Maritime Studies
|
|
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
Maritime Studies |
|
Caroline Morrison[1]
Australia relies on the vast surrounding ocean environment for trade, resources, tourism and lifestyle. Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP) aims to protect this valuable national asset. Nonetheless, maritime threats such as maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and illegal immigration, among others, threaten ocean security. Security provision falls partly to the Australian Defence Force, yet, the goals or responsibilities outlined in AOP are not considered in Defence’s own policy, limiting effective and comprehensive protection of Australia’s ocean. Thus, formal links should arguably be made between AOP and Defence policies to ensure the effective and comprehensive protection of Australia’s vast maritime interests. Such measures will be explored in this article.
Australia is popularly identified as a ‘wide brown land’,[2] yet such a description gives little indication of Australia’s fundamental reliance on the sea. Australia is, in fact, a maritime nation: an island continent located at the intersecting point of three major oceans, the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans, with a combined coastline of 61,700 kilometres (km).[3]
Australia has jurisdictional responsibility for 16 million sq. km of ocean, an area larger than the Australian land mass itself.[4] Furthermore, Australian trade, commerce and tourism are all dependent on the surrounding maritime environment.[5]
In 1998 the Australian Government released its Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP). This policy was created in response to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), ratified in 1994, under which all signatory States gained access to a 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around their territory. AOP is a strategic framework for the planning, management and ecologically sustainable development of Australia’s fisheries, shipping, petroleum, gas and seabed resources while ensuring the conservation of the marine environment.[6] AOP identifies the importance of the oceans surrounding Australia and endeavours to protect them. AOP, however, was never legislated and so holds no legal power for the implementation of its agenda. The policy relies on the Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH) and existing legislation, such as the Customs Act, Quarantine Act, Defence Act and Fisheries Management Act for the sustainable management of Australia’s oceans.
Furthermore, seven years after publication, there are still significant threats to Australia’s maritime security, broadly defined to include environmental and resource security. A major concern of late is the surveillance and enforcement capabilities and effectiveness of a major security provider, the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This concern has arisen as maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and organised crime threaten Australia’s ocean security and sustainability. It has been suggested that both Defence and Oceans policy makers have lacked a whole-of-government outlook towards oceans security, resulting in a lack of coordination and information sharing between the Departments responsible for both environmental and Defence policies. Hence the roles of both the ADF and AOP need to be reassessed. To date, Defence has taken some steps to enhance its enforcement capability, but AOP still has very little impact on Defence futures planning.
AOP was released in December 1998, the Year of the Oceans. The policy sets out to ensure the long-term health of Australia’s oceans, and to provide a coherent strategic planning and management framework for the protection of Australia’s national maritime interests.[7] It also aims to overcome jurisdictional overlap and inconsistency in oceans management resulting from conflicting departmental and sectoral interests.[8] These interests were to be coordinated through several bodies:
• The National Oceans Ministerial Board (NOMB), disbanded in 2004 after a closed review of the policy.
• The Oceans Board of Management (OBOM), established in 2004 to replace NOMB as the high-level group of officials chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH). Comprises representatives from many Government departments and agencies interested in Australia’s maritime issues.
• The National Oceans Advisory Group (NOAG), gives cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral advice to OBOM.
• The Oceans Policy Sciences Advisory Group (OPSAG), comprises representatives of 18 Australian Government marine science agencies, State research institutions and non-government marine science interests. Promotes coordination and information sharing between Government marine science agencies and the broader marine science community.
• The National Oceans Office (NOO), the main administrative point for AOP under the Marine Division of DEH from 2004.[9]
In creating and implementing this policy Australia became a world leader in the field of oceans management with considerable scope to influence other States, particularly in the immediate region.[10] There have, however, been problems in the organisation, structure and coordination of the policy and its goals to date. It seems that a fully integrated and coordinated policy, especially in regard to strategic issues of security and protection, is yet to be achieved.
For example, the NOO is located in Tasmania, distancing AOP’s administrative body from the political process in Canberra. In fact, AOP has not had a high profile in the political sphere, especially to those responsible for security. As a result, key strategic representatives were missing in the early years of AOP’s principal decision-making body. The Minister for Defence and the Minister for Justice and Customs, significant ministers for the protection of Australia’s oceans, were not represented on the Oceans Ministerial Board. Progress has been made, however, and recent decisions see the Director General Navy Strategic Policy and Futures (DGNSPF) participating on OBOM and the Deputy Director Navy Environmental Policy (DDNEP) participating on NOAG. Nonetheless, the strategic obligations of AOP have not been fully incorporated into Defence Policy, resulting in a compartmentalised or fragmented approach to environmental security within Defence.[11]
Such a fragmented approach to comprehensive maritime security arguably raises concern over the many threats in Australia’s ocean environment. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all in depth, so focus will be placed on the most pressing and current threats impacting upon AOP’s goals to protect Australia’s rights and jurisdiction over offshore areas.
