an opportunity to negotiate.[9] Though Monis may have prepared to die and refused direct contact with police negotiators, the combination of holding hostages, relaying his demands via the hostages, and not committing suicide was a sign of a negotiation ploy.[10] From the benefit of hindsight, after the siege, a note was discovered in Monis’ pocket containing details of his lawyer and inmates he met during his remand which indicates his intention to come out of the situation alive.[11] These actions by Monis presented a hard style of negotiation where he forcefully communicates his demands, which is not to be confused with refusal of negotiation.

Finally, the Munich Massacre in 1972 during the Summer Olympic Games involving Palestinian terrorists seizing 11 Israeli athletes as hostages triggered the development of hostage negotiation practices.[12] The outcome was 16 hours later, coincidentally the same duration time as the Lindt café siege, Munich police opened fire where 1 policeman, 10 terrorists, and all 11 hostages died.[13] Therefore, it is historically important to understand why hostage negotiation practices exist as means to achieve better outcomes for the preservation of human lives.

III WHAT WERE THE ALTERNATIVES IN THE EVENT OF NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATORS AND MONIS?

Alternatives represent options available to all parties in the event an agreement was not reached after negotiations. As was the case in the siege, both NSW Police and Monis failed to reach any agreement which led to the alternatives of Monis murdering a hostage and NSW Police executing Monis in response. In line with the framework of principled negotiation, negotiators should ensure that their proposals or options in working towards an agreement are a better solution than their best alternative in the event an agreement was not reached. Drawing from the scenario at stake during the siege, illustrated below is a table containing alternatives available for both law enforcement and Monis.

Party
Alternatives
NSW Police Force
• Buy time till the Monis fell asleep or surrendered. I believe this would have been the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) . However, there lies the risk for letting time subside while Monis’ demands were not met. Monis could have grown tired of demands not being met and responded by murdering a hostage or hostages.
• Execute Monis via a sniper while the hostages are still in the café. This presented challenges such as impaired vision of Monis, legal justification to shoot Monis, and penetration of two panes of glass (pane of glass from the shooting point and pane of glass at the Lindt café).[14]
• Execute Monis by police entering the café via violent means while hostages are still in the café. This presented the obvious risk to the safety of hostages. This proved to be the case where the execution of Monis’ also led to the accidental death of hostage, Katrina Dawson, during a crossfire.
• Surrender to Monis’ demands. However, this would be inconsistent with government policy in dealing with terrorist demands.
Monis
• Surrender to law enforcement and face the criminal justice system (selected as most probable BATNA).
• Execute the hostages if demands were not met.
• Suicide, since Monis may not want to face time behind bars if he were to surrender.

Due to a sense of irrational behaviour aligned with a terrorist act, it is difficult to understand the BATNA if one were to view Monis’ perspective. Since the violent act was a means of expressing his political views, it can be understood how Monis’ BATNA might have been the execution of hostages and/or suicide to prove a point. On the other hand, as mentioned the note found in Monis’ pocket of his lawyers and inmates’ details was a sign that he preferred to survive the siege. Considering this evidence and the benefit of hindsight, I lean towards the surrendering to law enforcement and face the criminal justice system as Monis’ BATNA.

IV SHOULD NSW POLICE FORCE (NSWPF) HAVE CHANGED THE PLAYER DURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH MONIS?

Fostering a mutual understanding and rapport with the negotiating partner are important to the relationship element of principled negotiation. This would have served a greater possibility for the survival of hostages if Monis communicated with a negotiator to establish a level of trust. Of course, this task may deem impossible prima facie when facing the prospect of dealing with a hostage-taker such as Monis. Whilst both the police negotiators and Monis may never place full trust in each other, it is important to establish mutual understanding for negotiations to gain healthy progress and subsequently provide the best chance for the survival of the hostages. If some level of trust and engagement was possible to establish during the siege, then who was best fit to build a working relationship with Monis? Throughout the siege, Monis repeatedly refused to directly communicate with NSW police negotiators and no negotiated agreement was ever reached.[15] The Australian Federal Police (AFP) were not involved in the siege negotiation, but it was an option. This begs a couple of questions:

1) Were the NSW Police negotiators best equipped to handle such a high-risk situation? and

2) Would Monis be more open to communicating with the AFP?

To address the first question, the inquest concluded that the negotiators:

• Previous dealing in domestic sieges did not require the sophistication required to generate options during the Lindt café siege.

