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James, Raul --- "The Dimensions Of Fintech, Regtech And Regulatory Sandboxes In Australia" [2022] UNSWLawJlStuS 7; (2022) UNSWLJ Student Series No 22-7


THE DIMENSIONS OF FINTECH, REGTECH AND REGULATORY SANDBOXES IN AUSTRALIA

RAUL JAMES

I INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the 21st century, two catalysing forces collided that shook the fabric of the world of Banking and Finance. The first is the advancement of the ‘Information Age’ that had been gathering momentum exponentially from the mid-20th century following the proliferation of personal computing devices in tandem with the growing speed and accessibility of the world wide web to the general populace.[1] This age is characterised by the increasing preference for digital as opposed to analogue electronic systems as an enabler for the transmission of greater volumes of information between participants. The second is the deepening interdependency of international markets as a product of rapid globalisation.[2] This furthering of multilateral and bilateral ties has reduced barriers to the free flow of goods, services, capital and ideas across borders; resulting in the synthesis of deeply intertwined and interdependent economies. The consequences of events happening in one market economy risked reverberating across the globe just as much as trends in business and consumer behaviour spread virulently as a pandemic.

The collision of these two forces resulted in the technological disruption of many industries; Ultimately it was the devastation of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that precipitated a catharsis of the last vestiges of outdated business models in industries that were most resistant to change.[3] This essay will focus on the impact of technological disruption in the world of Banking and Finance and explain how this produced FinTech, RegTech and Regulatory Sandboxes in the context of Australia.

II FINTECH

It may come as a surprise to many that the term “Financial Technology” is reported to have been coined during a Financial Services Technology Consortium in 1993 by Citicorp,[4] the predecessor to the multinational bank Citigroup. The colloquial contraction of this term resulted in the aptly named “FinTech” that is used to denote a sector that is inspired by the innovative application of information technology in the creation of new financial products and services.[5]

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines FinTech as:

... digital technologies that have the potential to transform the provision of financial services spurring the development of new – or modify existing – business models, applications, processes, and products. In practice, the term “fintech” is also broadly used to denote the ongoing wave of new Digital Financial Services (DFS).[6]

The BIS goes on to distinguish DFS as:

... financial services which rely on digital technologies for their delivery and use by consumers.[7]

This distinction is crucial as it provides a nuanced understanding to what is often a generalised but inaccurate assumption that FinTech simply meant the application of technology to finance.[8] Technology had always played a key part in the delivery of financial products and services to consumers from as far back as 1838 with the commercialisation of the telegraph.[9] It is also evident that the digitization of financial services for consumers had predated the term “Financial Technology”, since the introduction of the Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) at the start of the 1970’s,[10] or even earlier with the advent of credit cards in the 1950s.[11] Although it would be difficult to demarcate when FinTech really began, the general consensus would approximate it as around the time of the GFC when the delivery of digital financial services to consumers via personal computing devices became more commonplace.[12] From that point onwards, distinguishing what applications of technology in finance qualifies the categorisation of FinTech bears less relevance.

A Impact on Banking and Finance and Legal Implications

The banking and finance industry in the context of Australia prior to the GFC had been notoriously characterised as being highly saturated and difficult to break into due to its high barriers to entry.[13] The levelling effect of the GFC however resonated a shift in consumer attitudes that coincided with the introduction of new internet-based business models. Thanks to the exponential effect of Moore’s law,[14] feature-rich web-based content improved drastically and paved the way for the rapid success of numerous new “start-up” companies, that not only found innovative ways to deliver a range of new products or services, but also improved user experience with existing ones.[15] Industries with incumbent institutions that are presented with the new methods of competition from these “start-ups” are said to have been “disrupted”,[16] since they could no longer compete based on the dynamic that governed the previous paradigm. The banking and finance industry however suffered a unique consequence from the GFC, which are high levels of public distrust and unpopularity due to being largely perceived as being responsible for the worst economic crisis in living memory. Adding fuel to this fire were strong anti-establishment sentiments following the decision of Governments around the world to issue taxpayer-funded bailouts to these banking and finance institutions that were ‘too big to fail’.[17] The environment was ripe for disruption, as there was now a strong demand for alternative forms of finance and a preference to support ‘underdog’ startups.

The course of the last decade has seen the most numerous and digital-savvy generation of consumers, Millennials, enter the workforce and acquire a disposable income.[18] Accordingly, their consumer choices have been primarily responsible for the establishment of new categories of FinTech products and services in Australia, some of which are listed below:

• Fast-payment systems;

• Robo-advice;

• P2P lending; and

• Blockchain-based products and services.

(a) Fast Payment Systems

There is no industry definition of what constitutes a “Fast-Payment System”, but for the purpose of this discussion the writer will use the definition provided by the Bank of International Settlements, which is:

...a payment in which the transmission of the payment message and the availability of “final” funds to the payee occur in real time or near-real time on as near to a 24-*hour and seven-day (24/7) basis as possible.[19]

The steady decline in the use of physical methods of payment such as cheque, from four million a day to less than 300,000 per day by 2017,[20] has been substituted with a diverse variety of electronic payment methods. These are:

• Credit and debit cards;

• BPAY;

• EFTPOS; and

• Paypal.[21]

Different or overlapping regulations may govern these electronic payment methods due to a range of factors, however the main two types are:

• “Non-Cash Payment Facilities” that are not exempt from being “financial products” under the Corporations Act;[22] and