Maritime terrorism is a threat to Australia’s offshore oil and gas installations as well as to Australia’s significant shipping industry. Damage to or destruction of an offshore installation or trade vessel could cause dangerous oil spills, pollution and chemical and commercial waste. In July 2004, an ASIO threat assessment advised that Al Qa’idah and associated groups continued to have a capacity to carry out terrorist attacks, including against Australian maritime interests.[12] Recent attacks on the USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg demonstrate that well-organised and highly motivated terrorist organisations can and will attack shipping if it suits their aims.[13]
Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing is another major concern for the wellbeing of Australia’s ocean environment as it causes depletion in fish stocks and rising fish prices.[14]
Australia’s Fishing Zone (AFZ) at nine million sq. km is the third largest in the world and Australia’s fishing industry is the fifth largest primary industry in Australia. Illegal fishermen are becoming more common and more daring. Senator Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, commented that ‘recent experience has shown a growing trend in the unwillingness of some illegal fishing boats and other vessels suspected of criminal activity to comply with requests to be boarded’.[15]
Also, increasingly sophisticated IUU fishing vessels contain advanced technology, such as GPS, and are able to take very large catches of fish. There is evidence of large-scale illegal commercial fishing operations becoming more common than the traditional subsistence fishing. Large ‘Iceboat’ motherships anchor just outside Australian territory while smaller boats, Bodi, feed them by darting back and forth into Australian waters. Up to 200 Bodi work on Australian waters and take 20,000 shark fin each year.[16] In the last financial year, 8,108 foreign fishing vessels (FFV) were sighted in Australian waters.[17] 259 IUU vessels were intercepted, 134 apprehended, 83 subject to legislative forfeiture of catch and equipment and 42 cautioned.[18]
The most common area for this illegal fishing is to the north of Australia. Customs and ADF Patrol Boats dedicate most of their sea days to operations in the north as this is the most accessible space for the largely Indonesian contingent of illegal fishermen. The Southern Ocean, though, has also experienced increasing levels of illegal fishing. Yet severe weather conditions, including Force 12 gales and seas of more than 10 metres, make conditions extremely inhospitable for fishermen and enforcement teams alike. Southern patrolling did however lead to the successful ‘hot pursuit’ of the Viarsa I, the longest pursuit in Australian maritime history.[19] Yet, there are very few enforcement vessels capable of patrolling in the Southern Ocean.
Illegal immigration is a concern for Australian Customs, Defence, Immigration and Quarantine departments, among others. Illegal immigrants are often transported in unseaworthy and unhygienic vessels with little water, food or protection. Ballast water on such vessels could easily contain marine pests or infectious and communicable diseases. Illegal persons and goods may also bring such diseases ashore. Cases have been drastically reduced since the Tampa incident and subsequent public education in Indonesia. Over the 2003-04 period only three suspected illegal entrant vessels (SIEVs) and 86 suspected unauthorised non-citizen asylum seekers (SUNCs) were intercepted at sea, compared to several thousand at one time.[20] Nonetheless, the risk cannot be ruled out. Illegal immigration could well become a major problem in the future if island States continue to fail, and if sea levels continue to rise, engulfing low-lying islands.
Capabilities for surveillance and enforcement are in danger of becoming unsustainably stretched due to the threats of maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and illegal immigration. The Australian Government has responded in some degree to maritime threats by implementing programs such as the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS) and the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) to combat terrorism, Operations CRANBERRY and MISTRAL to combat illegal fishing, and Operations RELEX I and II to combat illegal immigration.
AMIS is a framework for combining, analysing and managing existing information on vessel identity, crews, cargoes and movements.[21] AMIS will coordinate information and intelligence gathering from our maritime area, as previously there was no central coordinated hub.[22] JOPC is the body that coordinates AMIS and is staffed by ADF and Customs personnel. The Commander JOPC, normally a Rear Admiral, reports to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) for military offshore maritime protection operations, and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Customs for civil maritime surveillance operations.[23]
Operation MISTRAL (1998-) is a joint operation with Customs and AFMA in the Southern Ocean. The ADF supports Coastwatch and AFMA in enforcing Australian sovereign rights and fisheries laws in the Southern Ocean.[24]
Operations RELEX I (2001) and II (2002-) are multi-departmental responses to people smuggling aimed at preventing the incursion of unauthorised vessels into Australian waters such that, ultimately, people smugglers and asylum seekers would be deterred from attempting to pursue Australia as a destination.[25]
Operation CLEARWATER, held in April 2005, was a significant whole-of-government operation involving Customs, ADF, Australian Fisheries Management Authority and Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), coordinated by Coastwatch. In nine days, Australian Customs and RAN Patrol Boats apprehended 27 illegal fishing boats and 240 crews in the Gulf of Carpentaria.[26]
Such responses, however, are not recognised by AOP nor the 2000 Defence White Paper, as they originated after the policies’ release. No update has been published of either policy that includes the new measures. The Australian Government has a responsibility to protect Australia’s national interests and implement a coordinated and effective response to maritime threats.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is often a primary responder in cases of oceans violation, yet Defence policy makers do not see the ADF as such. The ADF’s core task, as defined by Government policy, is warfighting and not the constabulary or peacetime tasks described above. This can be seen in the most recent Defence White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, (Defence 2000), the source of current military concepts of strategy. The four core priorities of the ADF are stipulated as:
1. Defending Australia,[27]
2. Contributing to the Security of our Immediate Neighbourhood,[28]
3. Supporting Wider Interests,[29] and
4. Peacetime National Tasks.[30]
Three of the four core tasks in the government policy statement Defence 2000 are directly related to the traditional threat of armed conflict, be it on Australian territory, in the region or as part of a coalition abroad. ADF structure and capability acquisitions[31] are therefore focused on warfighting. It is understandable that the ADF is structured in such a way, to be prepared for the most serious traditional security threats of interstate warfare, however, one questions whether the Defence view of security is too narrow and if serious asymmetric peacetime threats, such as maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and illegal immigration, are being marginalised.