• Failed to provide comfort to the hostages via their direct communications with them.

• Failed to understand Monis’ underlying interests.

• Failed to use opportunities to extract concessions from Monis in response to his smaller demands such as switching off the Christmas lights and the moving of police vehicles outside the café.

• Did not show signs of progress towards a negotiated settlement.[16]

The above conclusions led to the recommendation for NSW Police Force (NSWPF) to review their training of negotiators and draw on international experience.[17] If the NSWFP were not well equipped, would negotiations by the AFP faired any better? At the time of the siege, they were known to have more exposure in crisis negotiations and carried a good record as their Police Negotiation Team (PNT) experienced two deaths (at no fault of the negotiators) in the 30 years of their existence.[18] Furthermore, the AFP PNT had completed international training and several courses.[19] However, the inquest indicated that Monis was mistrustful towards all authority figures.[20] This leads to the second question, would Monis be more open to communicating with the AFP considering they are still law enforcement?

I believe the answer lies in the practice of putting oneself in Monis’ shoes, as much as I acknowledge it would deem to be a difficult task due to conflicting internal values with Monis’ intentions. Nonetheless, it is a practice utilised by the Harvard Negotiation Program when addressing interests and generating options.[21] For example, when Monis was confirmed as the gunman at approximately 2:30pm on the day of the siege,[22] the NSWPF were able to gather a profile of the character they were dealing with. Monis’ comprehensive criminal record of serious charges, including an accessory to murder of his ex-wife.[23] This would provide strong indication of Monis’ conflict with all arms of government, including the judicial and executive arm, not just the legislative arm in his demand to debate against Tony Abbott. On an assumption that law enforcement were the last group Monis wished to deal with, it might have been time change the player by changing negotiators. The inquest proposed a change in tactics by late afternoon or early evening and suggested the use of a third-party intermediaries to assist police negotiators.[24] Police negotiators did acknowledge the use of a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) to establish direct contact with Monis as an alternative, but it was never adopted.[25]

I explore whether Monis have been opened to speaking to a civilian capable of negotiating who is not involved with law enforcement, such as a qualified mediator? If so, what qualifications, experience, and skillsets are required for a mediator to deal with a hostage situation? Furthermore, would Monis speak to someone like a mediator who spoke his native language or from the same heritage or religion? If such a person existed or were even available at the time of the siege, this method may have eliminated the hostages as intermediary contacts, on the assumption neither of them could understand or speak Monis’ native tongue, and subsequently force direct communication with Monis. If such a mediator did not exist, a police officer who could speak Monis’ native language or culture in collaboration with the existing police negotiators might have established direct negotiations.

The concern of the lack of specialised knowledge or access to expertise to pay attention to Monis’ religion in police negotiations was highlighted in the inquest,[26] which strengthens my proposal of selecting a negotiator as a mediator who may share some common cultural ground with to build a rapport. To further strengthen my argument, cultural influences were recognised during the 2002 Bethlehem incident where negotiators noted the importance of communicating to Palestinian fighters in Arabic to create a positive relationship.[27] This suggestion also presumes that such a mediator can also speak English to translate to the NSWPF. The lack of trust from Monis was evident when he challenged the honesty and truthfulness of the police negotiators.[28] The inquest further highlighted a failure to objectively assess Monis’ challenge of the negotiators’ trustworthiness to seek alternatives which possibly meant a change of the primary negotiator.[29] Of course, although my proposal of using a mediator who could speak Monis’ native tongue is worth considering, there is no guarantee the suggestion to change the player would have worked to build rapport with Monis during the Lindt Café siege.

V WHAT WERE THE INTERESTS AMONGST ALL PARTIES?

An important part of negotiating is by understanding the other party by trying to see their perspective.[30] Below is a table to determine interests from all parties involved such as law enforcement (including the negotiators), the hostages, and Monis.

Party
Interests
Law Enforcement/Negotiators
• Safety and welfare of hostages.
• Justice; the arrest or execution of Monis.
• Release of hostages.
• Avoid bad publicity as the public was watching the events unfold.
• Keep the public calm due to fear of bombs planted within the Sydney CBD.
• Direct communication with Monis.
Hostages
• Their own safety and welfare.
• Justice; the arrest or execution of Monis.
• Release/escape from the café.
• To be with their families.
Monis
• Freedom of political expression via live debate against Tony Abbott and request for an ISIL flag.
• Publicity as he requested for the hostages to contact the media.
• Justice by displaying terror against those he felt discriminated against.
• Negotiate and make demands by threatening the lives of hostages. If a hostage was executed, it could have ended his bargaining as police may have taken forceful action.
• Own safety and freedom (based on lawyer and inmate contacts found in his pocket in the aftermath of the siege).
• Custody of his children.