• “Purchased Payment Facilities” under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act.[23]

The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has exclusive jurisdiction in regulating Payment Systems,[24] which includes any arrangement that allows account holders in financial systems to transfer funds to each other. The highly complex regulated banking and payments infrastructure in Australia may be partly responsible for there being no other Start-up other than Paypal (which was founded in the 90’s) to operate a proprietary electronic means of payment in Australia when it received its Purchased Payment Facility (PPF) Authorised Deposit Taking Institution (ADI) licence from 2006 to 2020.[25] Only very recently did another FinTech, Wise Australia Pty Ltd, succeed in obtaining a PPF ADI licence.[26]

All other electronic payment systems are owned or operated by the major banks with the approval of the RBA. This includes Australia’s latest New Payments Platform (NPP), which is operated and owned by the RBA and a consortium of banks.[27]

(b) Robo-Advice

The internet is now the most preferred venue of seeking quick answers for advice. Certain FinTechs have realised that this presents the opportunity to provide financial advice as a service en masse via the use of an automated program. Certain providers have even gone a step further by creating programs or “bots” that can use complex calculations to engage in high-frequency trading of investment assets.[28]

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) defines ‘robo-advice’, or ‘Digital Advice’ as:

...the provision of automated financial product advice using algorithms and technology without the direct involvement of a human adviser. It can comprise general or personal advice, and range from advice that is narrow in scope (e.g. advice about portfolio construction) to a comprehensive financial plan).[29]

Accordingly, the provision of this service requires the provider to hold an Australian Financial Services License (AFSL),[30] as they are providing a financial service in accordance with the Corporations Act.[31]

Although it may appear as though it is a “Robot” or automated service that provides the particular financial product advice, the owner and provider of that facility will be the legal entity liable for the provision of the financial product advice.[32]

Examples of this FinTech product may take the form of an app, software or online service that provides investment recommendations that amounts to providing ‘financial product advice’. This feature is commonly found on various app-based investment platforms such as Raiz Invest,[33] and Spaceship.[34]

(c) P2P Lending

The rise in demand for alternative finance and disintermediated lending resulted in the creation of “Peer to Peer” (P2P) lending. Where traditional finance is characterised as involving a bank or other financial institution advancing funds under a loan agreement to a Borrower,[35] P2P lending describes arrangements where non-finance industry lenders are connected directly to prospective borrowers.[36] The aim of this exercise is that it opens an investment channel for those with excess capital to the underfinanced segment of society without the involvement of a financial intermediary.[37]

P2P lending is a viable solution for a real gap in the finance market. The most common cited reasons Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) need access to small-sized loans that is:

• To maintain cash-flow in the short term;

• To obtaining business machinery or equipment; and

• To expand the business.[38]

Unfortunately, SMEs are characterized by traditional finance as being commercially unattractive due to the relatively high cost to return ratio of servicing such a lender.[39]

An Australian Credit Licence (ACL) will be needed if the loans are being provided to retail consumers,[40] however, none is required for loans provided to companies that are SMEs.[41] It is important to note that SME’s are still protected by the Australian Consumer Law from the use of ‘unfair terms’ against them in standard form contracts,[42] on top of a range of other regulations that may apply such as Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know-Your-Customer (KYC) obligations.[43]

(d) Blockchain

The “Dark Horse” of FinTech rose from the depths of the GFC to be the best performing asset of the decade.[44] Bitcoin is the first use-case for Blockchain technology when it was published by its mysterious creator,[45] and marked the epoch of an entirely new digital economy. Blockchain Technology is a form of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), which ASIC describes as a:

specific configuration of technology components that records and tracks information in a distributed (as opposed to ‘centralised’) manner and enables participants of the network to have secure access to a consistent view of the information on the ledger at any point in time.[46]

Blockchain was originally intended to be used as the anti-establishment alternative to the global financial system by its early supporters who envisioned a trust-less, permissionless, decentralized and ubiquitous means of payment.[47] Blockchain technology facilitates the digital transfer of value from one entity to another by recording the validity of the transaction, proved by complex cryptographic calculations, on a time-stamped “block” of information that exists on a ledger or “chain” of blocks hosted on a distributed network.[48] It is said that the decentralised and transparent nature of the network which allows independent third-party verification removes the need to trust any intermediary.[49]

Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies are perceived negatively due to its past association with criminal activity, fraud and money-laundering. Regulators have expressed how cryptocurrencies could be used for these purposes time and time again,[50] with some countries such as China having resorted to banning cryptocurrency uses altogether citing fears that these Digital Assets threaten to destabilize the financial system.[51] On the other extreme, countries such as El Salvador have moved to embrace Bitcoin by legislating the recognition of Bitcoin as legal tender.[52]

Australian regulators such as ASIC have advised that they will maintaining a technology-neutral approach to DLTs and its by-product Cryptocurrencies,[53] with the RBA even expressing that Cryptocurrencies:

do not raise any significant concerns for the Bank’s mandate to promote competition and efficiency and to control systemic risk in the payments system.[54]

and

Nor do they currently raise any major issues for the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability mandates.[55]

Accordingly, ASIC has determined that most Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin that are currently provided to Australian retail investors via Digital Currency Exchanges or even overseas-based platforms do not fall within ASIC’s regulatory perimeter since these products do not qualify as a financial product or service requiring an AFS Licence or a Market Licence.[56] Digital Currency Exchanges are governed by the AML/CTF Act,[57] and covers any entity that provides the service of exchanging digital currency for money in Australia as a ‘designated service’.[58] This places all Digital Currency Exchanges subject to mandatory registration with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analytics Centre (AUSTRAC).[59]