The security environment is becoming more uncertain with a combination of state and non-state actors and asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The events of 9/11 and the Bali and Jakarta bombings in 2002 and 2003 prompted the release of Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003 (Defence Update 2003). Defence Update 2003 considered the non-traditional threat of terrorism, however, it did not prompt change to the core priorities or capability goals of Defence. Bateman suggests that a previous notion, that non-traditional security roles should not detract from the core function of defending Australia from attack, seems outdated in the new security environment.[32]
Yet the Government’s view of security, as expressed in the 2000 White Paper, remains narrow, despite the ADF’s many peacetime and non-traditional operations. Defence policy makers hold to the notion that a Defence force structures for war and adapts for peace.
Figure 1. Span of RAN maritime tasks
Source: RAN Doctrine 2 (2005), p. 9.
Constabulary and diplomatic tasks appear to be secondary roles of the ADF and Forbes argues:
the protection of national interests (through constabulary and diplomatic tasks) is often seen as a less important task than preparing for warlike operations, yet it is a fundamental task that goes to the root of national interests.[33]
In the current security environment, constabulary, diplomatic and military tasks are becoming more closely linked than Defence policy suggests. Regional terrorist groups are capable of targeting Australia’s offshore oil and gas installations and current levels of illegal fishing threaten our international trade and domestic economy as never before. Hence, constabulary and diplomatic operations have become central to Australia’s national and strategic interests, and therefore should be central to the ADF’s force structure and training at the highest policy level.
AOP regulates the marine environment, hence the main arm of the ADF concerned with AOP is the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). RAN responsibility, as presented in Government White Papers, has been the defence of the Australian territory from an invading force (DA). Yet, expeditionary troop deployment in recent years and feeble military power in our immediate neighbourhood shows that the threat of direct conventional invasion onto Australian soil is unlikely. Still, DA remains the core priority of defence preparedness and training. DA necessitates the defence of the air-sea gap between Australia’s Top End and the island States to our north and north-west. It involves the maritime activity of Sea Denial.[34]
Sea Denial is primarily a defensive strategy that does not create the control of Australia’s oceans envisaged in AOP. Sea Denial is valuable, but only as part of a more comprehensive security strategy that includes Sea Control[35] and Maritime Power Projection.[36] Sea Control relates directly to enforcement and constabulary tasks and is hence the most relevant strategy to the ADF in its role as security provider. [37] Thus far, however, Sea Control and Maritime Power Projection have not been highlighted in Defence White Papers, because a narrow view of the role of Defence has been adopted and pursued. However, the strategies of Sea Denial, Sea Control and Maritime Power Projection would ensure comprehensive maritime security, firstly in a military sense but ultimately in a broader maritime sense and at the same time fulfil AOP’s goals for oceans protection.
A recent RAN publication, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2 2005, presents the long standing trinity of naval roles – Military, Constabulary and Diplomatic – in a triangle of the span of maritime tasks. The capabilities needed for Sea Denial, Sea Control and Maritime Power Projection described below allow for the full implementation of the three roles.
Yet, RAN capabilities are ultimately directed by the Defence 2000 force structure and capability guidelines which focus on the military wing of the triangle. Despite this, RAN Doctrine 2 2005 suggests that there is a growing importance of constabulary operations as a principal task of modern naval forces.[38] Contributions to constabulary operations are made most commonly through the use of the Fremantle and Armidale Class Patrol Boats (FCPB and ACPB). RAN Doctrine 2 2005 states:
Patrol Boats are limited in their warfighting capability but contribute to the enforcement of Australian legislation within its maritime domain, by maintaining Australia’s sovereignty, and preventing illegal immigration, fishing and smuggling.[39]
RAN patrol boats are the main surface asset in support of civil law enforcement and coastal surveillance operations. Yet, at present, only 30 per cent (five) of the 15 FCPBs are specifically tasked to border control and maritime security functions.[40] Combined, therefore, with Customs’ eight patrol boats, there are on average only 12 (or at most 13) vessels conducting enforcement operations in the water at any one time. This number seems insufficient for the 16 million sq km of ocean under Australia’s responsibility, when there are over 8000 illegal incursions per year.
Snushall suggests that there has been an unexpected increased role for the ADF in civilian enforcement operations[41] in Australia’s oceans, but that any involvement to date has not been integrated into Defence policy. He also states that current ADF and Customs capabilities to successfully patrol Australia’s vast ocean domain and interdict illegal vessels are deficient.[42] Bateman supports this view in his 2004 publication – Does the RAN have the capacity and capability to meet its enforcement roles as outlined in Australia’s Oceans Policy?[43]
The RAN’s deficiency is the result of insufficient numbers of patrolling vessels, vessels being ill-fitted for Southern Ocean conditions, a growing number of illegal vessels and/or activities, or the lack of communication and coordination between Defence and environmental enforcement agencies.
Also, interdiction and arrest powers are complicated by the many hundred legislations under which officers operate.[44] As a result, ADF platforms will generally have an Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) officer on board during civilian operations so RAN personnel are not responsible for collecting evidence or appearing in court.[45] Further restrictions on RAN’s Constabulary activities are that Defence patrol boats do not have unilateral authority to fire on or ram illegal vessels to make them stop, so ushering intruders out of Australia’s waters is often the only option.[46]
Recent initiatives and operations show that the Australian Government is paying more attention to issues of maritime security and is beginning to understand the significant risk posed by non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, illegal fishing and organised crime. Failure to recognise these responsibilities in Defence policy will constrain force acquisitions and ultimately restrict the full integration of environmental and security concerns into Defence policy.
