Goldblatt, Beth --- "Violence against women and social and economic rights: deepening the connections" [2019] UTSLRS 5; (2019) Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law 359

Last Updated: 21 September 2020

Chapter 21.  Violence against women and social and economic rights: deepening the connections (in S Harris-Rimmer and K Ogg (eds) Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law, 2019, Edward Elgar)

Beth Goldblatt

I. INTRODUCTION

Violence against women is a complex phenomenon that takes many forms.^[1] It has been defined by the United Nations Human Rights Council as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women and girls of any age, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’.^[2] It includes domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual harassment at work, violence on the streets, in schools and communities, and sexual violence during war and other political and economic conflicts.^[3] It is multi-causal, systemic and fundamental to the ongoing oppression of women in every society of the world.^[4] It is evident throughout history and across societies and cultures and is persistent and difficult to challenge despite significant efforts over recent decades to understand and eliminate it. It is indiscriminate in affecting women at every age and stage of life, ability, colour, ethnicity and religion.

 Violence against women cuts across class, touching both rich and poor. It is clear, however, that poverty and unequal access to resources contribute to the conditions that make women vulnerable to violence.^[5] For example, unsafe transport and lack of street lighting open women to attack. Precarious employment means that women are less able to resist harassment. Inadequate sanitation and water expose women and girls to violence in informal settlements and in fields. Lack of affordable housing makes it difficult for women to break ties of dependency with abusive men.

 Violence generates and deepens poverty by keeping girls out of school and work, by forcing women from their homes and by requiring them to expend resources protecting themselves and avoiding harm. Thus violence may compound pre-existing inequalities in access to resources and opportunities by women. And gender inequality may worsen women’s poverty and exposure to violence.^[6] In addition to the economic burden of violence carried by women themselves, there is a large social cost attached to missed schooling and to restrictions on women’s employment and their capacity to participate fully in their communities and societies.^[7] The cost implications of responding to violence are also significant where these require additional and specific medical, security, housing and social services provision.^[8] The global loss of workplace productivity due to domestic violence is estimated at between 1 and 2 per cent of gross domestic product.^[9] The current global economic context poses a range of new challenges for vulnerable women and girls since some states in developed and developing countries are cutting benefits and services, employment is increasingly crossing borders and becoming less open to regulation, and financial crises are deepening poverty in many communities.^[10]

 Much of the focus of legal and human rights responses to violence against women has concerned criminal justice measures against perpetrators or has involved efforts to sanction violence in the home and workplace.^[11] These initiatives have primarily drawn on civil and political rights to equality, dignity, autonomy and bodily integrity to frame legal responses. While these and other civil and political rights are centrally implicated, the focus on social and economic rights in addressing violence against women has been more limited.^[12] These rights have arisen, at times, in relation to the right to health for victims of violence^[13] or in relation to housing rights for women escaping violence.^[14] Social and economic rights have also been considered in relation to reparations for women victims of violence in post-conflict contexts.^[15] The issue of violence against women is less commonly considered as it relates to rights to social security, food and basic services such as water and sanitation, although recent efforts to think about these linkages are a welcome development.^[16] This indicates a growing awareness of the links between poverty and violence against women in the human rights arena. Women’s workplace safety has been a long-standing focus of feminists but the changing nature of work requires new thinking around ways of protecting women from violence via their economic rights.^[17]

 While recent writing (both by scholars and human rights bodies) has linked violence against women to social and economic rights, this area is somewhat under-developed in international law.^[18] This may be related to the historical undervaluing of social and economic rights. This second-class status has led to more limited engagement with and interpretation of these rights in general and from a women’s rights perspective.^[19] This chapter suggests the need for a closer understanding of how violence acts as a barrier to women’s exercise of and access to their social and economic rights and how these rights might support efforts to address violence against women.^[20] Social and economic rights have potential value in contributing to the prevention of violence, rather than just responding to it. Together with substantive approaches to equality, social and economic rights might be marshalled to achieve transformative changes to society, by altering some of the structural underpinnings of poverty and inequality that contribute to violence against women. For example, these rights might be used to require governments to employ women in public works programmes that improve their status and economic power in their communities and reduce their vulnerability to violence. This is not to suggest that civil and political rights as well as cultural rights are less central to efforts to address violence against women. The complexity of this issue demands a holistic engagement of the full spectrum of rights, premised on the understanding that substantive realisation of all rights may require resource allocation and redistribution.

 The chapter begins by outlining some of the concerns raised by critical feminist scholars in relation to feminist engagements with international law, particularly where they deal with violence against women within international human rights law (Section II). The chapter argues that a focus on social and economic rights might overcome some of these concerns in using human rights to address violence against women. It explores ways in which the conceptual connections between violence against women and social and economic rights might be deepened in international human rights law (Section III). The chapter then discusses the current approach to the relationship between violence against women and social and economic rights by key human rights treaty bodies and independent mandate holders (Section IV).^[21] This leads to a consideration of a recent process to update General Recommendation 19 on violence against women by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. This process is examined through the lens of social and economic rights, which is also used to assess the new General Recommendation 35. Further action and research to improve the international legal framework on violence against women and social and economic rights is suggested at the end of this discussion.

<a>II. CRITICAL CONCERNS WITH FEMINIST APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

There are a number of critical concerns with the way feminists have engaged with violence against women in international human rights law. These should inform the project of integrating a focus on violence against women into the development of social and economic rights. The first concern is that by arguing for the inclusion of women’s experiences into existing legal rights, women are seen as deviant and exceptional, and thus not fully human, and are required to conform to a male norm.^[22] The invisibility of women’s experience of violence and how it impacts on their social and economic rights requires contextual, evidence-based engagement with prior understandings of the content and purpose of social and economic rights. This does involve strategies of inclusion that carry the paradoxical danger of treating the male subject as the ordinary holder of social and economic rights. However, rights do not have fixed meanings and require ongoing reinterpretation as society undergoes change. For example, the changing nature of work under globalisation presents challenges to rethink labour rights for men and women. These changes present opportunities to develop the meaning and content of social and economic rights in altered contexts and also offer opportunities to consider how violence against women might influence these new meanings.