The fast-developing nature of Blockchain technology is pushing the limits of our financial regulators. One such example is the introduction of Smart Contracts, which are computer programs that automatically execute commands between two or more contracting parties,[60] into the Blockchain.[61] This radically scales the complexity of transaction; unlocking the ability for counterparties to engage in intricate microtransactions that are economically feasible, technologically secure and require no human intermediaries to supervise.[62]

The resulting product is the branching of a whole new FinTech industry within Blockchain Technology, called Decentralised Finance (DeFi).[63] The World Economic Forum recognizes its potential to:

provide functions analogous to, and potentially beyond, those offered by traditional financial service providers, without reliance on central intermediaries or institutions.[64]

The current list of business models and functions built and operational on Defi platforms now include P2P lending products, derivatives, synthetic financial instruments, insurance products and asset management applications.[65] The developments that are happening with DLTs are unquestionably the most cutting-edge component of the FinTech sector.

III REGTECH

The wave of technological innovation lifts all boats and spares few areas from market disruption. Regulatory compliance functions which used to be relegated to in-house back-office functions or outsourced to multi-disciplinary professional services firms is now at risk of being either replaced or restructured with software. Much like “FinTech”, “RegTech” is an industry coined to describe the convergence of Regulatory Compliance and Technology where more “Tech” focused range of products and services are developed to provide smarter and improved solutions for meeting regulatory obligations.[66]

The Australian Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology describes RegTech as:

... the use of new technology in regulatory monitoring, reporting and compliance. RegTech companies typically provide software-as-a-service (SaaS) to assist businesses to comply with regulations efficiently and cost effectively.[67]

A common misconception is that RegTech is a subindustry within Fintech. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has even stated that:

RegTech is a sub-set of FinTech that focuses on technologies that may facilitate the delivery of regulatory requirements more efficiently and effectively than existing capabilities.[68]

This narrow conception is due to the predominant association that RegTech has with the Financial Services industry. However, it is important to note that RegTech is sector agnostic, and its products are applicable to whichever industry that are encumbered with regulatory compliance obligations.[69] A Global RegTech Industry Benchmark report in 2019 Identified in a survey of over 824 RegTech vendors that more than half of respondents considered themselves as having clients that are not part of both the Financial Services Sector or its outsourced compliance service providers, such as the advisory, consultancy, legal and accountancy industries.[70] The average percentage of core sectors of RegTech non-financial clients have been identified as coming from:

• Government Civil Service – 28%

• Software – 24%

• Energy or Utilities – 22%

• Real Estate – 17%

• Healthcare Equipment – 15%

• Pharmaceuticals and Biotech – 15%[71]

There are possible wide-ranging applications of RegTech solutions that would add significant value, especially in highly regulated industries where regulatory compliance and reporting are an unavoidable aspect of business. The RegTech Association of Australia has identified the RegTech industry may even have significant export potential, which they predict globally would exceed USD$127 billion by 2024.[72]

The Financial Services Industry is undoubtedly the current major driver of the RegTech industry. In the same Global RegTech Industry Benchmark report mentioned above, it was surveyed that almost 89% to 94% of RegTech vendors target banks, insurers and FinTechs as potential clients.[73] The obvious reason is that all of Financial Services is virtually impacted by regulation and firms already have an existing budget that is dedicated towards compliance functions. One could even argue that in some shape or form, the application of technology to risk management and legal compliance had its origins about the same time the world of quantitative finance slowly transitioned from analogue to digital in as early as the 1980s and 1990s,[74] with the earliest RegTech systems perhaps being part of the emergence of financial engineering and Value at Risk (VAR) systems in major firms.[75]

It is understandable therefore why RegTech is easily confused as being part of the FinTech industry, since they share the same origins with the fallout from the 2008 GFC becoming a catalysing force for the growth of RegTech as it was for FinTech.[76] The stark difference between them is that RegTech has proliferated primarily due to top-down existing institutional demand,[77] unlike Fintech, which grew from the bottom by start-ups or industry outsiders from an institutional technology-based background.[78] Consequently, the marketing of RegTech products and services have focused more on business-to-business (B2B) solutions for traditional finance companies, whereas FinTech entrepreneurs would compete for more business-to-consumer (B2C) as well as B2B market share.[79]

A RegTech’s Impact on Banking and Finance

The incentives for the Financial Industry to embrace RegTech are all different iterations of the same need: which is to minimize their exposure to the ‘legal risk’ of being in contravention of financial laws and regulation in the most efficient way possible. The strongest selling point for RegTech is that undergoing a transformation of regulatory compliance processes is simply a matter of survival as institutions are forced to adapt to an increasingly complex regulatory landscape.[80]

The major development of financial regulation have historically been reactionary measures to the inadequacies of domestic regulation in the face of the transformative effects of globalisation.[81] Since the 1980’s, new regulations have served to provide brief periods of homeostasis in between stages of rampant economic growth, often separated by a cataclysmic outbreak of financial crisis such as the Stock Market Crash of 1987, Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Dot Com Bubble crisis of 2001 and more recently, the 2008 GFC. Cooperative networks of policy makers and international bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) have for the past 50 years been coordinating regulatory responses to these events,[82] with the notable standards among them being the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I, II and III),[83] the FATF 40 recommendations.[84]

The Financial Industry must also keep pace with domestic reforms following major revisions of Government policy. The most notable Australian financial reforms flowed from the findings of the Wallis Inquiry of 1996-1997,[85] which led to the creation of Australia’s ‘twin-peaks’ regulatory framework.[86] More recently, the 76 recommendations made in the Hayne Royal Commission in its final report in 2019 are still yet to be fully implemented.[87] Compounding the effects of this fast-changing regulatory landscape is the fact that the internationalisation of markets has led to the merging of financial institutions into large multi-national conglomerates,[88] that spans the offering services across national borders[89]. Ergo, most of these major institutions are exposed to the laws of multiple jurisdictions.