Policy makers must acknowledge the operational reality of our current maritime security environment and the role the ADF is currently taking. RAN operations are constantly associated with constabulary, peacetime, non-traditional tasks rather than traditional military territorial invasion or aggression.
A broader understanding of security among Defence policy makers is needed to link AOP with Defence policy and to further incorporate non-traditional Defence tasks into mainstream Defence policy, and to direct military acquisition and priorities to reflect the constabulary and diplomatic operational realities and necessities outlined in AOP.
In the debate surrounding AOP and Defence strategy, there has been little integrated long-term planning for the future of Australia’s oceans thus far. Such planning is needed to fulfil AOP’s goals of a healthy and sustainable maritime environment. However, without effective planning with the ADF and Customs, without continued integration and coordination between ocean stakeholders, and without communication between State and Federal Governments the future of the maritime environment is uncertain.
Bateman and Grove suggested that AOP and Defence policies have not yet been linked because no one agency has full responsibility for taking a holistic view of the requirements for policing Australia’s offshore zones.[47] A former Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) Chairman suggested that AOP has been dominated by the green movement to focus solely on the environment, resulting in a shallow understanding of the importance of Defence to maritime security.[48] This phenomenon is compounded by the fact that only limited detail of security and enforcement operations is actually explored in AOP.
For Defence, environmental issues have not in the past driven policy decisions because of a narrow military security focus. A previous Defence policy maker whilst drafting Defence 2000 stated that AOP was not a Defence policy issue. Defence policy makers focused instead on the realist military concept of conventional inter-State conflict. However, such a position neglects the importance to ADF structure and preparedness of military peacetime roles, and the constabulary and diplomatic tasks associated with them. Defence 2000 seems to under-emphasise the important domestic and peacetime activities Defence assets are actually involved in, such as the frequent constabulary tasks of the RAN.
Despite the policies not being linked, many believe that to achieve comprehensive security of Australia’s maritime responsibility the two policies should be linked. Firstly, linkage of AOP to Defence Policy would raise the profile of the Oceans Policy. Over the years, AOP has slipped under the radar, hence current Defence policy makers have limited knowledge of the AOP and so do not consider it while creating Defence policy. AOP is arguably a very valuable document for Australia’s maritime security and could be extremely influential if it were better and more widely understood and applied.
Another reason to link the policies is so a truly whole-of-government approach to oceans security management could be advanced. Many stakeholders are necessarily involved in the whole of government process, but linking Defence policy with AOP is an important step, as Defence is a key security provider. It was also suggested that it is Defence’s responsibility to appreciate and respond to the fact that AOP has added to the nature and extent of responsibilities that Defence can be expected to undertake routinely. Tonkin suggests that linkage between AOP and Defence policy could highlight the necessity for priority to be given to the force elements necessary for constabulary operations as part of the overall Defence Force preparedness.[49] Linkage at the policy level could thus bring Defence policy in line with the operational realities.
A third reason for linking the policies is to highlight the importance of the ocean environment to wider national security in the contemporary era. This paper has identified that the Government should embrace a more holistic approach to security than it currently takes, because contemporary security is more than just territorial military security. Rather, contemporary concepts of security include social, economic, environmental, political and military elements. It was expressed that Defence input into ocean surveillance and enforcement needs to be reviewed in light of recent developments in border protection issues and offshore protection. Such maritime security issues require increasing constabulary and peacetime operations in the domestic sphere. Whether civilian forces or the ADF take charge of this surveillance and enforcement role is a decision for the Australian Government.
To link Australia’s Oceans Policy and Australian Defence Force Policy, many actions are necessary. Steps have already been taken to link the two, including the appointment of the Director General Navy Strategic Planning and Futures (DGNSPF) as the Defence representative on OBOM and the Deputy Director Navy Environmental Policy (DDNEP) on NOAG. As a result, Defence may become more consultative with DEH, yet at the policy-making or cabinet decision level, there may still exist a gap between Defence and Environment that limits Defence’s ability to contribute fully to maritime constabulary tasks. Further steps could be taken to make the Defence policy-making process more internally consultative with the Defence personnel who benefit from a closer relationship with DEH.
Linkages between the Oceans and Defence policies would be a step towards heightened constabulary preparedness across the sector and already the new Armidale Patrol Boats will have heightened constabulary functionality. Other Defence initiatives, however, are not acquired for constabulary purposes. The Air Warfare Destroyer, Joint Strike Fighter and Abrams Tank acquisitions demonstrate how Defence policy makers continue to be focused on the conventional yet uncommon land warfare style of fighting, with an emphasis on expeditionary deployments overseas, rather than more common constabulary and diplomatic roles in Australian waters.[50]
Likewise, current AOP initiatives lack a coordinated link to Defence. The NOO is developing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) within Regional Marine Plans around Australia’s coastline. These areas could have serious ramifications for surveillance and enforcement bodies, primarily the ADF. If three new MPAs are created in each of the 11 Regional Marine Plans, as for the South Eastern Regional Marine Plan (SERMP), there would arguably be additional demand for patrolling in order to assure the security of the areas. Such additional responsibility may be beyond the current capabilities of the RAN and civilian patrolling agencies. It has been suggested that there is not enough recognition within either Defence or environmental bureaucracies of how important surveillance and enforcement will be, given the development of MPAs and national and state marine parks. Furthermore, the MPAs could potentially impact upon the crucial military training and exercise areas of the ADF. The policies need effective links to ensure coordinated and integrated planning within both departments.