 A second concern relates to the feminist framing of women as victims of violence, rendering them passive objects deserving protection rather than full legal subjects claiming rights.^[23] Claiming social and economic rights for prevention of violence, not just protection of women, is one way of shifting the emphasis but the concern is still a valid one in engaging in this project. The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), while stressing the equal rights of men and women,^[24] uses the male pronoun (Article 11(1)) and talks of special protection for mothers (Article 10(2)).^[25] Thus protective approaches to women are embedded in a Covenant designed with men in mind, despite the entrenchment of gender equality. Since protection against violence informs women’s social and economic rights as well as rights-based responses to their status as victims of violence, any feminist development of the links between these issues should carefully avoid portraying women as passive objects of the law.

 A third critique of feminist engagement with violence against women in international law comes from ‘Third World’ scholars who accuse western feminists of ‘othering’ women in the developing world.^[26] This leads to the treatment of women as victims but also reinforces ‘gender and cultural essentialism’.^[27] This results in the attribution of blame to culture rather than the economic forces of colonial and neo-colonial development.^[28] Linking social and economic rights to violence against women is a way of avoiding this concern since it focuses attention on the economic and social dimensions of violence and requires a deeper understanding of the complex causes of violence at the international and domestic level. It shifts focus from the purely ideological/cultural to the material causes of violence. However, a ‘first world’-oriented approach could continue to entrench differences between women in developed and developing countries unless it engages with the global economic forces of neoliberalism and the way they shape a range of conditions and experiences across the world. A political economy approach to violence against women that informs a human rights response would avoid missing the structural dimensions of this violence. Thus, Yakin Ertürk, the former Special Rapporteur on violence against women noted that such an approach^[29] ‘makes explicit the interconnections between the economic, social and political realms, demonstrating that power operates not only through coercion but also through the structured relations of production and reproduction that govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, privileges and authority within the home and society at large’.

 A fourth critique of feminist work in international law dealing with sexual violence is that it leads to a ‘sexual security regime’ that polices women’s bodies, restricts their freedoms and extends its surveillance capacities towards state interests in supporting the market.^[30] This critique accords with the concern already expressed in this chapter about the criminal justice focus of many human rights and legal responses to violence against women. A deeper understanding of the structural dimensions of gender inequality and the economic relations implicated in violence against women would enable a more far-reaching response. A focus on social and economic rights rather than the more usual emphasis on civil and political rights would encourage such a response. It also offers a more balanced approach to human rights by integrating these two sets of rights. Attention to prevention by addressing the material causes of women’s vulnerability to violence using social and economic rights shifts the emphasis away from protection and the consequent dangers of state control.

<a>III. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS – CONCEPTUAL CONNECTIONS

With these concerns in mind, the chapter now distils and develops the conceptual relationship between violence against women and social and economic rights. In so doing, it aims to contribute to deepening these connections in international human rights law.

 As noted, violence against women has strong links to poverty. The following are features of this interrelation. First, violence against women can render women poorer by forcing them out of their homes or workplaces, requiring them to spend more on accommodation, health and transport and reducing their livelihoods.^[31] Second, violence against women and fear of such violence can prevent women from accessing health care, education and other services, leading to reduced life chances.^[32] Third, violence against women can take the form of control of women’s access to finances and resources (‘economic violence’ as a form of domestic violence).^[33] Fourth, violence against women can lead to mental and physical ill-health and disability, which can impact on women’s access to employment, income and other forms of participation in society.^[34] Fifth, poverty can prevent women from escaping violent situations in the home or in the community.^[35] Sixth, poverty can push women into unsafe work environments and public spaces.^[36] Seventh, the reduction or removal of services, such as cut-backs to welfare or public housing, can expose women to violence.^[37]

 Poverty is often causally linked to economic inequality, which is itself shaped by gender.^[38] Some aspects of poverty are common to men and women, for example where there is inadequate housing and lack of basic services such as electricity and sanitation. This form of poverty, though apparently equal in its reach, is experienced differently by men and women, resulting in gendered disadvantage.^[39] Thus, for example, women may have greater responsibilities for collecting water and gathering fuel than men due to sexual divisions of labour, cultural expectations and stereotypes. Economic inequality may be more overtly gendered where women are prevented from owning and inheriting property, occupying certain jobs or accessing education. The response to violence against women therefore needs to address poverty and the structural basis of economic inequality in its general manifestation as well as the causes of gendered poverty and unequal access to resources and opportunities.^[40]

 Addressing gendered poverty and disadvantage using social and economic rights requires a substantive approach to equality to inform the operation of these rights.^[41] Substantive equality has been defined by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women as ensuring that^[42]

<quotation>... women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming underrepresentation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women. </quotation>

A substantive equality approach has also been adopted by other treaty bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.^[43] This approach requires attention to the material dimensions of inequality alongside the recognition dimensions of status-based harms.^[44] It involves transformative approaches to the structures that perpetuate inequalities and requires attention to the participation of those affected by inequality.^[45] Violence against women, in its origins and effects, can be understood using a gender inequality lens in terms of these four dimensions: first, it has material impacts and causes since disadvantage exposes women to violence and violence leads to disadvantage. Second, it is rooted in and excused by culture, religion and value systems that entrench harm to women. Third, it impedes women’s participation in communities, representative structures and society as a whole by reducing their agency and voice through silencing and fear. Finally, it is resistant to change through responses that are inadequately structural and far reaching. Violence against women cannot be addressed at the individual level or within a criminalising frame alone.