The sum of these factors is that regulatory compliance processes are exponentially intensifying in cost and difficulty to maintain.[90] The fearsome consequence of infringing these regulations would result in costlier penalties in fines and settlements that have increased post-crisis by a factor of forty-five,[91] exceeding US$300 billion as at 2017.[92] Naturally, the application of innovative technologies becomes a promising solution to the following compliance areas:

• Anti-money laundering (AML);

• Know-Your-Customer (KYC) and Sanctions Monitoring;

• Prudential regulatory reporting and data submission;

• Trading book risk management; and

• Capital assessment and stress testing.[93]

RegTech holds the promise that it is possible to have your cake and eat it too. The benefits of cost reductions across the board will also be paired with a reduction of risk from human error or malpractice. Although RegTech solutions are mostly a B2B offering, it is important for Banks and Institutions to consider that the resulting greater efficiency gains would ultimately translate to a better experience for customers.

B RegTech’s Legal and Regulatory Implications

ASIC had announced that it would actively be engaged in the promotion and development of of RegTech as it believes that it would:

...Help organisations build a culture of compliance, identify learning opportunities, and save time and money on regulatory matters while improving compliance and outcomes for consumers.[94]

This is representative of the high level of trust and confidence that regulators have for RegTech’s potential and place in the future of compliance. ASIC has even set up what it calls a “RegTech liaison group” that is comprised of a wide range of parties including industry, technology firms, academics, consumer bodies, other regulators for the purpose of collaborating every four months on promoting the positive application of RegTech.[95]

The collaborative role that Regulators play in the development of RegTech may influence the way future compliance processes and future regulations are created. A major trend for regulators is their pursuit of establishing continuous monitoring capabilities that provides live insights using tools such as deep learning and artificial intelligence to identify and avert problems rather than spend costly resources on enforcement actions post factum.[96] A greater appreciation of these capabilities could be seen being implemented in AML, KYC and Prudential regulatory reporting.

A key requirement of AML obligations is to identify and report suspicious transactions that may be tainted with criminal, fraudulent or even terrorist activity.[97] Accordingly, a greater public interest is served if Regulators are capable of actively cooperating in flagging these events and stopping them in their tracks, rather than placing the entire responsibility for investigation and reporting cost on the financial service provider only to render hefty fines much later when their systems fail.[98] It is worth noting that the Australian Government recently reviewed the AML/CTF Act,[99] and made recommendations to include the regulation of ‘digital currencies’ as well as extending the legislation to cover non-financial businesses such as accountants, lawyers and real estate agents.[100]

The digitization of the financial system and the emergence of new FinTech developments such as online banking and blockchain technology has exerted the capabilities of financial services in satisfactorily identifying and verifying their customers in accordance with their KYC duties. The prevalence of sophisticated fraudulent methods used to defeat client verification procedures has brought calls for new standards and accordingly suggestions have been put forward for a shift from KYC to a Know-Your-Data (KYD) strategy.[101] Although there has been no consensus on how this system would be implemented due to privacy and public surveillance concerns, the idea that each individual will be identifiable and their transactions monitored via the implementation of a “digital identity” has surfaced frequently. What once seemed like a far-fetched idea may achieve reality after the COVID-19 pandemic introduced the implementation of similar “digital identity” standards with the rollout of vaccination certificates and contact-tracing measures.

Finally, on the aspect of prudential regulatory reporting it is important to note that active and constant data collection is already being implemented by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). These functions were transferred from the Reserve Bank of Australia to APRA via the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 (Cth).[102] APRA has recently replaced its previous ‘Direct to APRA’ (D2A) data collection system with the “New Data Collection solution” that it hails as an easy-to-use system for collecting high-quality data and is adaptable to future business needs.[103] However, as web-based services start to dominate financial services, cybersecurity starts to feature as an important factor in maintaining the stability of the financial system. Accordingly, APRA introduced the new Prudential Standard CPS 234 which is aimed at combatting the threat of cyber attacks and this came into force in July 2019.[104] Since prudential regulatory reporting has gone beyond mere financial data, cybersecurity has emerged as another avenue that is ripe for RegTech development.

IV REGULATORY SANDBOX

Certain academics have fittingly pointed out that providing a definition for what constitutes a “Regulatory Sandbox” is inherently flawed since the features vary greatly across the various jurisdictions that are running them.[105] Indeed, based on this reasoning certain regulatory initiatives could possibly be considered a “Sandbox” despite not being given the official designation.[106] However, for the purpose of this essay we will only be considering a Regulatory Sandbox where it has been officially declared as such in the context of Australian banking and finance without engaging in the futile attempt of arguing parameters to the concept.