Any suggestions for future linkages between the policies must be pragmatic, achievable and appealing to the Government of the day, as only they can pursue recommendations and change the status quo.
First and foremost, the Government should release a new Defence White Paper. Six years have passed since the last Defence White Paper and there have been significant changes in international security in that time. RAN Doctrine 2 2005 explains that military policy is by nature a dynamic construct and hence, as the nature of conflict changes, so policy must evolve to incorporate new technologies, operational experience, and new ideas about how warfare is to be conducted and military resources allocated and utilised.[51]
Likewise, a review of AOP should be conducted and released publicly, to reflect the changing maritime environment and changing security concerns and priorities which have arisen over the last eight years. An updated policy should assess achievements of the policy thus far, address the issues of maritime security and security providers, comment on developments in departmental structure and evaluate the MPAs and their influence on other ocean users.
A step towards linkage could come from not only the update but the enactment in legislation of AOP. AOP relies on the coordination of the many government departments responsible for existing legislation for the implementation of its goals.[52] Legislating AOP could not only streamline the many pieces of legislation, but give AOP more influence in Departmental decisions, especially within the security machinery of Government. The NOO has already gained influence in Cabinet by being absorbed into DEH. As an independent office, NOO lacked the vital backing of a government department to give power to its decisions.[53]
The problem remains, nonetheless, that at the policy-making level, linkage between DEH and Defence has not yet been fully embraced. The lack of inter-reference by either policy results in a discord between the expectations and operations of AOP and Defence in regard to oceans security.
Cooke doubts the ADF, with its current force structure, could fully provide the level of constabulary capability required under AOP without detracting from other key ADF functions.[54] It would seem that 14 Navy and eight Customs patrol boats cannot adequately patrol 16 million sq. km of ocean. Forbes seconds this doubt by stating that fully embracing AOP’s constabulary tasks would limit the RAN’s ability to carry out its core warfighting role.[55] Furthermore, Defence Update 2003 recognised that the ADF would increasingly operate in coalitions, and expeditionary operations far from Australia’s immediate neighbourhood, to combat rising global uncertainties, as evidenced by Afghanistan and Iraq.[56] In a time of war, Australian expeditionary contributions from Defence may remove vital platforms from Australia’s oceans and create gaps in maritime enforcement capabilities.
In such a case, perhaps it would be logical to create a specific force to conduct the maritime constabulary tasks. It has been suggested that a Coastguard could be created. An Australian Coastguard would coordinate maritime surveillance and enforcement operations and possess fully organic capabilities (aircraft and patrol vessels) for surveillance and enforcement operations, thus lessening reliance on Defence resources. A Coastguard, in most scenarios, would reduce the need for Navy Patrol Boats and also reduce the RAN’s necessity to perform the trinity of roles discussed earlier in this paper. However, naval stakeholders would argue that Australia cannot afford such a duplication of force, because it would marginalise Navy’s constabulary and diplomatic roles. The RAN sees its patrol boats as important platforms for training junior officers and providing valuable maritime knowledge and operational experience. The likelihood of a Coastguard under the current Government is very slim, yet an investigation into the benefits and drawbacks of a Coastguard should be conducted. In any case, an important task yet to be undertaken is an investigation into the scope of RAN involvement in constabulary duties over the next 20 years. Further research and analysis needs to be conducted to establish trends in maritime constabulary duties, and determine likely military involvement.
Perhaps linkage between the policies would be best achieved through the creation of a National Security Strategy (NSS) as suggested in the Joint Standing Committee report of 2004, Australia’s Maritime Strategy. An NSS demonstrates that national security is broader than just military security.[57] Such a strategy would facilitate linkage between the two areas of national security concerned in this report, military and environmental security. An NSS would be a guide to the Defence Forces regarding their role in an integrated national concept for promoting and achieving international prosperity, peace and security, while highlighting the strategic environmental issues belonging to DEH and all ocean users.
Australia relies upon the 16 million sq. km of ocean under its jurisdiction for valuable and necessary maritime resources. AOP, released in 1998, aims to protect the valuable maritime environment yet has lacked governmental power and recognition. The ADF, and especially the RAN, is called upon to be a maritime security provider, yet little recognition is given to this important role within Defence policy. In fact, Defence policy focuses on the unlikely threat of conventional warfare and invasion on Australian soil. Due to this narrow focus of security, Australia’s maritime resources and skills are perhaps not being appropriately directed for the maximum protection of Australia’s maritime environment.
Such a lack of appropriate direction leaves Australia vulnerable to threats such as maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and illegal immigration, among others. To combat these threats actions should be taken to further link AOP and Defence policy so that comprehensive maritime security is achieved. Linkage of the two policies would raise the profile of the AOP, advance a truly whole-of-government approach to oceans management and security, and highlight the importance of the ocean environment in the wider national security of the contemporary era. Steps have been taken to commence linkages between the two departments responsible for the policies, but at a policy-making or Cabinet level there still exists a discordance that limits Defence’s ability to contribute to maritime constabulary tasks.
The Government should give priority to the preparation and release of a new White Paper and also release a public update of the Oceans Policy. A step towards linkage could come from not only the update but the enactment in legislation of AOP, giving it more influence and power at a policy-making level. A Coastguard could be created to coordinate maritime surveillance and enforcement operations but would marginalise Navy’s constabulary and diplomatic roles, roles the RAN does not want to lose. Finally, a NSS would facilitate linkage between the two areas of national security concerned in this report, military and environmental security, by allowing a broad definition of security and bringing the interests of the policies closer together.