By addressing interests, it is important to distinguish between instrumental and fundamental interests.[31] An achievement of an instrumental interest may subsequently achieve the fundamental interest.[32] For example, speaking to Tony Abbott and obtaining an ISIL flag were instrumental interests of Monis. It appears the police negotiators did not seek to understand why Monis wanted to speak to Tony Abbott and why he wanted an ISIL flag, which would have established the fundamental interests. Seeking to understand fundamental interests could have established further engagement with the hostages as intermediaries and indirectly with Monis. There were fears from law enforcement that an ISIL flag may be used as a backdrop for the execution of hostages,[33] however this was an assumption as negotiators never attempted to understand the reason behind such demand. I could only take an educated guess by stating that Monis’ fundamental interest behind such demands were to express his political views on a public stage.

I believe it was important for the negotiators to establish common ground to build rapport and subsequently present an opportunity to understand underlying interests. From the above table, I believe that common interests shared between the parties were safety and justice for their own respective reasons. Therefore, the negotiators could have relayed the message to Monis via the hostages as intermediaries to address these common interests as a starting point to negotiations for the purpose of engagement. Another common interest between the hostages and Monis was family, as presumably all the hostages had loved ones waiting for them and Monis was known to try and obtain custody of his children after a debrief was conducted on his profile once he was identified as the gunman. Monis fought for custody and is most likely the motivation behind the accessory to murder of his ex-wife. However, this manoeuvre could have backfired with a negative response.[34] Nonetheless, these are examples of topics of discussion for negotiators to use when initiating communication.

VI WHAT COMMUNICATION STYLE WOULD HELP BUILD A POSITIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HOSTAGES AND MONIS?

How would a negotiator establish and maintain communication with someone who does not wish to speak? Roger Fisher has suggested to establish communication via intermediaries when the negotiating partner does not wish to initiate direct contact.[35] On the occasions when police negotiators’ calls were answered, they were done so by hostages upon the instructions of Monis.[36] On each occasion, Monis refused police negotiators’ request to speak with him directly.[37] The inquest highlighted that it was a form of indirect communication where the negotiators could have used the opportunity to gather further information, check on the welfare of hostages, hear Monis’ demands and also attempt to understand the fundamental interests.[38]

It was clear that Monis was adopting a hard style to negotiation which involves an extreme position, avoidance to talk directly with negotiators, an unwilling to concede his position, and the making of threats to hostages. How should one communicate when the other party adopts an aggressive style in negotiation and negotiating in bad faith especially since the bomb threat turned out to be a bluff? The negotiators could have adopted the ‘negotiation jujitsu’ approach, where one does not push back when the other party announces a firm position.[39] For example, in response to Monis’ demand of speaking to Tony Abbott, one of the police negotiators said to a hostage which infuriated them:

“You realise that he is our Prime Minister, he’s a very busy man who deals with people not only nationally but internationally as well...so it is difficult”.[40]

Using the negotiation jujitsu approach, the negotiator could have avoided defending their position especially when they did not have authority to agree to demands (the authority laid with the Police Forward Commander). The inquest suggested that the negotiator could have requested the reason why Monis wanted to speak to Tony Abbott and what issues he wished to discuss,[41] which is consistent with ‘negotiation jujitsu’ in looking behind Monis’ position to determine underlying interests. The same approach could have also been applied in response to Monis’ other demand of an ISIL flag. The inquest further expressed that the communication from the negotiator to the hostages in response to Monis’ demand to speak to Tony Abbott left them feeling neglected and upset, which subsequently increased the risk that hostages to act impulsively.[42] Consequently, there were no clear signs of a positive working relationship being established between the police negotiators, the hostages, and Monis. Unfortunately, this impulsiveness led to the final escape of six hostages at approximately 2am and subsequent first gunfire from Monis and eventual execution of a hostage, Tori Johnson. Therefore, an increased in engagement from negotiators may have prevented the panic escapes of hostages and eventual killing of Tori Johnson.