A “Sandbox” is a concept that is imported from the technology sector and it refers to a controlled environment that is purpose-built to test new ideas, systems, processes or software. The results are monitored and studied for weaknesses and strengths, while limiting the impact of any negative effects that may arise. Regulators have imported this opaque concept as a new way of developing regulatory standards that will attract development and innovation in their jurisdictions in a way that still limits risks to consumers and overall financial stability.

The Australian Government has declared their Regulatory Sandbox initiative as a means to:

Encourage and support the design and delivery of new financial and credit services that will benefit consumers and businesses.[107]

In Australia, a Regulatory Sandbox pursues the creation of a controlled environment by providing limited exemptions under strict eligibility criteria to new entrants, such as Fintech startups, from having to obtain an Australian Financial Services Licence (“AFSL”) or Australian Credit Licence (“ACL”).[108] This is theorized as something that will provide a win-win outcome for both regulators and businesses, as new entrants are spared from having to set up and maintain costly regulatory compliance and thereby avoid exposure to a degree of ‘legal risk’ from non-compliance and focus on bringing new innovative products and services to market sooner.[109] The fixed time period that covers Regulatory Sandboxes would presumably provide sufficient data to both the participants and regulators in analysing how successful or risky the venture is.

A Impact on Banking and Finance

In the quest of making the Australian Financial Industry more globally competitive, the Australian Government is faced with the reality that it needs to be a competitive player itself against other jurisdictions to reinvigorate its stagnant and competitively saturated Financial Industry.[110] This coincides with the efforts of other Governments in capturing the global wave of Fintech within their borders,[111] where it is reported that fifty countries have now implemented their own versions of regulatory sandboxes.[112] Regulators from seventeen countries are even collaborating together in this initiative by forming what they call the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN); trading notes on the outcome of their policies to foster constructive competition in attracting innovation and investment.[113]

A participant of the Regulatory Sandbox program will have “Graduated” if it could prove by the end of the term that it is feasible for it to continue operations and obtain all the necessary legal compliance which it was previously exempted from. Although this task may seem daunting, graduating from the program signals a proof of concept that is highly attractive to investors, [114] as the information collected throughout the length of the program substantiates the growth potential of the Regulatory Sandbox graduate.[115] Countries with successful Fintech regulatory sandbox graduates have empirically been shown to achieve a higher amount of capital investment on average compared to start-ups that do not receive this type of support.[116] It is well documented how crucial a role that angel investors play in building the success of innovative new companies through their financial resources, as well as their highly sought network of scarce skilled talent and experience.[117] Accordingly, Australia has much to gain from cultivating this ecosystem since the feedback it gains may provide precious insight into what new forms of laws and regulations are needed to balance a safe financial system that also offers globally competitive financial services.[118] This reflects the changing relationship that regulators play with businesses to being one that is increasingly symbiotic.

Australia’s performance has been a mixed bag. Its regulator, ASIC, only managed to attract seven participants in the first rendition of its Regulatory Sandbox program launched in 2016.[119] By comparison, competing jurisdictions such as the UK had met significant success through their program after it had managed to attract 117 Fintech companies.[120] It is important to note that for no logically discernible reason ASIC had conducted a separate program running parallel to its Regulatory Sandbox, called the “Innovation Hub”, which was set up to achieve the same overlapping objective of sending a pro-innovation signal to FinTechs, albeit by using different methods. Unlike the ASIC Regulatory Sandbox, the ASIC Innovation Hub establishes direct lines of cooperation between the regulator and Fintechs where individualized guidance and regulatory treatment is formulated.[121] This alternative to the ASIC Regulatory Sandbox consumed more resources, but also fielded more positive results with up to 69 credit licences being granted by the year 2018 from the 347 entities that participated in the program.[122] Despite the powerful psychological effect that a Regulatory Sandbox has in drawing in venture capital,[123] it becomes the least preferred of the two ASIC programs among FinTechs due to its restrictive and confusing qualities further discussed below.

B Legal and Regulatory Implications

The Australian Government reviewed the ASIC Regulatory Sandbox and reconfigured it with what it unassumingly calls the “ASIC Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox” after passing two pieces of legislation, being:

Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth); and

The National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth)

This update by the Morrison Government received assent on 29 May 2020 and took effect on 1 September 2020.[124] This response followed some criticism from academia and industry [125] that the previous Regulatory Sandbox imposed too many restrictions on prospective FinTechs to effectively test their products and services.

Among the biggest changes to the previous restrictions is that the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox extends the licensing exemption period from 12 months to 24 months for participants.[126] Furthermore, the cap on the number of wholesale or retail clients for participants is now removed, where previously there was a strict 100-retail client limit.[127] However, these services are subject to a $10,000.00 value limit per retail client,[128] with overarching caps on the aggregate value of all services exposed to retail and wholesale clients set at $5 million.[129] This extends to all services allowed under the exemption, including the expanded list that now includes:

• Non-cash payment facilities;

• Superannuation products

• Simple managed investment schemes

• Life insurance; and

• Listed securities in approved overseas markets and crowd-funding services.[130]

The ASIC Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox subsequently introduced the following new eligibility restrictions for participants:

• The ‘net public benefit test’;[131] and

• The ‘innovation test’.[132]