Argirides, ‘Which security issues pose the biggest threat to regional order and Why?’, Major Essay (ADFA), June 2003.
Argirides, A, ‘People Smuggling, Human Trafficking, Illegal Immigration, and Asylum Seekers: National and Global Considerations and Implications’, Major Essay for Global Security (ADFA), May 2005.
Argirides, A, ‘Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in South-East Asia,’ Tutorial paper for Transnational Crime (ADFA), May 2005.
Argirides, A, ‘Terrorism and Homeland Security’, internet message board posting no. 171 (ADFA), 26 July 2005.
Australian Customs Service, Annual Report 2003-04, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2004.
Australian Customs Service, Arming of Australian Customs Vessels Boosts Border Security, Media Release, 15 July 2005.
Australian Customs Service, Illegal Fishing Blitz Nets Major Haul, Media Release, 20 April 2005.
Australian Customs Service, Long-term Commitment to Southern Ocean Armed Patrols, Media Release, 10 May 2005.
Australian Fisheries Management Authority, ‘Monitoring and investigating reports of illegal fishing activity’, http://www.afma.gov.au/information/publications/fishery/fmp/ - content
Fisheries Management Papers, no. 2, March 1997.
Australian Marine Sciences Association, ‘Marine Taxonomy in the New Millennium’, Discussion Paper for the Oceans Policy Advisory Group, 2004.
Baird, R, ‘The Australian Maritime Identification System: Practical Policy or Political Puff?’, Australian National Internships Program Research Report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, May 2005.
Bateman, WS, ‘Oceans Management Policy – Catalyst for Cooperation?’ in WS Bateman & D Sherwood (eds), ‘Oceans Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension’, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy, no. 1, University of Wollongong, 1994.
Bateman, WS, ‘Australia’s Oceans Policy and the Maritime Community’, The Annual Boulton Lecture, Sydney, 30 September 1999.
Bateman, WS & Bergin, A, Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, April, 2005.
Bateman, WS & Bergin, A, ‘Law and Order at Sea in the South Pacific: the Contribution of the Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, in Ocean and Coastal Management, vol. 42, 1999.
Bateman, W & Grove, E, ‘Maritime Enforcement in the Southern Ocean: Some Operational and Policy Considerations’ in S Bateman, and DR Rothwell, (eds), Southern Ocean Fishing: Policy Challenges for Australia, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy, no. 7, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1998.
Bateman, WS & Sherwood, D (eds), Oceans Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy, no. 1, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1994.
Bergin, A, ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation’, Working Paper No. 23, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994.
Burmester, H, ‘Australia and a Stable Legal Maritime Regime’, in Bateman and Sherwood (eds), op. cit., 1994, pp. 55-66.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy, Canberra, 1998.
Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Canberra, 2000.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, Canberra, 2003.
Cooke, E, ‘Hill’s Medium Power Maritime Strategy and the Royal Australian Navy’s Enforcement Obligations Under Australia’s Oceans Policy’, in Wheate N (ed.), Peter Mitchell Essays 2004, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 17, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2005.
Crane, R, Rear Admiral, CSM, RAN, ‘The Maritime Identification System and additional measures to increase Australia’s offshore maritime security’, paper presented at the United Services Institute of the ACT, Inc., Canberra, May 2005.
Crickard, FW, ‘Oceans Policy and Maritime Strategy: The Canadian Experience’ in Bateman and Sherwood (eds), op. cit., 1994, pp. 5-18.
Department of Defence, Annual Report 2003-04, Canberra, 2004.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2003-04, Canberra, 2004.
Elliott, L, ‘The Sea in International Politics’ in Bateman and Sherwood (eds), op. cit., 1994, pp. 67-83.
Environment Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy: Oceans Facts and Figures, Background Paper 1, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997.
Flint, M, ‘Timor Sea Oil and Gas – Too valuable to ignore?’, in G Kerr (ed.), Australian Maritime Issues 2004, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 12, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2004.
Forbes, A, ‘Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia’s Exclusive Zone’, Working Paper No. 11, Sea Power Centre - Australia, April, 2002.
Hill, R., World First Plan to Safeguard our Oceans, Media Release, 23 December, 1998.
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Maritime Strategy, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, June 2004.
McCaffrie, J, ‘Potential Threats to Australian Maritime Security’, in S Bateman, & D Sherwood, (eds), op. cit., 1994, pp. 37-54.
McMillan, R, Captain RAN, ‘Maritime Security Issues – An Australian Perspective’, paper presented during the Philippine Navy Maritime Studies Period, Manila, August 2005.
Newton, G, ‘Australia’s Marine Environment and Marine Science – Snapshot 2004’, Paper presented during the Pacific 2004 International Marine Organisation Conference, Sydney, 3-5 February, 2004.
O’Connor, M, ‘Future Organisational Direction for Maritime Border Protection: The Case for an Australian Coastguard’, in M Tsamenyi, & C Rahman (eds), Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: the MV Tampa and Beyond, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy, no. 13, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2002, pp. 99-116.
Osinowo, AA, ‘The Impact of Changing International Ship and Port Facility Security Obligations on the Traditional Role of Naval Forces’, in N Wheate (ed.), op. cit., 2005.
Ritchie, C, Vice Admiral RAN, ‘Sailing into the future’, in G Kerr, (ed.), op. cit., 2004.
Roberts, G & McKinnon M, ‘Surge in Illegal Fishing Vessels’, The Australian, 6 September 2005.
Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 2000, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000.
Royal Australian Navy, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2 2005, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2005.
Ryan, P, ‘Heard and McDonald Islands and Illegal Fishing’, in B Snushall, & R Heath (eds), Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conflicts and Constabulary Responsibilities, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 11, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2003.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations 1990-2005, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2005.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘Australia’s Maritime Dependence’, Semaphore, Issue 8, September, 2003.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘The New Maritime Security Environment’, Semaphore, Issue 11, November, 2003.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘Considerations in Maritime Barrier Operations’, Semaphore, Issue 2, May, 2004.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘Naval Operations other than war 1901-2004’, Semaphore, Issue 6, July, 2004.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘The Roles and tasks of Maritime Forces’, Semaphore, Issue 13, November, 2004.
Sea Power Centre - Australia, ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project’, Semaphore, Issue 2, February, 2005.
Snushall, B, ‘The Enforcement Aspects of Australia’s Oceans Policy’, Working Paper No 14, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2003.
Strachan, J, Navy Futures Study No. 1: Regional Trends Analysis, Navy Strategy and Futures Directorate, Navy Headquarters, 2000.
Suresh, MD, ‘Impact of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code on the Traditional Role of Naval Forces’, in Wheate N (ed.), op. cit., 2005.
Till, G, Sea Power: A guide for the 21st Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004.
Toohey, P, ‘Pirates of the North Seas’, The Bulletin, 20 July 2005.
Tonkin, R, ‘Security Pressures and Preferred Options for Enhanced Offshore Maritime Security’, paper presented at the Safeguarding Australia 2005 conference at the National Convention Centre, Canberra, 12 July 2005.
Vince, J, ‘Australia’s Oceans Policy: Five Years of Integration Across Sectors and Jurisdictions?’, Maritime Studies, vol. 133, November/December, The Australian Centre for Maritime Studies, Canberra, 2003.
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb04.htm, Australia’s Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century, Research Brief no. 4, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2004-05 [accessed 8 August, 2005].
www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/docs/Strengthening_offshore.pdf, Strengthening Australia’s Offshore Maritime Security, February, 2005 [accessed 10 August, 2005].
http://www.defence.gov.au/globalops.cfm [accessed 10 August, 2005].
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10117,16279327-29277,00.html [accessed 17 August, 2005].
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd178.htm Maritime Transport Amendment Bill 2005, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2005 [accessed 22 August, 2005].
www.afma.gov.au/pubs/fmps/fmp2.php, Monitoring and investigating reports of illegal fishing activity, Fisheries Management Papers No. 2, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, March 1997 [accessed 30 August, 2005].
www.customs.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=4238, 4299, 4300, 4242, 5503, Australian Customs Service [accessed 20 September, 2005].
www.customs.gov.au, Enforcement Operations in the Southern Ocean, August 2005, and Heard Island and McDonald Island and Australia’s Patagonian Toothfish Fishery, August 2005 [accessed 20 September, 2005].
www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats, [accessed 25 September, 2005].
www.defence.gov.au/adc/hqadc_geddes2.htm#2004, Bateman, S, Does the RAN have the capacity and the capability to meet its enforcement role as outlined in Australia’s Oceans Policy?, Geddes Papers, 2004, pp. 53-63 [accessed 25 September, 2005].
www.appea.com.au/Publications/DidYouKnowJuly03.pdf, [accessed 27 September, 2005].
www.dfat.gov.au/facts/seafoodindustry.html, [accessed 29 September, 2005].
http://www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2005.html, Tackling illegal fishing with Indonesia, Australia leads cooperation to stamp out illegal toothfish trade [accessed 8 October, 2005].
[1] Caroline Morrison is a student of the University of Sydney completing a BA(Languages), majoring in Politics. This is an edited version of a larger research report she compiled for the Sea Power Centre – Australia while she was participating in the Australian National Internships Program in 2005.
[2] Dorothea Mackellar’s description in her 1908 poem My Country.
[3] www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/ [accessed on 25 September, 2005].
[4] Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 2000, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, p. 12.
[5] Royal Australian Navy, The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN Doctrine 2 2005, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2005, p. 180.
[6] WS Bateman, Australia’s Oceans Policy and the Maritime Community, The Annual Boulton Lecture, Sydney, 30 September 1999.
[7] Australia’s Oceans Policy, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
[8] The Departments of Environment and Heritage (DEH); Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA); Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS); Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF); Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); Education, Science and Technology (DEST); Defence (DOD) and the Antarctic Division of DEH all have separate and often conflicting maritime interests.
[9] Australia’s Oceans Policy, vol. 1, pp. 11-18.
[10] Australia shares a maritime border with seven States: Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Zealand, Norway and France, (Norway and France by virtue of the sub-Antarctic and tropical territories).
[11] E Cooke, ‘Hill’s Medium Power Maritime Strategy and the Royal Australian Navy’s Enforcement Obligations Under Australia’s Oceans Policy’, in N Wheate (ed.), Peter Mitchell Essays 2004, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 17, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra – forthcoming.
[12] R Tonkin, ‘Security pressures and preferred options for enhanced offshore maritime security’, paper presented at the Safeguarding Australia 2005 conference at the National Convention Centre, Canberra, 12 July 2005.
[13] The USS Cole was the target of a terrorist suicide attack in 2002 while refueling in Aden Harbour. 17 crew were killed and 39 injured in the attack. The French supertanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen in 2002 by a small, fast vessel packed with explosives, causing 90,000 barrels of oil to spill into the ocean. M Flint, ‘Timor Sea Oil and Gas – Too valuable to ignore?’, in G Kerr (ed.), Australian Maritime Issues 2004, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 12, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2004, p. 15.
