(1) There is a defence
of qualified privilege for the publication of defamatory matter to a person
(the recipient ) if the defendant proves that —
(a) the
recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some
subject;
(b) the
matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient
information on that subject; and
(c) the
conduct of the defendant in publishing that matter is reasonable in the
circumstances.
(2) For the purposes
of subsection (1), a recipient has an apparent interest in having information
on some subject if, and only if, at the time of the publication in question,
the defendant believes on reasonable grounds that the recipient has that
interest.
(3) In determining for
the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in
publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court
may take into account —
(a) the
extent to which the matter published is of public interest;
(b) the
extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public
functions or activities of the person;
(c) the
seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published;
(d) the
extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions,
allegations and proven facts;
(e)
whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter
published to be published expeditiously;
(f) the
nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates;
(g) the
sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those
sources;
(h)
whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s
side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the
defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person;
(i)
any other steps taken to verify the information in the
matter published; and
(j) any
other circumstances that the court considers relevant.
(4) For the avoidance
of doubt, a defence of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is defeated if
the plaintiff proves that the publication of the defamatory matter was
actuated by malice.
(5) However, a defence
of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is not defeated merely because the
defamatory matter was published for reward.