Valid participants of the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox will firstly need to adequately show that their new service solves a special problem that exists in the Australian marketplace for it to meet the ‘net public benefit test’ criteria. Important points include how the new service will enhance consumer experience, lower prices, introduce more efficient business models or diversify the variety of options available in the marketplace.[133] ASIC also expects participants to be able to comprehensively outline what are the main risks consumers will be exposed to and accordingly provide an adequate risk mitigation plan to ensure consumers are protected, thus demonstrating a ‘net public benefit’.[134]

The “innovation test” as the title of the second eligibility criteria suggests requires a FinTech to satisfy the regulator that their proposed service is actually “innovative”. Unsurprisingly, ASIC has not shed much guidance on what their formula is for something to be considered “innovative”, other than simply expressing that a successful application will have to sufficiently propose a service that is new or unlike anything that is presently available in Australia.[135] It has been argued that ASIC may even be slightly presumptuous to consider itself competent to decide on such a question,[136] seeing that adjudicating matters of “novelty” is best suited for regulators such as IP Australia who are more accustomed to this skillset.[137]

It is clear from these two criteria that ASIC seeks to strike a balance that protects Australian consumers from all too risky ideas yet also ensures that it does not allow any gimmick claiming to be a new tech-based service to easily benefit from licensing exemptions. Unfortunately, it is a bit perplexing for start-ups to pitch a complete service ex-ante for a fast-evolving Financial Industry to ASIC,[138] using ambiguous standards that are not even imposed on the traditional Financial Industry. Although it can be argued that these tests are not too unusual since they were borrowed from the Sandbox programs of foreign counterparts such as Singapore and the UK,[139] it begs the question whether regulators are even in the position to predict what consumers need in a fast evolving free-market economy. The irony is that if the Australian Government had to be subjected to the same criteria of ‘net public benefit’ and ‘innovativeness’ upon designing the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox program, it will be unlikely to succeed.

Despite these “enhancements”, the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox makes no change to its most contentious feature of all, which is its “non-authorisation” based model of approval into the program.[140] FinTechs that wish to participate in the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox would simply submit a written notice in the prescribed form to ASIC, and after 30 days participants will have to proceed on the assumption that they are part of the program since no express written confirmation or approval is required from ASIC.[141] This virtual absence of any screening function for participants presents a significant element of uncertainty that they may lose their licensing exemption at any point prior to the expiry of the period, since ASIC is empowered to interfere if it decides that an exemption should cease pursuant to any of the grounds set out in the act.[142] This would include the risk of failing debatable criteria such as either the “innovative” or “net public benefit” tests, which otherwise would benefit all parties concerned if such an issue were raised prior to the commencement of operations. This alarming legislative feature appears to contradict the very purpose of having a Regulatory Sandbox in the first place, since it is meant to provide some certainty to participants that they would not be unexpectedly exposed to a ‘legal risk’ of liability for operating a business without a licensing exemption.

V CONCLUSION

The changes made by the Fourth Industrial Revolution has completely reimagined the way Financial Services is going to be delivered in the 21st century. With these developments come novel challenges that require smart and robust regulations, with equally capable regulators to ensure that risk will never outweigh the benefit of these innovations. It is no surprise that new legislation is now taking shape on the horizon of Australia’s Banking and Financial Services industry, as Australia’s Treasurer Josh Frydenberg recently promised to bring FinTechs and Cryptocurrency-based products and services to heel by retaining what he describes as Australia’s “sovereignty over our payments system”.[143] The likely starting point will be a reconfiguration of laws that govern payments systems under the auspices of the RBA to capture Cryptocurrencies and Buy-Now-Pay-Later services.[144] What used to be a relatively more embryonic environment for FinTechs for the past decade may now take a more rigid form in the near future.


[1] John Hill, Fintech and the Remaking of Financial Institutions (Academic Press, 2018), 30.

[2] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley, ‘The evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?’ (2015-2016) 47 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1271, 1280.

[3] Ibid 1286.

[4] Ellene Zimmerman, The Evolution of Fintech, The New York Times (Internet Newspaper, 6 April 2016) < https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/the-evolution-of-fintech.html>.

[5] Anton Didenko,'Regulating FinTech: Lessons from Africa' (2019) 19 San Diego International Law Journal 311, 317.

[6] Erik Feyen, Jon Frost, Leornardo Gambacorta et al, Monetary and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers No 117, (July 2021) vi.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 2), 1274.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 2) 5.

[11] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 2) 1279.

[12] Erik Feyen, Jon Frost, Leornardo Gambacorta et al (n 6) 5.

[13] Arlen Duke, Corones’ Competition Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, 7th ed, 2019) 125 [2.420].

[14] Andrew Lo, Moore’s Law vs. Murphy’s Law in the Financial System: Who’s Winning? Bank for International Settlement, Working Paper No. 564 (May 2016).

[15] John Hill (n 1).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] John Hill (n 1) at 22.

[19] Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Bank for International Settlements, Fast Payments – Enhancing the Speed and Availability of Retail Payments (November 2016) 6.

[20] Alan Tyree, Banking Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 10th Edition, 2021) at 311.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s763(1).

[23] Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1988 (Cth).

[24] Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1988 (Cth), s7.

[25] APRA, Register of Authorised Deposit-Taking Institutions (Webpage, 9 November 2021) < https://www.apra.gov.au/register-of-authorised-deposit-taking-institutions>.

[26] Ibid.

[27] New Payments Platform, The company (Webpage, undated) < https://nppa.com.au/the-company/>.