[14] www.customs.gov.au, ‘Enforcement Operations in the Southern Ocean’, August, 2005 [accessed 20 September, 2005].
[15] Australian Customs Service, Arming of Australian Customs Vessels Boosts Border Security, Media Release, 15 July, 2005.
[16] P Toohey, ‘Pirates of the North Seas’, The Bulletin, 20 July 2005.
[17] G Roberts & M McKinnon, ‘Surge in Illegal Fishing Vessels’, The Australian, 6 September 2005.
[18] Australian Customs Service, Annual Report 2003-04, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2004, p. 65.
[19] The Viarsa I was a Uruguayan-flagged illegal fishing vessel sighted and pursued from the Heard and McDonald Islands area in the Southern Ocean. Customs, AFMA and the RAN gave chase for 21 days before finally being able to board and escort the vessel to Fremantle for prosecution. Australian Customs Service, op. cit., p. 11.
[20] Australian Customs Service, op. cit., p. 63.
[21] Royal Australian Navy, 2005, op. cit., p. 191.
[22] R Baird, ‘The Australian Maritime Identification System: Practical Policy or Political Puff?’, Australian National Internships Program Research Report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2005, unpublished, p. 34.
[23] Baird, op. cit., p. 35.
[24] www.defence.gov.au/globalops.cfm, [accessed 10 August, 2005].
[25] A Argirides, ‘People Smuggling, Human Trafficking, Illegal Immigration, and Asylum Seekers: National and Global Considerations and Implications’, Major Essay for Global Security (ADFA), May 2005, unpublished.
[26] Australian Customs Service, Illegal fishing blitz nets major haul, Media Release, 20 April 2005.
[27] DA is the capability to defend Australian territory from any credible attack, without relying on combat forces of other countries. Minister of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Canberra, 2000, p. 46.
[28] CSIN is defence forces able to make a major contribution to the security of our immediate neighbourhood, UN-sanctioned international operations, regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. ibid., p. 48.
[29] SWI is the ability to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood where our interests are engaged. ibid., p. 51.
[30] PNT is the support of wider national interests and wider community needs. ibid., p. 52.
[31] Acquisitions include platforms (vehicles, aircraft, ships, submarines), armaments and technology.
[32] www.defence.gov.au/adc/hqadc_geddes2.htm#2004, S Bateman, ‘Does the RAN have the capacity and the capability to meet its enforcement role as outlined in Australia’s Oceans Policy?’, Geddes Papers, 2004, p. 56.
[33] A Forbes, Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia’s Exclusive Zone, Working Paper No. 11, Sea Power Centre - Australia, April 2002, p. 4.
[34] Sea Denial is the condition that exists when one’s adversary is denied the ability to use a maritime area for their own purposes for a period of time, without being able to exercise sea control oneself. Royal Australian Navy, op. cit., 2005, p. 252.
[35] Sea Control is the condition that exists when one has the freedom of action to use a maritime area for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, deny its use to an adversary, loc. cit.
[36] Maritime Power Projection is the ability to project, sustain and apply effective military force from the sea in order to influence events on the land, ibid., p. 246.
[37] Forbes, op. cit., p. 37.
[38] Royal Australian Navy, op. cit., 2005, p. 136.
[39] Royal Australian Navy, op. cit., 2005, p. 133.
[40] R McMillan, Captain RAN, ‘Maritime Security Issues - An Australian Perspective’, paper presented during the Philippine Navy Maritime Studies Period, Manila, August 2005.
[41] B Snushall, ‘The Enforcement Aspects of Australia’s Oceans Policy’, Working Paper no. 14, Sea Power Centre - Australia, 2003, p. v.
[42] ibid.
[43] www.defence.gov.au/adc/hqadc_geddes2.htm#2004, pp. 53-63.
[44] Some key legislation includes: Customs Act 1901; Quarantine Act 1908; Migration Act 1958; Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967; Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) 1981; Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989; Fisheries Management Act 1991; Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; Border Protection Amendment Act 1999; Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement powers) Act 2001; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980; LOSC 1982 Agreement for Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region 1986 and Protocol; Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific and Protocols.
[45] Forbes, op. cit., p. 22.
[46] P Toohey, ‘Pirates of the North Seas’, The Bulletin, 20 July 2005.
[47] WS Bateman & E Grove, ‘Maritime Enforcement in the Southern Ocean: Some Operational and Policy Considerations’, in S Bateman & DR Rothwell (eds), Southern Ocean Fishing: Policy Challenges for Australia, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy, no. 7, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1998, p. 121.
[48] Private interview, Canberra, September 2005.
[49] R Tonkin, op. cit.
[50] C Ritchie, Vice Admiral, RAN, ‘Sailing into the future’, in G Kerr (ed.), Australian Maritime Issues 2004, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 12, Sea Power Centre - Australia, Canberra, 2004, p. 41.
[51] Royal Australian Navy, op. cit., 2005, p. 203.
[52] See fn. 43 above.
[53] Interview with Ms Bernadette O’Neil, Director, Marine Policy Coordination, Marine Division, Department of Environment and Heritage, 13 October 2005.
[54] Cooke, op. cit.
[55] Forbes, op. cit., p. 66.
[56] McMillan, op. cit.
[57] Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Maritime Strategy, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, June 2004, pp. 26-32.
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2005/28.html