 Gender inequality, violence and poverty also generate specific forms of discrimination, often borne out of stereotyping and stigma.^[46] Thus, women who have experienced domestic violence, for example, may risk losing tenancies from disapproving landlords. Women who complain of harassment in the workplace may be penalised by unsympathetic employers, facing job loss or demotion. School girls who report abuse from teachers or fellow students may be judged harshly or punished. In cases such as these, violence and discrimination contribute to poverty and deepen inequality for such women and their children. This can be responded to with capacious understandings of grounds of discrimination,^[47] or with the inclusion of specific prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of a person’s status as a victim of gender-based violence.^[48] In addition, discrimination against people because they are poor can further disadvantage women and push them into unsafe living or working arrangements. Prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of social class or socio-economic status may also assist women and girls to avoid violence.

 Social and economic rights require close interaction with substantive approaches to equality to address gender inequality, linked to poverty and disadvantage that are intimately tied to violence against women. Close attention should be given by states and non-state actors to the preventative measures needed to address what Manjoo calls ‘pre-existing patterns of cross-cutting structural subordination, gender hierarchies, systemic marginalization and structural inequalities that may be at the root cause of the violence that women experience’.^[49] Street lighting and safe transport campaigns, improved workplace laws that assist women to avoid encounters with stalking or harassing partners, and school programmes to educate children about violence are some of the measures that could channel resources and innovative initiatives towards violence prevention.^[50] Public works programmes could reserve places for women who have experienced domestic violence and could be used to make neighbourhoods safer. Each of the social and economic rights promised by the ICESCR, the International Labour Organization Conventions and other human rights treaties requires detailed and creative re-examination and development to find ways of addressing violence against women through these commitments.^[51]

<a>IV. DEVELOPMENTS ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW – OPPORTUNITIES FOR A DEEPER FOCUS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

The chapter now analyses, in brief, the ways in which violence against women and social and economic rights have been considered within international human rights law, particularly by the committees responsible for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the ICESCR and certain independent mandate holders. Thereafter it considers the process for the redrafting of the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 19 on Violence against Women leading to General Recommendation 35 and the opportunity this has provided to deepen the focus on social and economic rights in framing human rights responses to violence against women. Finally, it discusses other developments that might impact on international law and some suggestions for further research.

<b>Violence Against Women and Social and Economic Rights in International Law

Violence against women has been identified as a human rights violation within international human rights law since the early 1990s.^[52] Although CEDAW did not include reference to violence against women, the CEDAW Committee soon took steps to address this glaring omission by asking states parties to report on the issue.^[53] In 1992 the CEDAW Committee adopted the more comprehensive General Recommendation No. 19 (GR 19) on Violence against Women.^[54] GR 19 defined violence against women and located it clearly within the definition of discrimination:^[55]

<quotation>The Convention in article 1 defines discrimination against women. The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence. </quotation>

The General Recommendation noted that violence against women affected women’s social and economic rights and specifically mentioned the rights to health and to work.^[56] It also recognised the social and economic implications of traditional attitudes and practices towards women, including those involving violence, as they affected women and girls’ education and employment opportunities.^[57] It saw poverty as pushing women into prostitution and trafficking, forced labour and arranged marriages, exposing them to violence.^[58] While it referred to the specific vulnerabilities of rural women it did not elaborate on how these might relate to their social and economic rights, which are set out in Article 14 of CEDAW. This Article makes reference to social security, housing, water, electricity and sanitation, which are curiously absent from the Convention in relation to urban women. The General Recommendation also failed to specifically mention Article 13 of CEDAW regarding discrimination against women in economic and social life in considering the link with violence against women in these spheres. Importantly, the Committee recommended that states parties take a range of preventative, protective and rehabilitative measures in addressing gender-based violence,^[59] although it did not relate these directly to social and economic rights.

 There have been numerous references to violence against women by UN human rights bodies since 1992,^[60] some concerning social and economic rights.^[61] The CEDAW Committee has referred to violence against women and social and economic rights in many of its proceedings although it has not conducted a systematic consideration of this interrelationship. A previous Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk, undertook the first detailed analysis of the political economy of violence against women in 2009.^[62] This approach suggested that the underpinnings of violence are structural and linked to the sexual division of labour, neoliberalism and globalisation, and conflict and militarisation.^[63] The Special Rapporteur spelled out the links between violence against women and a range of social and economic rights with a focus on the global economic context. She recommended that the ‘promotion and protection of women’s economic and social entitlements to prevent and protect them from violence must be pursued transnationally’.^[64] The report is significant for its analytical depth and critical emphasis as well as for its attention to the international environment. The current Special Rapporteur’s most recent report concerns states parties’ obligations to provide adequate shelters for women and children seeking protection from violence, although it does not focus on the right to housing or other social and economic rights in terms of prevention of violence.^[65] Another Human Rights Council special procedures mandate holder, the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, considered the connection between violence against women and discrimination against women in economic and social life in 2014.^[66] It did not consider the role of social and economic rights in any depth but made strong arguments about the links between forms of violence against women and the economic dimensions of this.