[28] Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Financial Robots as Instruments of Fiduciary Loyalty’ [2018] SydLawRw 3; (2018) 40 Sydney Law Review 63, 63.

[29] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Providing digital financial product advice to retail clients (Regulatory Guide 255, 30 August 2016).

[30] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s911A.

[31] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s766A and s766B

[32] Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson (n 27) 64.

[33] Raiz, <https://raizinvest.com.au/>.

[34] Spaceship, homepage <https://www.spaceship.com.au/>.

[35] Susanne Chishti, ‘How Peer to Peer Lending and Crowdfunding Drive the FinTech Revolution in the UK’, in Aste Tomaso et al (ed), Banking Beyond Banks and Money : A Guide to Banking Services in the Twenty-First Century (Springer International Publishing, 1st ed. 2016) 57.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Susanne Chishti (n 34) 58.

[38] Susanne Chishti (n 34) 62.

[39] Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman, Fintech Lending to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Improving Transparency and disclosure, February 2018, 14.

[40] National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), s29.

[41] Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (n 38) 10.

[42] Competition and Consumer Act 2011 (Cth), s23.

[43] Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth).

[44] Samyuktha Sriram, ‘Bitcoin Becomes Best Performing Asset of the Decade, Returning Ten Times More than Nasdaq 100’, Yahoo Finance (Internet News, 16 March 2021) < https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-becomes-best-performing-asset-132208120.html>.

[45] Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’, Bitcoin.Org (White Paper, 18 August 2008) < https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>.

[46] Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), Evaluating Distributed Ledger Technology (Information Sheet 219, 18 March 2017).

[47] Kevin V. Tu and Michael W. Meredith, ‘Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age,’ [2015] 90 Washington Law Review 271, 274.

[48] Balázs Bodó, Daniel Gervais and João Pedro Quintais, ‘Blockchain and Smart Contracts: The Missing Link in Copyright Licensing?’ [2018] 26(4) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 311, 314.

[49] Nakamoto (n 44) 3; also see Michael Finck and Valentina Moscon, ‘Copyright on Blockchains: Between New Forms of Rights Administration and Digital Rights Management 2.0’ (2019) 50 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 77, 89-90.

[50] The Senate Select Committee on Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre Final Report (Report, October 2021), at 16, 2.56.

[51] ‘China declares all crypto-currency transactions illegal’, BBC News, (Internet News, 24 September 2021) < https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-58678907>.

[52] Joe Hernandez, ‘El Salvador Just Became the First Country to Accept Bitcoin as Legal Tender’, NPR (Internet News, 7 September 2021). < https://www.npr.org/2021/09/07/1034838909/bitcoin-el-salvador-legal-tender-official-currency-cryptocurrency>.

[53] Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), Evaluating Distributed Ledger Technology (Information Sheet 219, 18 March 2017).

[54] Tony Richards, Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Cryptocurrencies and Distributed Ledger Technology’ (Speech, Australian Business Economists Briefing, 26 June 2018).

[55] Ibid.

[56] The Senate Select Committee on Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre Final Report (Report, October 2021), at 11, 2.39.

[57] Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth).

[58] Ibid s6.

[59] Ibid s76A.

[60] Eric D. Chason, ‘Smart Contracts and the Limits of Computerized Commerce’ (2020) 99(2) Nebraska Law Review 330, at 349.

[61] Yuliya Karaulova, ‘Decentralized Finance to Improve the Performance of Centralized Finance’ [2017] (Summer) 8(4) Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics 1167, 1170.

[62] Ibid at 356.

[63] Yuliya Karaulova (n 60) 172.

[64] World Economic Forum, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Policy-Maker Toolkit White Paper, June 2021, p. 6.

[65] The Senate Select Committee on Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre Final Report (Report, October 2021), at 5, 2.12.

[66] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross P. Buckley, ‘The emergence of RegTech 2.0: From know your customer to know your data’ [2017] University of New South Wales Law Report Series 63, at 3.

[67] The Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology First Interim Report (Report, September 2020) at 34.

[68] Feedback Statement, Financial Conduct Authority, Call for Input on Supporting the Development and Adopters of RegTech 3 (2016) at 3.

[69] Becker, Michael, Kevin Merz and Rüdiger Buchkremer, ‘RegTech—the Application of Modern Information Technology in Regulatory Affairs: Areas of Interest in Research and Practice’ (2020) 27(4) International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management 161, 165.

[70] Schizas, Emmanuel, et al, Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance of the University of Cambridge in partnership with Ernst and Young, "The Global Regtech Industry Benchmark Report." (2019) at 21.

[71] Ibid at 34.

[72] The Senate Select Committee (n 66) at 11.

[73] Schizas, Emmanuel, et al. (n 69).

[74] Ibid.

[75] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley, ‘Fintech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 371, at 387.

[76] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross P. Buckley, (n 65) at 3.

[77] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 383.

[78] Banks Rushing to Collaborate with FinTech Startups, FINEXTRA (Sep. 16, 2016), https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/29443/banks-rushing-to-collaborate-with-fintech-startups; Andrew Meola, 1 in 5 European Banks Would Buy FinTech Startups, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 17, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/1-in-5-european-banks-would-buy-fintechstartups-2016-6/?r=AU&IR=T

[79] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 383.

[80] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 390.

[81] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 377.

[82] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley, ‘Fintech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 371, at 385

[83] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 385.

[84] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 385.

[85] Alan Tyree (n 19) at 4.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 386.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross P. Buckley, (n 65) 7.