Setting a de-escalation strategy from the start of communications will help keep hostages calm and would further prevent a feeling of neglect or taking matters into their own hands by forging their own escape. There were opportunities during the morning and afternoon on the day of the siege, Monis allowed lengthy discussions between hostages and the negotiators.[43] Again, as mentioned earlier, this was an opportunity for negotiators to establish concern for the welfare of everyone in the café including Monis to de-escalate a highly stressful situation for all parties. The negotiators could ask the hostages of their welfare by asking ‘Are you okay?’, ‘Does anyone need medical attention?’ [44] and relaying those questions onto Monis. The negotiators could also convey via the hostages of their preference to keep Monis away from harm.

Active listening and paraphrasing will also aid to de-escalate siege, where the negotiators could rephrase Monis’ demands in their own words. Additionally, a non-judgmental and non-authoritarian verbal communication aids to de-escalate the situation further.[45] A non-judgmental and non-authoritarian approach could derive from playing the Columbo game especially since Monis was deemed to be a narcissist and having an inflated sense of self-importance.[46] The Columbo game involves playing a ‘dumb-but-trying’[47] approach to negotiation where it could allow the negotiators to provide an inferiority towards Monis and act as a distraction from unreasonable demands,[48] such as the one to speak directly with Tony Abbott. For example, a lot of Columbo-style simple questions may have been successful in understanding Monis’ underlying interest.

The approach to negotiation should also be hard on the problem and soft on the people and to always consult before deciding (ACBD).[49] This approach means the negotiators play the role of problem-solvers, where they could have collaborated with the hostages to relay messages to Monis to communicate how all parties have an invested interest in resolving the situation swiftly in a peaceful manner. It also conveys to the hostages of some progress in negotiations as opposed to repeatedly requesting to speak with Monis which became repeatedly unsuccessful. Furthermore, the negotiators could generate creative options to subsequently escalate to the Police Forward Commander to seek approval and form any agreement with Monis.

The inquest further suggested the consultation of third parties who knew Monis for assistance. For example, the police negotiators could have used the Grand Mufti of Australia to discuss religion as a ground for engagement.[50] There was attempt from the negotiators of showing respect and being soft on the person as they addressed Monis as ‘Sheikh’ when speaking to the hostages before those phone calls were abruptly ended.[51] However, it could be argued that the negotiators ask Monis via the hostages what he would like to be called despite knowing his true identity as a means to build rapport.[52] Therefore, utilising the most appropriate form of communication style and subsequently establishing a positive working relationship with Monis would have served as the foundation to pave the way to generate options for the benefit of the negotiators, the hostages, and Monis.

VII WHAT OPTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN GENERATED?

Principled negotiation separates the creative aspect of decision-making (negotiators role) to the official commitment (the officer or commander in chief).[53] During the siege, it does not appear that the negotiators were communicating with the hostages with a purpose to generate options and were instead too focused on establishing direct contact with Monis.

Most interestingly, it appeared Monis was the party generating options. For example, one of the hostages conveyed under Monis’ instructions to release hostages in exchange for his demands.[54] As noted earlier, there were fears by police on the possibility of an ISIL flag been used as a backdrop to execute hostages. While the refusal to concede this demand may had its merits, the negotiators did not seem to take advantage of this opportunity by engaging with the hostages to generate options of their own. The below table represents a combination of Monis’ demands and options I have collated designed to address the various interests covered earlier in this paper.

Interests addressed
Options
• Release of hostages
• Safety and welfare of hostages
• Possession of an ISIL flag
• Publicity
• Freedom of political expression
• Justice for Monis
• Monis’ offer to release of one hostage in exchange for ISIL flag
• Monis’ offer to release of two hostages in exchange for a media broadcast to state that Australia is under attack by Islamic State
• Monis’ offer to release five hostages in exchange to speak to Tony Abbott.
• Negotiators could have requested to release or allow for medication of sick and vulnerable hostages as this bring some positive publicity for Monis, however displays empathy from him
• Negotiators could offer for Monis to issue a written statement for broadcasting in exchange for release of all hostages and his surrender
• If an ISIL flag could be obtained by police, offer to display it outside the café as opposed to providing directly to Monis
• Direct communication with Monis
• Release of hostages
• Safety of Monis
• The moving of police vehicles and officers and switching off Christmas tree lights was granted by police. However, negotiators could have requested to do so in exchange for direct communication with Monis and/or release of hostages.