 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has shown a deep awareness of women’s specific needs and rights in several of its General Comments. Most notable are General Comment 16 (GC 16)^[67] on the equal rights of men and women and General Comment 20 (GC 20) on non-discrimination.^[68] However, the understanding of violence against women as closely related to the enjoyment of women’s social and economic rights is less well developed. In GC 20 there is no mention of violence against women as a form of discrimination, even where sex discrimination is specifically discussed.^[69] In GC 16 there is no reference to violence against women in any of the discussion of gender equality or state obligations. Violence is first mentioned in relation to the specific example of housing rights aimed ‘to provide victims of domestic violence, who are primarily female, with access to safe housing, remedies and redress of physical, mental and emotional damage’.^[70] The same housing example refers to coerced marriage and, somewhat out of context, also states that^[71]

<quotation>[g]ender based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of equality. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate violence against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private actors. </quotation>

The example of the right to health mentions female genital mutilation^[72] and the paragraph on education talks of ‘favourable conditions to ensure the safety of children, in particular girls, on their way to and from school’.^[73] There is no reference in this General Comment to violence in relation to other rights such as food, social security, land or work. GC 16 reflects the common approach to mentioning violence against women in relation to housing following domestic violence and safety of girls on their way to (but not at) school. Sexual harassment at work and health services following violence against women are often included in such examples but are absent from this General Comment. The sentences on violence against women found in the housing example, while important, would have been better placed as a general statement and should not have been limited to private actors since violence against women by state officials such as teachers is all too common.^[74] The gender neutrality of these sentences, while potentially problematic, is offset by the earlier reference to domestic violence, which more accurately reflects the reality of gender-based violence as a phenomenon that is imbalanced in relation to women.

 Outside of the treaty body system, a group of experts drew up the ‘Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 2002 ‘to guide the interpretation and implementation of guarantees of non-discrimination and equal exercise and enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, in order to ensure that women can enjoy these rights fully and equally’.^[75] The references to violence in the Principles are limited although some important links were made by the authors. The first was in the context of globalisation and neoliberalism where it was noted that poverty linked to job insecurity and cuts to services can lead to women’s vulnerability to trafficking and violence.^[76] It was further stated that ‘economic and political insecurity provoke private and public backlash against women’s rights that may be expressed through violence and articulated in the form of defending cultures and traditions’.^[77] In defining women’s social, economic and cultural rights, the Principles mention violence in reference to sexual harassment in the workplace,^[78] coerced marriage^[79] and trafficking.^[80] The Principles state that ‘sexual harassment of women and violence against women must be understood as forms of sex discrimination’.^[81] There is no mention of violence, however, in the discussion of the impediments to women’s exercise of their economic, social and cultural rights,^[82] a notable omission. The relationship between poverty, gender inequality and violence is not fully developed in the Principles as they do not link exposure to violence with limitations on women’s access to their social and economic rights, nor do they explain how violence generates the need for social and economic rights, and how such rights might prevent violence. Violence against women should have been included in the list of principles of gender equality as well as in the enumerated impediments to women’s enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights.

<b>CEDAW Committee Update of General Recommendation 19

In March 2015 the CEDAW Committee decided to update GR 19 on violence against women and in July 2016 it adopted a new draft General Recommendation (Draft GR 19),^[83] which it published for public consultation until end September 2016.^[84] The draft Recommendation saw what it terms ‘gender-based violence against women’ (GBVAW) as ‘the fundamental social, political and economic mechanism by which the subordinate position of women with respect to men and their stereotyped roles are perpetuated’.^[85] The CEDAW Committee reiterated that GBVAW is a form of discrimination against women and is, as a result, an obligation requiring immediate response. This is significant since social and economic rights which are realised progressively may take time to achieve where resources are limited, but measures to end violence, as a form of discrimination, must be realised immediately.

 The CEDAW Committee, in its Draft GR 19, called on states to take actions in relation to prevention, protection and redress, data collection and monitoring, and international cooperation. In relation to prevention the Committee recommended measures that ‘address the underlying causes of gender-based violence against women, including the denial of their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’.^[86] This is a significant acknowledgement of the relationship between social and economic rights and the prevention of GBVAW and goes beyond the earlier version. The Draft GR recognised the differing exposure to and impact of violence based on intersecting discrimination and listed as examples the categories of ‘urban/rural’ and ‘ownership of property’ as factors alongside colour, indigenous status, marital status and so on.^[87] The failure to mention poverty or class is notable given their key role in deepening women’s vulnerability to violence.

 The Draft GR 19 set out preventative measures, which importantly include education against attitudes leading to violence in schools at all levels and in society as a whole. This includes awareness-raising and education of state and non-state actors. It also includes programmes targeted at ‘education, health, social services and law enforcement personnel’^[88] and mandatory ‘capacity-building, education and training for the judiciary, lawyers and law enforcement officers, including forensic medical personnel, legislators, health-care, education and social personnel’.^[89] These are notable acknowledgements of the need for sensitive personnel providing some of the social services that women require in response to violence and to prevent its occurrence. However, the Draft GR 19 failed to mention the direct role that social and economic rights can have in preventing violence such as through provision of adequate housing and work opportunities, basic services provided in a safe manner, appropriate transport and so on. The draft, while listing a wide range of state obligations, is relatively silent on the provision of services and benefits by state and private bodies that might prevent violence against women. There is reference to the role of businesses and transnational corporations in providing internal complaint mechanisms and supports for victims of violence;^[90] however, there is no requirement that such groups provide more substantive preventative measures to their workers, customers and communities through, for example, safer working environments, worker accommodation and so on.

 The protection and redress measures set out in the Draft GR 19 make some reference to social and economic issues. These include financial and legal aid; medical and counselling services; training and employment opportunities for victims; helplines, crisis centres and shelters.^[91] The reparatory measures are quite far reaching and include ‘monetary compensation and the provision of legal, social and health services’.^[92] While these are important efforts to respond to the costs of violence, they do not address all the social and economic rights implicated such as housing, education, food and basic services.