[91] Piotr Kaminski & Kate Robu, ‘A Best-Practice Model for Bank Compliance’, MCKINSEY (Web page, January 2016) Exhibit 1, <http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/a-best-practice-model-forbank-compliance> .

[92] Reuters staff, ‘Banks paid $321 billion in fines since financial crisis: BCG’, Reuters (Internet News, 3 March 2017) < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-fines-idUSKBN1692Y2>.

[93] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley, ‘Fintech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 371, at 395.

[94] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s Innovation Hub and our Approach to Regulatory Technology (Report 523, May 2017) at 18.

[95] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s Innovation Hub and our Approach to Regulatory Technology (Report 523, May 2017) at 20.

[96] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley, ‘Fintech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 37(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 371, 382.

[97] Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), s41.

[98] Martin Arnold & Sam Fleming, Regulation: Banks Count the Risks and Rewards - Crackdown on Money Laundering Threatens to Leave Parts of Developing World Cut Off from Global Finance, Financial Times (Internet News, 14 November 2014) <https://www.ft.com/content/9df378a2-66bb-11e4-91ab-00144feabdc0> .

[99] Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth).

[100] Report on the Statutory Review of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 and Associated Rules and Regulations, tabled in parliament on 29 April 2016, at 4.

[101] Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis and Ross Buckley (n 74) 404.

[102] King & Wood Mallesons, Australian Finance Law (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Pty Limited, 7th ed., 2015) at 8.

[103] Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 (Cth).

[104] Prudential Standard CPS 234, July 2019.

[105] Anton Didenko, ‘A better model for Australia's enhanced FinTech sandbox’ [2021] UNSWLawJl 38; (2021) 44(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal, 1078, 183-184.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Explanatory Statement, Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) at 1; Explanatory Statement, National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) at 1.

[108] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[109] Iris H-Y Chu, ‘A Rational Regulatory Strategy for Governing Financial Innovation’ [2017] 8(4) European Journal of Risk Regulation 743, 748.

[110] Arlen Duke, Corones’ Competition Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, 7th ed, 2019) 125, 2.420.

[111] John Hill, (n 2) 110.

[112] Buckley (n 10) 57.

[113] Global Financial Innovation Network, GFiN One Year Report 2019 (Report, 2019) 4.

[114] Ivo Jenik and Kate Lauer, ‘Regulatory Sandboxes and Financial Inclusion’ (Working Paper, CGAP, October 2017) 7.

[115] Jayoung James Goo and Joo-Yeun Heo (n 29) 50.

[116] Jayoung James Goo and Joo-Yeun Heo, ‘The Impact of the Regulatory Sandbox on the Fintech Industry, with a Discussion on the Relation between Regulatory Sandboxes and Open Innovation’ (2020) 6(2) Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity 43, at 58.

[117] Jayoung James Goo and Joo-Yeun Heo (n 29) 51.

[118] Buckley (n 10) 77.

[119] Ross P. Buckley et al, ‘Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond,’ (2020) 61 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 55, 71.

[120] Ibid at 72.

[121] Buckley (n 10) 58.

[122] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s Innovation Hub Progress Report (Inforgraphic, March 2015 – August 2018)

https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4852383/innovation-hub_progress-report-infographic_aug18.pdf.

[123] Buckley (n 10) 70.

[124] Jane Hume, ‘Regulatory Sandbox to Boost Fintech Innovation and Competition in the Financial System’ (Media Release, Treasury, 28 May 2020).

[125] Anton Didenko, ‘A better model for Australia's enhanced FinTech sandbox’ [2021] UNSWLawJl 38; (2021) 44(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1078, at 1085.

[126] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 4; National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 4.

[127] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 4; National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 11

[128] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 12(1).

[129] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 13(1); National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 10(1).

[130] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 11.

[131] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[132] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[133] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[134] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[135] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox (Information Sheet 248, 25 August 2020).

[136] Ross P. Buckley et al, ‘Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond,’ (2020) 61 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 55, 63-64.

[137] Ross P. Buckley et al, ‘Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond,’ (2020) 61 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 55, 71.

[138] Anton Didenko, ‘A better model for Australia's enhanced FinTech sandbox’ [2021] UNSWLawJl 38; (2021) 44(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1078, at 1101.

[139] Monetary Authority of Singapore, Fintech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines (Guidelines, November 2016) 5, 6; Financial Conduct Authority, Regulatory Sandbox (November 2015) 3.4.

[140] Anton Didenko, ‘A better model for Australia's enhanced FinTech sandbox’ [2021] UNSWLawJl 38; (2021) 44(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1078, at 1087.

[141] Anton Didenko, ‘A better model for Australia's enhanced FinTech sandbox’ [2021] UNSWLawJl 38; (2021) 44(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1078, at 1100.

[142] Corporations (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 4; National Consumer Credit Protection (Fintech Sandbox Australian Financial Services Licence Exemption) Regulations 2020 (Cth) s 14.

[143] Renju Jose and Byron Kaye, ‘Australia Proposes New Laws to Regulate Crypto, BNPL”, Reuters (online, 8 December 2021) < https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/australia-plans-update-regulatory-framework-payment-systems-2021-12-07/> .

[144] Anthony Currie, ‘Australia Drags FinTech into Regulatory Future”, Reuters (online, 8 December 2021) < https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/australia-drags-fintech-into-regulatory-future-2021-12-08/>.


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