The option for negotiators to offer a broadcasted written statement will have mitigated the fears of an execution of hostages in front of an ISIL flag while also providing the fundamental interests of publicity and freedom of political expression for Monis. Thus, while the instrumental interests (i.e., speaking to Tony Abbott or obtaining an ISIL flag) were not served for Monis, the fundamental interests may have been addressed to reach any agreement with Monis.

VIII DID ANY OBJECTIVE EXTERNAL BENCHMARKS HINDER THE EVALUATION OF CREATIVE OPTIONS?

Since the siege was legally defined as a terrorist act, it subsequently meant there were legal constraints on negotiation process in not conceding to terrorist demands derived from NCTP.[55] It is argued that terrorist demands are not conceded to prevent incentive for others to conduct sieges in future.[56] Additionally, counter-terrorism experts argued that any sense of achievement from terrorists should be avoided and instead make them feel that their efforts were a failure.[57] Nonetheless, this was the opportunity for negotiators to communicate with the hostages of the legitimate reason why they could not concede to Monis’ demands in speaking to Tony Abbott and obtaining an ISIL flag as opposed to dismissing without reason. [58]

However, the NCTP did not prevent negotiators from generating options. As an example, in the generation of options on behalf of police negotiators in the previous section of this paper, I suggested to offer Monis an opportunity to produce a written statement for broadcasting in exchange of for release of all hostages. I argue that it is not a concession of a terrorist demand, or instrumental interest, because Monis does not get the opportunity to debate with Tony Abbott or obtain an ISIL flag and is therefore a counteroffer instead. To mitigate the concern of conceding to terrorist demands out of fear of motivating future occurrences, it has been argued that once terrorists achieve a symbolic gesture, such as a media broadcast, they are likely to view that the outcome was not worth the effort and subsequently disincentivise any future occurrences of a siege.[59]

On the other hand, hostage-takers may take extreme measures such as killing hostages for failing to meet their objectives and ensure a martyr death.[60] It was claimed that Monis wanted to be a martyr and saw himself as a defender of human rights.[61] Unlike governments, terrorism does not recognise the conventional laws and rules of the western world.[62] Consequently, the NCTP could have been treated as a guideline as opposed to strict adherence.

Aside from the legal mechanisms derived from the NCTP, another form of legitimacy is Monis’ religious beliefs as hostage-takers are loyal to their own principles.[63] It was understood that Monis was of Islamic faith, and it could be argued that Monis’ actions are inconsistent with his own religious beliefs and his self-proclamation of being a ‘defender of human rights’. However, the NSWPF understandably noted in their submission during the inquest that using Monis’ religion carried the risk of provoking an adverse reaction.[64] Subsequently, this could lead to a heated debate surrounding religion and politics which would have an adverse effect on negotiations.

IX HOW WOULD ANY COMMITMENTS BE CARRIED OUT WHEN THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL OF MISTRUST?

In a highly stressful and life-threatening hostage situation, I argue that a verbally executed agreement would be most appropriate to most types of agreement. The NSW Operational Commander initially agreed to Monis’ demand to speak live on radio in exchange for the release of half of the 18 hostages at the time. Interestingly, a negotiator pointed out that the decision was inconsistent with the NCTP and personally felt it was too dangerous.[65] Consequently, the agreement was never reached. It was established that the Police Forward Commander had authority to commit to any agreement during the siege and the negotiators were to generate options in tandem with hostages and Monis.

Hypothetically, how would an agreement have been arranged if the police had instead committed to such an agreement? Fair procedures could be adopted as a solution to successfully implement an agreement.[66] For example, if the police and Monis agreed for him to speak live on a radio broadcast in exchange for half the hostages, procedurally both parties could have further agreed to release the first half of the hostages before the live broadcast and release the remaining half after the broadcast was complete. If Monis did not release the remaining half of the hostages after a live broadcast, it would weaken his reliability for future agreements and detriment aspects of future demands being granted. Likewise, if the police did not go through with the broadcast before receiving the first half of hostages, it would potentially endanger the lives of the remaining half of hostages. Therefore, such fair procedure acts as a safeguard to prevent either party acting in bad faith by not holding their end of the agreement.