 A large number of submissions on the Draft GR 19 were provided by non-government organisations and other stakeholders.^[93] Many of these addressed the gaps in relation to social and economic rights, particularly through linking violence against women and the right to health.^[94] Two that provided more comprehensive and analytical consideration of the social and economic rights of women facing violence are specifically considered here. The first, from the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pointed out that unlike the 1992 GR 19, the new Draft GR failed to note that poverty prevents women from leaving abusers. It argued that poverty has an additional role in exposing women to violence where, for example, women risk unsafe transport or precarious work situations.^[95] It suggested that the new GR require states to address ‘structural discrimination in the area of economic and social rights which entrenches women’s poverty’.^[96] The submission focused on the issues of housing and land, arguing that violence against women was a key cause of homelessness and that property ownership protected women from violence. It suggested that the new GR should include a requirement that states allow evictions of perpetrators of violence from the family home regardless of who is the owner or leaseholder.^[97] It also referred to other social and economic rights, such as social security, social protection floors to ensure adequate livelihood, transportation, child care and various measures within the workplace for domestic violence victims. Lastly, it suggested that the GR include a prohibition against discrimination of women who have experienced domestic violence in relation to land, housing, education and employment in particular.^[98] These suggestions offer to strengthen the new GR both in deepening the links between violence against women, equality, and economic and social rights at a broad level; and in terms of specific requirements relating to these rights that emerge in the final version.

 The second submission that raised valuable points on economic and social rights in the Draft GR was provided by International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW-AP) representing a range of organisations and individuals. The submission saw the Draft GR as an opportunity to update and locate violence against women within the social and economic context of neoliberal economic globalisation and current growth and development models.^[99] It noted that this context has led to unsafe, abusive and unaccountable work environments; a roll-back of social provision; and privatisation and deregulation of services such as shelters and health care for women affected by violence.^[100] It argued that growth and development models chosen by states should not ‘exacerbate the prevalence of GBVAW or serve as a barrier to addressing it ... The updated GR should also highlight the impact of poverty on marginalised groups and its relation to GBVAW.’^[101] The submission stressed the need for the new GR to consider the impact of growing economic migration in relation to violence against women.^[102] IWRAW-AP also noted the new forms of violence that the GR will need to take into account, including violence in relation to sexual and reproductive health and economic violence. It noted that while the term ‘economic violence’ has been used by the CEDAW Committee it has not been adequately defined and this should occur within the GR.^[103] The strength of this submission is its strong contextual framing of the issue of violence in the current, global economic context and the emphasis on new forms of harm facing women in the workplace and as a result of poverty.

 Both submissions, and a number of others, pointed to the need for greater attention to economic and social rights in the new GR. In July 2017 the CEDAW Committee released General Recommendation 35 which updates GR 19.^[104] GR 35 both updates and is complementary to GR 19 so the two should be read together in guiding states parties on their obligations in relation to violence against women. GR 35 is similar to the draft version but there are some notable additions that suggest that some of the submissions on social and economic rights were heeded. For example, the draft discussed intersectional discrimination but failed to mention class as a category. GR 35 includes ‘socioeconomic status and/or caste’ as one of the factors affecting women.^[105] The new version also includes more contextual references to global economic factors such as supply chains, extractive and off-shoring industries and economic crises.^[106] The GR also refers to the indivisibility of rights such as the right to life and health in relation to women’s right to be free from violence.^[107] The GR specifically mentions migrant domestic workers in discussing the obligations on states parties to repeal immigration laws that prevent this group from reporting violence.^[108] In relation to prevention measures, the GR now refers to public safety measures such as adequate physical infrastructure including lighting.^[109] Importantly, it also places the obligation on states parties to encourage the private sector to take efforts to prevent violence in the workplace or that affects women workers.^[110] The GR includes reference to affordable housing and land alongside access to financial aid, legal, medical and social services, education and childcare for violence victims/survivors.^[111] Unfortunately, these types of services and the goods emanating from social and economic rights are not discussed in relation to prevention in the GR. In addition, the GR does not refer to ‘economic violence’, nor does it discuss the impact of poverty or structural economic discrimination on women’s exposure to violence as suggested in the two submissions considered above. These understandings remain to be spelled out more clearly within the international framework. GR 35 is, however, an improvement on the Draft GR in its attentiveness to social and economic factors and rights in relation to violence against women.

<b>Other Developments in International Law and Areas for Further Research

The CEDAW redrafting of the General Recommendation on Violence against Women is only one of the notable efforts to improve the international legal responses to this global issue. Some suggest that this may not be enough. In particular, the former Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida Manjoo, has called for an inquiry into the ‘normative gap’ in international human rights law on the issue of violence against women.^[112] The current Special Rapporteur, Dubravka Šimonović, has taken this debate forward by calling for submissions from stakeholders on the adequacy of the international legal framework.^[113] Whatever the outcome of this debate and the forms of the legal mechanisms that may or may not emerge from it, now is an important moment to consider whether the overall approach to violence against women as a human rights violation takes adequate account of social and economic rights.

 Additional areas to improve the international human rights framework could involve updating some of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comments dealing with discrimination, gender equality and specific social and economic rights. Other treaty body committees might also look to reorient responses to violence against women away from purely criminal justice approaches towards more preventative approaches involving social and economic rights. Some of the creative law and jurisprudence emerging from regional and domestic jurisdictions might also inform the international law. Domestic examples include an Indian decision ordering municipalities to provide public toilets for women following incidents of sexual violence;^[114] and South African litigation that challenges the temporary housing conditions of women who have been evicted and are exposed to violence.^[115] Research on domestic litigation strategies and jurisprudence on violence against women engaging social and economic rights would be valuable.^[116] Other areas for research should consider the role of social and economic rights in addressing violence against women where transnational actors are involved.

<a>V. CONCLUSION

The chapter has argued that violence against women is strongly linked to poverty and that social and economic rights should be more fully understood, developed and used in responding to this violence. It has suggested that relating violence against women to social and economic rights addresses some of the critical concerns that feminists have articulated about the way that violence against women is approached in international law. It has synthesised existing understandings and formulated a set of conceptual connections between violence against women, social and economic rights, and substantive equality to advance scholarship and legal development in this area. Lastly, it has analysed the way in which violence against women and social and economic rights have been dealt with in international human rights law and discussed recent developments that might lead to a deeper consideration of the interconnections. It has also suggested areas for further development of the law and research to inform this. While there are valid concerns about the lack of implementation of international law, some of its problematic approaches to women, and broader concerns with the limits of law in tackling violence against women, the need to develop the fullest and most effective human rights framework integrating social and economic rights in response to violence against women is a necessary project.

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^[1] The chapter consciously employs the terminology of ‘violence against women’ rather than ‘gender-based violence against women’ as a shorthand. Gender-based violence also affects men and boys. Men are subject to sexual and gender-based violence in a range of situations, including in prisons and during wars, while boys experience domestic violence and bullying in schools and other institutions. In addition, violence against women is not only a heterosexual phenomenon. However, the existence of violence against women by men, which occurs on a large scale across societies, has systemic features that mean it is properly the subject of specific inquiry and targeted response. Such analysis and response must of course be mindful of the nuanced nature of this violence and of the groups and identity categories implicated in any discussion of it. For a consideration of the complexities involved in framing gender/sex in international human rights law, see Dianne Otto, ‘International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking Sex/Gender Dualism’ in Margaret Davies and Vanessa E. Munro (eds), A Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate, 2013) 197.

^[2] Human Rights Council, ‘Accelerating efforts to eliminate violence against women: preventing and responding to violence against women and girls, including indigenous women and girls’, Resolution adopted on 1 July 2016, A/HRC/RES/32/19.

^[3] Note the arguments by feminist scholars of transitional justice for the recognition in international law of ‘socio-economic violence’, discussed in Diana Sankey, ‘Gendered Experiences of Subsistence Harms: A Possible Contribution to Feminist Discourse on Gendered Harm?’ (2015) 24(1) Social & Legal Studies 25–45.

^[4] The World Health Organization estimates that it affects 1 in 3 women during their lifetimes: WHO, Responding to Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence against Women – WHO Clinical and Policy Guidelines (2013).

^[5] Jacqui True, The Political Economy of Violence Against Women (Oxford University Press, 2012); Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, ‘Political economy of women’s human rights’, Reported to the Human Rights Council on 18 May 2009, A/HRC/11/6.

^[6] Sandra Fredman and Beth Goldblatt, Gender Equality and Human Rights, for Progress of the World’s Women 2015–2016, Discussion Paper No. 4, pp. 1–65 (UN Women, 2015).

^[7] Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and practice, ‘Thematic Analysis: Eliminating Discrimination against Women in Economic and Social Life with a Focus on Economic Crisis’, report presented to the 26th session of the Human Rights Council, see A/HRC/26/39, 1 April 2014.

^[8] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The World’s Women 2015 (United Nations, 2015) 141.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and practice, above n 7.

^[11] In 2015, at least 119 countries had legislation on domestic violence, 125 had laws on sexual harassment and 52 had laws on marital rape: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, above n 8, at 160.

^[12] The absence of social and economic rights in relation to violence against women is a gap in both the violence against women literature and in the social and economic rights literature. For consideration of the issues in the African context, see Sheila Dauer and Mayra Gomez, ‘Violence against Women and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa’ (2006) 7(2) Human Rights Review 49; Elsje Bonthuys, ‘Domestic Violence and Gendered Socio-Economic Rights: An Agenda for Research and Activism?’ (2014) 30 South African Journal on Human Rights 111.

^[13] For example, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’, E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 February 2004.

^[14] For example, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to housing, as a component of the right to a standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimi‑nation in this context, A/ HRC/19/53, 26 December 2011.

^[15] ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo’ report presented to the fourteenth session of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/14/22, 23 April 2010; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘General recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations’, CEDAW/C/GC/30, 1 November 2013.

^[16] For example, the recent reports of UN Human Rights Council mandate holders have discussed violence against women in relation to water and sanitation, and food: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Human Rights Council, Thirty-third session, 27 July 2016, A/HRC/33/49, at 9–10; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Human Rights Council, 31st Session, 14 December 2015, A/HRC/31/51 at 5.

^[17] Jane Pillinger, Violence and Harassment Against Women and Men in the World of Work: Trade Union Perspectives and Action (International Labour Office, Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV), 2017).

^[18] For a discussion of women’s social and economic rights in international law, see Larking in this volume; Christine Chinkin, ‘Gender and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Eibe Reidel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 134; Sandra Fredman, ‘Engendering Social and Economic Rights’ in Beth Goldblatt and Kirsty McLean (eds), Women’s Social and Economic Rights: Developments in South Africa (Juta, 2011) 4; Dianne Otto, ‘Gender Comment: Why Does the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Need a General Comment on Women?’ (2002) 14(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1. For a consideration of gender and social and economic rights in comparative constitutional law, see Beth Goldblatt, ‘Constitutional Approaches to Gender and Social and Economic Rights’ in Helen Irving (ed), Constitutions and Gender (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 482–500.

^[19] True, above n 5, at 26, calls for a ‘greater integration of the human rights framework and its application to the systemic violence that women experience’.

^[20] The chapter does not give specific attention to violence against women and gendered poverty in the context of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction or disasters. Note, however, the view that violence against women in peacetime should be seen as a ‘war against women’: Catherine A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Harvard University Press, 2006). See, in response, Dianne Otto, ‘Remapping Crisis through a Feminist Lens’ in Sari Kuovu and Zoe Pearson (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2011) 75, at 90–92.