X CONCLUSION

It is of value to reflect on process and outcome of negotiations to understand what worked and where improvements could be made. Unlike commercial negotiations, it is unfortunate that hostage situations can involve the death of human lives (as it did in the Lindt café with Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson) and that one cannot walk away from negotiations thinking ‘we got a good deal’. Whilst I accept there is no guarantee that everyone would have survived if things were done differently, there is evidence to suggest that applying the tools of the Harvard Program of negotiation on the events of the Lindt café siege has its merits on how it could allow negotiators to influence Monis to release all the hostages and surrender to the criminal justice system.


[1] Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege (The Coroner’s Court of New South Wales, Coroner Barnes, 24 May 2017) 313 (‘Lindt siege inquest’).

[2] Russ Scott, ‘The Sydney Lindt café siege: The role of the consultant psychiatrist’ (2020) 54(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 244-258, 245, citing Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 100.

[3] Lindt siege inquest (n 1).

[4] Guy Olivier Faure and Ira William Zartman, Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics and Politics (Taylor & Francis Group, 1st ed, 2010) 10.

[5] Karl Roberts, ‘Should we negotiate with terrorist hostage takers?’, The Conversation (online, 30 May 2017)< https://theconversation.com/should-we-negotiate-with-terrorist-hostage-takers-78390>.

[6] Ibid; Faure and Zartman (n 4).

[7] The Peace Research Institute Oslo, ‘Bargaining with the Devil When to Negotiate, When to Fight’ (YouTube, 16 May 2012 00:46:57-00:47:45) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMC-FxqPDWU>.

[8] Mediatedotcom, ‘Roger Fisher: Negotiating with Terrorists More Beneficial than Judging’ (YouTube, 19 October 2010) 00:00:21-00:01:40 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HbHSUe4LiBY>.

[9] Michael Ross Fowler, 'Relevance of Principled Negotiation to Hostage Crises' (2007) 12(2) Harvard Negotiation Law Review 251-318, 256, citing I William Zartman, 'Negotiating with Terrorists' (2003) 8(3) International Negotiation 443-450, 446-447.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Scott (n 2) 253.

[12] David A Soskis and Clinton R Van Zandt, 'Hostage negotiation: Law enforcement's most effective nonlethal weapon' (1986) 4(4) Behavioral Sciences & the Law 423-436, 424.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 321, 329.

[15] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 284.

[16] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 24.

[17] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 24-25.

[18] Platypus Magazine (Australian Federal Police, July-December 2014, Edition 116), 10.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 415.

[21] Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New York: Penguin, 3rd edition, 2011) 69.

[22] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 390.

[23] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 12.

[24] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 282.

[25] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 288.

[26] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 289.

[27] Fowler (n 9) 278.

[28] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 288.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Roger Fisher, ‘Negotiating with the Russians and with your spouse’,3.

[31] Fowler (n 9) 290.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 294.

[34] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 289-290.

[35] Mediatedotcom, ‘Roger Fisher: Working with People who Don't Want to Negotiate’ (YouTube, 19 October 2010) 00:00:00-00:00:43 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0awYNDLVOk>.

[36] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 284.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Fisher and Ury (n 21) 106.

[40] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 291.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 297.

[44] Lauren Miller, ‘Hostage Negotiation: Psychological Principles and Practices’ (2005) 7(4) International Journal of Emergency Mental Health 277-298, 282.

[45] Fowler (n 9) 271.

[46] Scott (n 2) 249.

[47] Miller (n 44) 283.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Fisher (n 30) 7.

[50] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 289.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Miller (n 44) 281.

[53] Mediatedotcom (n 35) 00:01:06:00:01:52.

[54] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 163-64.

[55] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 23.

[56] Faure and Zartman (n 4).

[57] Fowler (n 9) 297.

[58] Lindt siege inquest (n 1)284.

[59] Fowler (n 9) 297.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Jamelle Wells, ‘Sydney siege inquest: Man Haron Monis wanted to be 'hero in his own story’, ABC News (online, 1 June 2015)<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-01/sydney-siege-gunman-monis-wanted-to-be-hero-in-his-own-story/6510702>.

[62] Faure and Zartman (n 4) 11.

[63] Fowler (n 9) 292-293.

[64] Lindt siege inquest (n 1) 289.

[65] Jamelle Wells, ‘Sydney siege inquest : Hostage exchange agreement blocked by negotiators’, ABC News (online, 6 June 2016)<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-06/sydney-siege-inquest-hostage-exchange-message-police/7480070>.

[66] Fisher and Ury (n 21) 91.


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