^[21] The focus of the chapter is on international law but some of the responses of regional human rights bodies as well as domestic human rights approaches to the issue of violence against women offer important guidance on the role of social and economic rights. Key regional examples include: Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (The Istanbul Convention) adopted by the Council of Europe on 11 May 2011, CETS No. 210, entered into force on 1 August 2014; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, ‘Convention of Belem do Para’, adopted on 9 June 1994, OAS/Ser.L.V/11.92/doc.31, entered into force on 5 March 1995; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003, entered into force on 25 November 2005, Articles 4 and 5.

^[22] Alice Edwards, Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 305.

^[23] Ibid, at 306, citing Karen Engle, ‘Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female’ (1992) 26 New England Law Review 1509.

^[24] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 993 UNTS 3.

^[25] Dianne Otto, ‘Women’s Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 345, at 351.

^[26] Ratna Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1.

^[27] Ibid, at 2.

^[28] Ratna Kapur, ‘Gender, Sovereignty and the Rise of a Sexual Security Regime in International Law and Postcolonial India’ [2013] MelbJlIntLaw 12; (2013) 14(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 317–345, at 14.

^[29] Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, ‘Political economy of women’s human rights’, reported to the Human Rights Council on 18 May 2009, A/HRC/11/6, at 10.

^[30] Kapur, above n 28, at 16. Also see Prabha Kotiswaran, ‘Beyond Sexual Humanitarianism: A Postcolonial Approach to Anti-Trafficking Law’ (2014) 4 UC Irvine Law Review 353–406.

^[31] In relation to homelessness, see: FEANTSA, The Links between Violence against Women and Homelessness (Brussels: European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless, 2015) <http://www.feantsa.org/download/vaw_background_paper_final507550159640577037.pdf> .

^[32] In relation to education, see Khadijah Fancy, Because I am a Girl: The State of the World’s Girls 2012 (Plan International, UK) 53–54.

^[33] See for example, J. Kutin, R. Russell and M. Reid, ‘Economic Abuse Between Intimate Partners in Australia: Prevalence, Health Status, Disability and Financial Stress’ (2017) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health (online) 1–6. Also note the concept of subsistence harms as discussed by Sankey, above n 3.

^[34] On the health impacts of violence against women, see WHO, Global and Regional Estimates of Violence Against Women: Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and Nonpartner Sexual Violence (2013).

^[35] Sreeparna Ghosh, ‘The Political Economy of Domestic Violence in a Mumbai Slum: An Ethnographic Analysis’ (2015) 27(2) Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 175–198.

^[36] Frances Raday and Shai Oksenberg, ‘The Impact of Violence against Women on Women’s Economic and Social Life’, Background paper for the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice to inform the thematic report on ‘Discrimination against women in economic and social life, with a focus on economic crisis’, A/HRC/26/39, Human Rights Council 26th Session, 1 April 2014, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WGWomen/Pages/ESL.aspx> .

^[37] Rein Sander-McDonagh, Lucy Neville and Sevasti-Melissa Nolas, ‘From Pillar to Post: Understanding the Victimisation of Women and Children Who Experience Domestic Violence in an Age of Austerity’ (2016) 112 Feminist Review 60.

^[38] Sylvia Chant and Gwendolyn Beetham (eds), Gender, Poverty, and Development – Critical Concepts in Development Studies (Routledge, 2014).

^[39] See Sandra Fredman, ‘Women and Poverty – A Human Rights Approach’ (2016) 24(4) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 494–517.

^[40] See Bina Agarwal and Pradeep Panda, ‘Toward Freedom from Domestic Violence: The Neglected Obvious’ (2007) 8 Journal of Human Development 359.

^[41] Sandra Fredman, ‘Engendering Social and Economic Rights’ in Beth Goldblatt and Kirsty McLean (eds), Women’s Social and Economic Rights: Developments in South Africa (Juta, 2011) 4.

^[42] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2004) General Recommendation No 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures UN Doc A/59/38, annex I, para 8.

^[43] CESCR ‘General Comment No 16: Article 3: the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights’ (2005) 34th Session 2005, E/C 12/2005/4; CESCR ‘General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2009) 42nd Session 2009, E/C 12/GC/20. Also see Fredman and Goldblatt, above n 6.

^[44] Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn) (Oxford University Press, 2011).

^[45] Ibid.

^[46] Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, ‘Denial of the Means of Subsistence as an Equality Violation’ (2005) Acta Juridica 149, note, at 162: ‘Poverty exacerbates and deepens the inequality of members of already disadvantaged groups. Poor women get sex inequality writ large. ... [P]overty forces women to accept sexual commodification and subordination to men in order to survive. They engage in prostitution or “survival sex” to get by. They lose autonomy to choose freely with whom and when they will have sex, and even whether and when they will have children. They are more vulnerable to rape, assault and sexual harassment because they live in unsafe places, and they are not free to walk away from workplaces that are poisoned. They are not free to leave abusive relationships when destitution is the alternative. Poverty perpetuates women’s under-representation in governments and in decision-making and their lack of political influence.’

^[47] Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, ‘Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive Equality Speaks to Poverty’ (2002) 14(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 185.

^[48] The inclusion of a ground of discrimination on the basis of violence against women within Australia’s Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) was (unsuccessfully) argued for in relation to proposed reforms to this legislation in 2011. See Andrea Durbach, Domestic Violence Discrimination and the Consolidation of Commonwealth Anti-Discrimination Laws (Speech, 5 December 2011) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/speeches/domestic-violence-discrimination-and-consolidation-commonwealth-anti-discrimination>.

^[49] ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo’, Report to the Human Rights Council 23rd Session, 14 May 2013, A/HRC/23/49, at 21.

^[50] Raday and Oksenberg, above n 36.

^[51] See, for example, an exploration of the relationship between violence against women and the right to food, Anne C. Bellows and Anna Jenderedjian, ‘Violence and Women’s Participation in the Right to Adequate Food and Nutrition’ in Anne C. Bellows, Flavio L.S. Valente, Stefanie Lemke and María Daniela Núñez Burbano de Lara (eds), Gender, Nutrition, and the Human Right to Adequate Food (Routledge, 2016) 108.

^[52] For a brief history of earlier references to forms of violence against women in international law during the twentieth century see, Edwards, above n 22, at 7–8.

^[53] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against women’, Eighth session (1989).

^[54] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women’, Eleventh session (1992), contained in A/47/38, para 2.

^[55] Ibid, at para 6.

^[56] Ibid, at para 7. There was also specific reference to Articles 11 (employment) and 12 (health) paras 17 and 18, and 19 and 20 respectively.

^[57] Ibid, at para 11.

^[58] Ibid, at paras 13–16.

^[59] Ibid, at para 24.

^[60] For a history of the appearance of violence against women in international law, see UN Women, ‘Timeline of policy commitments and international agreements’ at <http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/302-timeline-of-policy-commitments-and-international-agreements-.html> . Also see, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo’, Report to the Human Rights Council, Twenty-Sixth Session, 28 May 2014, A/HRC/26/38.

^[61] Chinkin, above n 18, at 144–145.

^[62] Above n 4.

^[63] Ibid, at 10–12.

^[64] Ibid, at 28.

^[65] Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences’, Dubravka Šimonović, Report to the Human Rights Council, Thirty-Fifth Session, 6–23 June 2017, A/HRC/35/30.

^[66] Above n 5, at 20–21.

^[67] CESCR ‘General Comment No 16’, above n 34.

^[68] CESCR ‘General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2009) 42nd Session 2009, E/C 12/GC/20.

^[69] Ibid, at para 20. Strangely, all three examples provided in this paragraph relate to sex discrimination in the workplace.

^[70] CESCR ‘General Comment No 16’, above n 34, at para 27.

^[71] Ibid.

^[72] Ibid, at para 29.

^[73] Ibid, at para 30.

^[74] Fancy, above n 32, at 53–54; Faranaaz Veriava, ‘Gender Equality and Education in South Africa’ in Beth Goldblatt and Kirsty McLean (eds), Women’s Social and Economic Rights: Developments in South Africa (Juta, 2011) 224.

^[75] ‘Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 760, at 760.

^[76] Ibid, at 763.

^[77] Ibid.

^[78] Ibid, at 765.

^[79] Ibid, at 766.

^[80] Ibid.

^[81] Ibid, at 768.

^[82] Ibid, at 769–770.

^[83] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women. Addendum – Draft General Recommendation No. 19 (1992): accelerating elimination of gender-based violence against women’, 28 July 2016, CEDAW/C/GC/19/Add.1, para 10.

^[84] For the list of submissions in response to the draft GR, see <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/DraftUpdateGR19.aspx> .

^[85] Above n 83, at para 10.

^[86] Ibid, at para 15(a).

^[87] Ibid, at para 11.

^[88] Ibid, at para 15, prevention: (b)(ii).

^[89] Ibid, at para 15, prevention: (d).

^[90] Ibid, at para 15, prevention: (e).

^[91] Ibid, at para 15, protection and redress: (a)(iii).

^[92] Ibid, at para 15, protection and redress: (c).

^[93] Above n 84.

^[94] For example: The Center for Reproductive Rights, submission to CEDAW Committee on draft GR 19, undated 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GR19/Center%20for%20Reproductive%20Rights.pdf> Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), ‘Comments on Draft General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women’, 30 September 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GR19/PICUM.pdf> International Women’s Health Coalition, ‘Comments on the Draft update of General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women by Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)’, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GR19/International%20Women%27s%20Health%20Coalition%20.pdf> .

^[95] Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, submission to CEDAW Committee on draft GR 19, undated 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GR19/GlobalInitiativeESCR.pdf> .

^[96] Ibid, at 1.

^[97] Ibid, at 4.

^[98] Ibid, at 5.

^[99] IWRAW-Asia Pacific, ‘Partner Feedback to the Update on General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women by Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)’, undated 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/GR19/IWRAW_AsiaPacific.pdf> .

^[100] Ibid, at 5.

^[101] Ibid.

^[102] Ibid, at 7.

^[103] Ibid, at 8.

^[104] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating General Recommendation No. 19’, 26 July 2017, CEDAW/C/GC/35.

^[105] Ibid, at para 12.

^[106] Ibid, at para 14.

^[107] Ibid, at para 15.

^[108] Ibid, at para 31(c).

^[109] Ibid, at para 36.

^[110] Ibid, at para 39.

^[111] Ibid, at para 40(c).

^[112] Above n 60.

^[113] Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, ‘Call for submissions on the adequacy of the international legal framework’ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/InternationalLegalFramework.aspx> . Submissions were due by 1 November 2016.

^[114] Milun Saryajani Through Editor Geetali Vinayak Mandakini v Pune Municipal Commissioner, Pune And Ors, High Court at Bombay, 23 December 2015. For a discussion of the case and the violence leading to it, see Karuna Maharaj, ‘Bombay High Court makes Right to Clean Toilets a Fundamental Right for Women in India’ (OxHRH Blog, 8 Feburary 2016) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/bombay-high-court-makes-right-to-clean-toilets-a-fundamental-right-for-women-in-india/> .

^[115] Dladla and others v City of Johannesburg and others [2017] ZACC 42; 2018 (2) SA 327 (CC) .

^[116] The author of this chapter is currently engaged in a research project on litigation strategies concerning social and economic rights and violence against women in South Africa. Also see: Ana María Sánchez Rodríguez, ‘Contesting Neoliberalism: Bringing in Economic and Social Rights to End Violence against Women in Mexico’ in Gillian MacNaughton and Diane F. Frey, Economic and Social Rights in a Neoliberal World (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 173.